The Syrian Mosaic--Under Siege During Ramadan

(It is with a heavy heart that I write here about the horrific recent events in Syria, intending in this installment to put the Ramadan offensive into a broader perspective. The threat of of sectarian conflict, amid an escalating crackdown, is real enough, as is the possibility of civil war. These are indeed trying times for those who espouse non-violent tactics as a means of bringing about political change. The next post in this series will focus on the diversity of Islam in Syria.)

　

INTRODUCTION

"In Damascus, people of different religions have always known how to live together. From an early age we learn to distinguish our religions and ourselves, but not to hate other religions. We respect each other’s right to live together, and to share land, air and food. In this respect, Syria presents a model for the west on dealing with minorities." 

Sheikh Muhammad Al Yaqoubi (1A)

　

"The advantage of having these demonstrations is that we are creating a Syrian identity."

25-year-old Damascus activist/protester (1B)

 "A sectarian civil war on the Iraqi or Lebanese model is every Syrian’s nightmare. There must surely be another way out of the crisis."

Patrick Seale (1C)

A common view of Syria’s version of the Arab Spring is that it is unfolding amid fears that "Assad’s fall could bring a sectarian bloodbath" (3). These fears are not unfounded–but they are often exaggerated. Syrians are well aware of the sectarian violence that has plagued neighboring Lebanon and Iraq. Yet, any critical analysis needs to examine exactly how this bloodbath "boogeyman" has served the interests of President Bashar al-Assad–not only since mid-March, when the current uprising began in the town of Daraa–but for all the years of his presidency (since he succeeded his father President Hafez al-Assad in 2000).

For many years, with considerable skill, President Assad promoted the idea that he was first and foremost the defender of a tolerant social order–and it is true that many minorities in Syria have felt protected–at least in certain respects–by his policies. Moreover, he did reach out to moderate Sunni Muslims, as well as to Christians and Druze. But the favoritism shown towards his own Alawite community was resented–especially by less fortunate members of other communities and by those opposed to the Baath Party (in general) and to the Assads (in particular). Thus, when Syria’s pro-reform and pro-democracy protesters began to call upon President Assad to step down, those who had benefitted from his regime felt that their interests, and even their lives, were at risk (3).

Finding himself under pressure from protesters in nearly every corner of the country, Assad reiterated that only he could preserve Syria from an era of post-Assad sectarianism and intolerance (should his regime collapse). For the regime this notion has been an effective tool, shoring up its support among people who wanted desperately to believe Assad’s oft-repeated promises of reform. This message was aimed at members of religious and ethnic minorities–but resonated widely with the middle class professionals and the business elite, even those who were Sunni Muslims (4). Moreover, in the international arena it was also widely accepted that a post-Assad Syria would be a chaotic Syria, that could destabilize the entire region. This helps to explain the lagging response of the United States--as well as Israel’s unenthusiastic stance towards the possibility of regime change in Syria (5).

The Syrian uprising is now in its fifth month. Given Syria’s complicated religious and ethnic mosaic, news analysts have kept repeating, for all these weeks, that most of the protesters out on the streets are Sunni Muslims. Should this surprise us? Since the 1960s many Sunnis have denounced the Baath Party for its secularism. In the mid-1970s conservative Sunnis mounted a vocal and active opposition to the policies of President Hafez Assad, who then suppressed this movement with great force. This led to the Hama massacre in 1982 (when 10,000 or more were killed in the crackdown) (6).

By early July Anthony Shadid was reporting that "Hama has begun to emerge as a symbol of the uprising’s success" (7). And on every Friday in July there were large protests in Hama. It is these protests in Hama and in other cities and towns (Homs, Daraa, Jisr al-Shghour) that are well-known strongholds of Sunni conservatism that have given the Syrian uprising an Islamic (but not necessarily Islamist) dimension. When President Assad pointed to Islamists, Salafists, and their foreign backers as the instigators of the protest movement, he reinforced this view. That Islamists have consistently opposed the regimes of both Hafez and Bashar Assad is beyond dispute–and the animosity is deeply rooted–since the most conservative Sunnis still exclude the Alawi from the broader community of Muslims (8). Since the Assads and the regime’s inner circle are nearly all Alawites, it has been very easy for pundits to slip into a Sunni versus Alawite narrative when trying to explain the Syrian revolt.

Nevertheless, two demographic facts belie any characterization of the uprising as essentially Islamic (at the same time that they undermine the Sunni versus Alawite storyline). First, since Sunni Muslims dominate the country demographically, any political movement/ uprising/ revolution that managed to gain widespread popular support would have mostly Sunni feet on the ground. Therefore, it is necessary to look much more closely at what is motivating those who are calling for regime change. Secondly, the organizers of demonstrations have been mostly young people so there is a strong generational component to their activism (9). These young activists are surely, to some degree, out-of-sync with older political dissidents (who are often living abroad), but their political grievances are genuine: they are simply fed-up with an authoritarian regime–with its proclivity to arrest and torture people. They are savvy users of social media–as shown by how skillfully they have evaded the government’s news blackouts. Though they speak of democracy, it is true that their understanding of what democracy entails is incomplete. Yet, they are not unaware of Turkey’s democratic example. Of course, none of this is sufficient to remove the danger of sectarianism from any analysis. It is part of the Syrian reality–as recent sectarian incidents in Homs seem to suggest (10).

The Ramadan Offensive

In my previous post (July 28) I imagined Syria at a fork in the road, with its people facing the Lion of the Assad regime and the Alligator of civil war. Events since then have propelled the process forward in ways that are horrifying, so horrifying that the UN Security Council (after dallying for months) finally issued a statement condemning the violence in Syria (11).

Meanwhile the European Union and the US have imposed stricter economic and travel sanctions and the US is planning to take additional steps. U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford, who was in Washington this week, is urging the Obama administration to start thinking about how the US should respond when the Assad regime is toppled. At this point it is unclear what will happen next, but the Ramadan offensive is certainly changing the trajectory, perhaps towards more violence. Few believe that Assad will follow through with his reform agenda–that now includes multiparty elections, to be held before the end of 2011–when he has just arrested Walid al-Bunni, a venerable political dissident, and his sons–and while he is engaged in the most horrific crackdown yet, one that has now lasted more than a week. (12)

President Assad’s decision to launch a major offensive on July 31st –on the eve of Ramadan–shows how determined he is to suppress the uprising, regardless of the cost. Assad and his inner circle, fearful that the situation would get totally out of hand during Ramadan, ordered attacks by security forces on several several "hotspots" across Syria: Hama and Homs in center of the country, Deir al-Zour and Abu Kamal in the east, Daraa in the south, and Idleb in the northwest. On August 2 (Tuesday), in addition to a rising toll of dead and injured, hundreds of suspected organizers were arrested in the Damascus suburbs and in Zabadani (near the Lebanon border). By August 3rd, despite barricades hastily erected to keep them out, troops and tanks had penetrated the center of Hama, where they occupied Aasi Square. In addition to the 100 or so tanks in Hama, it was reported that about 200 tanks had surrounded the city of Deir al-Zour, where the shelling had begun on July 30th. Most of Syria’s oil fields are in the governorate of Deir al-Zour, which is also the home of many Sunni Muslim Bedouin with ties to their counterparts across the border in Iraq. Also of strategic importance in the east is the town of Abu Kamal, under attack since July 29thwhen security forces cut off its water, electricity, and communications. This eastern region Sunnis with close ties to fellow Sunnis in Iraq. Homs is strategically important too for its oil refinery and pipeline (bombed on July 29th). (13)

Assad’s priority, however, is putting down the revolt in Hama, with whatever brutality is necessary. The very large protest rally there on Friday (July 29th), followed by noisy gathering on Saturday night, provoked Assad but did not precipitate the assault on Sunday (July 31st)–which the regime might have been planning throughout July. The assault, from four directions-- with tanks shelling, machine guns rat-tatting, and snipers firing from roof tops--would last more than a week. By On Wednesday (August 3rd) the city’s water and electricity supplies have been cut and food and medicine were running short. Mostly unarmed civilians put up barricades and tried to keep the tanks from occupying the center of the city but eventually gave way.  The tanks now have occupied Aasi Square and other key areas. (14).

On August 5th (last Friday) people across Syria voiced their solidarity with the besieged residents of Hama in protests tagged as "The Day of God With Us." In and around Damascus there many more than the usual number of protests, with crowds marching to chants of "Leave, Bashar" and "Hama, we are with you until death." No doubt more intense demonstrations, nearly every evening and spreading into the center of Damascus and those breaking out in Aleppo (hitherto mostly quiescent, due in part to its moderate Muslim and Christian merchant class–and to its Sufi heritage) is causing great anxiety in Assad’s inner circle. There were also large protests in Homs, Daraa, Qamishli in the north (a Kurdish area). It has been reported that In Homs security forces fired into a mosque and in Damascus they surrounded one. The defiance was remarkable in tank-surrounded Deir al-Zour, which is now feeling the brunt of Assad's wrath. (15)

The Ramadan offensive is unrelentless. During all of last week the violence kept escalating and the death toll mounting (though without reporters on the ground there is much uncertainty about the intensity of the shooting and shelling). On July 31st the death toll was already more than 100 (including 76 in Hama), by Tuesday (August 2) it had risen to at least 125, and by Friday (August 5) it may have been as high as 250 in Hama alone. These numbers must be added to counts reported previously (July 28th) of more than 1600 protesters and civilians killed, nearly 3000 people unaccounted for (i.e. disappeared), 26,000 arrested (often beaten and tortured), including some 12, 600 still in detention. It is also thought that more than 500 members of the security forces have also died in the violence. (16) On Sunday (August 7) more than 50 and perhaps as many as 70 people were killed in by the security forces. The death toll was highest in Deir al-Zour (reported as 42), indicating that the offensive is shift eastward. (16)

Despite the ferocity of the crackdown protests and resistance have continue in Hama, Homs, and other cities.  It is as if the Syrian security forces are playing a game of "whack-a-mole" and perhaps they will becomes overstretched or exhausted before the protesters give up.  Let's hope the government collapses before a emerges on the eastern front, where Deir al-Zour is now under heavy attack. (17)

The symbolism of the assault on Hama is inescapable. Assad can’t escape from the consequences of what he is doing there (at least not in the court of world opinion). This week Ban Ki-Moon rebuked Assad for having "lost all sense of humanity" and even Russian President Dimitry Medvedev issued a stern warning–while the Turks are becoming more and more disgusted (18). Though the Arab response has been muted, on Saturday the Gulf Cooperation Council called for an immediate end the bloodshed. If Hama epitomizes the conflict between the regime and conservative Sunni Muslims (as I think it does), what can he gain by sending tanks that are "blasting at the minarets of mosques." How can the launching of a religious satellite station begin to compensate for the deaths of so many unarmed (or very lightly armed, with a stick) civilians–who are mostly Muslims–or the seizure of mosques so that they can be used as barracks? (19) This only brings the sectarian feelings, especially anti-Alawite resentment, from the background to the foreground. It reminds both Syrians and foreign observers that Assad’s most reliable units of the security forces are dominated by Alawite loyalists.

For Muslims Ramadan is a time for prayer and spiritual reflection, for compassion and forgiveness. It is a time for reconciliation, not retribution and ruthlessness. Families, neighbors, and friends gather to break the fast together. People open their hearts and their pocketbooks, sharing what they have so that others may enjoy the bounty of Ramadan night-time feasting. (The obligation to give alms to the poor is one of the Five Pillars of Islam). That President Assad has launched a Ramadan offensive is highly offensive--not only to Muslims but to many other people of faith and good-will throughout the world.

The timing of this offensive is sure to anger Muslims across the board. If Sunni Muslims begin to perceive these assaults as the full force of an Alawite regime attacking centers of "true" Islam, this would surely increase the potential for sectarian strife. Another sobering possibility is that people will take up arms to defend themselves (especially in areas along the Iraq border, where access to firearms is less of a problem) (20).

At this fork in the road–at what may be a turning point–at what may be a tipping point for those who have withheld their support for the protesters but are now appalled by recent events–we may ask: Will the tide turn? Will those who have been neutral or passive cast their lot in with the protesters? Will Sunnis and others in the military defect? Will the business elite respond if economic begin to bite harder? If Assad becomes weaker, will political loyalties shift? How might the composition of the crowds out on the streets change?

Like other commentators, I’ve been curious about the extent of participation by members of minority groups (those who are not Muslim, not Sunni Muslim, not Arab). Who’s protesting? Who’s chanting, "Come on Bashar, just leave"? (21). Who’s still backing Assad and where do these die-hard supporters fit into the Syrian mosaic? Who’s willing to give him another chance? Who really believes that he will eventually permit a multi-party elections?

Answering these questions is difficult. As the Ramadan offensive continues, protesters and the Local Coordinating Committees are making extraordinary efforts just to inform the rest of the world about what people are facing out on the streets (tanks, artillery, snipers, lack of medical supplies). The biggest impediment for those based outside the country, who would like to know more about the participation (or not) of minorities is the absence of foreign journalists–since the government has had a policy of keeping them out. Thus the contributions of a few, often anonymous, reporters or stringers on the ground is extremely valuable (22). Additional information is funneled via out to dissidents and human rights activists, whose reporting may be somewhat selective (or their sources unverifiable). Although most Christians are holding back and some are ardent supports of President Assad, Syrian opposition leaders in their talks with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have assured her that the ranks of pro-democracy activists inside Syria do include Christians. In online media there are references, here and there, to Christians, Druze, and Kurdish protesters. It is also being reported that some Christians, Alawites, and a few Sunni businessmen are starting to ease away from their relationships with the Assads (Bashar, his brother Maher and their extended family of cousins and in-laws). (23)
(I will integrate whatever information I have gather into my future posts in this series, where appropriate.)

One of the great pitfalls of trying to understand what’s happening in Syria is the habit (especially in the West) of framing events in terms of two-sided, overly simplistic scenarios: i) Muslim vs. "the Rest"; ii) Sunnis vs. Alawites; iii) Sunnis vs. the Assads. A closer examination of Syria’s mosaic, including the diversity of its Islamic traditions, undermines these scenarios, even as each contains a measure of truth.  That is coming in "Syria's Ancient and Modern Mosaic (Part II)."

ACTIVITIES

EXPLORE the Reuters "interactive" map and timeline to get a sense of how the Syrian uprising has developed--and sometimes stalled--over time. Good preparation for a current events discussion when school starts in the fall.

VIEW: Select footage to show in class to give students a sense of the scale of the demonstrations, their peaceful nature, and the brutality of the crackdown. Find clips on the CNN, Al Jazeera English , BBC News sites–in addition to those feature in The Lede (check previous posts on Syria for links to older material).

LISTEN: Deborah Amos is providing concise, interesting and accessible coverage on NPR [National Public Radio]. Select a recent item or a set (to provide more background) for a listening session in a social studies, history, or journalism class. (Some are listed in RESOURCES but search NPR for "syria deborah amos" for more items.)

READ/DISCUSS: To introduce the topic of the Syrian uprising and put it into a broader perspective assign Nour Ali’s article, This is a good place to start because it gives a very clear explanation of why what happened in Hama in 1982 resonates so deeply today (for both the people of Hama and the Assad regime).

• What do Syrians think of when they hear "Hama 1982"?
• What actions by the Muslim Brotherhood provoked the 1982 attack on Hama?
• Is this an example of a disproportionate response? Students should back up what their answer with details about the indiscriminate loss of life, the destruction (leveling) of large swathes of the city. Encourage them to use additional RESOURCES on Hama will help them answer this question.
• Why did people call this conflict the "war of the pyjamas"?
• How have people’s memories of 1982 "fueled" the current uprising, especially in Hama?
• Note how Mohamed's experience in 1982 connects with what he’s doing today. (The relevant parts could be extracted for a reading comprehension exercise, with this in mind, if you are unable to assign the entire article.)
• For "why Hama" Larbi Sadiki’s article also offers insight–that includes a discussion of the larger societal-political picture when he goes on to blame "four layers of power for what happened in Hama."

INVESTIGATE: Using Nour Ali’s article ("Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad") as a starting point. ASK: What clues do you find here about Hama’s ancient and pre-modern history? Then send them to the web to learn more. A Google search of "hama waterwheels syria" turns up the videos listed in RESOURCES and plenty of other good info. WORLD HISTORY: These wheels are an important component of the "Muslim Agricultural Revolution" so this provides an excellent past/present tie-in. When so much in Hama was destroyed, even mosques, the survival of the wheels sends a message about their great cultural significance.

MATH CLASS: Show the short video "Waterwheels of Hama" (just part of it would suffice). The largest wheels are 20 meters in diameter. ASK students to convert this to feet. Then ask them to compute (using either meters or feet) the circumference of a wheel of this size and the area of the space enclosed. NEXT, to connect the results of these calculations with the immense size the wheels, show "Salto de cabeza desde las norias de Hama" and pause when the clip shows the man walking at the top the wheel (unpause to show him jumping off). There’s plenty of info on the web to grab for an entire math lesson (e.g. using statistics about how much water a wheel can lift per hour or minute).

SPANISH CLASS ("Bell Ringer" activity): Show (or project/pause) the clip "Salto de cabeza desde las norias de Hama" and ask students to TRANSLATE the caption which appears below the video (distribute a paper copy or put it on white/black board).

• Caption text: "Escena captada en Hamma, Siria, donde los chavales se tiraban al río con apenas profundidad desde sus famosoas Norias de agua.
• Explain the historical link between Syria and Spain (the Umayyad dynasty).

READ/DISCUSS/DEBATE: Assign Patrick Seale’s short article, "Way Out of the Syrian Crisis" and ask students to make a bullet list of problems facing Syria OTHER than sectarian or ethnic divisions. Then DISCUSS whether or not dialogue is a realistic solution to Syria’s national crisis. This will help to put the Syrian mosaic into a much broader perspective. This discussion could be a starting point for further research, followed by an in-class DEBATE on how Syrians might reform or restructure their political institutions.

READ/DISCUSS/DEBATE: As an alternative to the Seale article, assign Hugo Dixon’s "Can Non-Violent Struggle Bring Down Syria’s Assad?" Focus the discussion on the efficacy (or not) of non-violent tactics.

• An excellent article to use when studying Gandhi’s efforts in India or the Civil Rights movement in the US (or other cases that are part of your curriculum).

HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY CLASS: If your world history, European history, or intellectual class includes the political theory of Hobbes, assign Larbi Sadiki, "In Syria, the Government Is the Real Rebel," to illustrate a contemporary, events-oriented engagement with those ideas. It is also a good item for POV analysis.

ANALYSIS: Speaking of POV, several op-ed contributions on the Asharq Alawsat provide excellent pieces for analysis. See especially those by Tariq Alhomayed. This news source has a very definite take on events in the Arab world, with a critical edge. Since the positions taken are clearly stated and strongly expressed, you can use items from this site to help students who find the concept of POV difficult.

GENERAL RESOURCES

"Recent Developments in Syria." Map and timeline [March 6 to August 3]. Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/interactive/idUSTRE77424P20110805?view=small&type=worldNews

• Excellent: map shows locations of all major protests. Drag bar to go back to March 6 (check especially what was happening on the Fridays).

"Syria: Governorates."   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Syria-blank-governorates.png

• A governorate is a province. A handy map to consult when the names of provinces appear in news articles. Some province names are also names of cities, for example, Deir al-Zour.
  

Syria Comment: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog

• Blog of Joshua Landis, a Syrian expert (married to a Syrian Alawite woman), who is frequently quoted in the media.
• Great resource–since there are now 83 posts tagged "Syria Revolution 2011" (plus earlier posts for background). Posts are compendiums of Landis’s opinions (with links to news items), commentary on others’ opinions (with links, often excerpts or translations), and guest or re-published posts.

Asharq Al-Awsat: Arabic International Daily–English Edition. http://www.asharq-e.com/default.asp

• See esp. opinion by editor-in-chief Tariq Alhomayed (a young but very experience journalist), who doesn’t pull any punches in his critiques of the Arab world’s responses to events in Syria. In addition to a BA in Media studies from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Alhomayed has worked towards a Master’s degree from George Washington University (Washington D.C) but is now based in London.

Historical Background


Heck, "Religion and the Authoritarian State: The Case of Syria" (2005): http://www.ou.edu/mideast/Additional%20pages%20-%20non-catagory/Heck_Religion.and.the.Authoritarian.State.pdf

• Scholarly article with much important background info (college students could profit from reading part/all of it).
• Browse links on the Syrian Studies Association web site for more high-quality material: http://www.ou.edu/ssa/links.htm
  

Fisk, Robert. "Ghosts from the Past: Syria’s 30 Years of Fear." Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies (June 24, 2010): http://www.dchrs.org/english/news.php?id=98&idC=3

Lund, Aron. "The Ghosts of Hama: The Bitter Legacy of Syria’s Failed 1979-1982 Revolution." URL: http://old.silc.se/files/pdf/The%20Ghosts%20of%20Hama%20by%20Aron%20Lund.pdf

Ali, Nour. "Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad." The Guardian (August 1, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/01/hama-syrian-city-defy-assad

• Nour Ali is the pseudonym of a Damascus-based, very knowledgeable journalist.

VIDEO: "Waterwheels of Hama." 01:43 mins. YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1meWUfXZP7o

VIDEO: "Salto de cabeza desde las norias de Hama." 0:33. YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rhpwRlYEtc&NR=1


Discussion and Commentary  

(I decided to list these chronologically as opinions shift as events unfold, circumstances change.)

Seale, Patrick. "Way Out of the Syrian Crisis." Gulf News (July 22, 2011): http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/way-out-of-the-syrian-crisis-1.841275

• See also Joshua Landis commentary (http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=11084)

Kodmani, Bassma. "To Topple Assad, It Takes a Minority." New York Times (July 31, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/opinion/to-topple-assad-it-takes-a-minority.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=bassma%20kodmani&st=cse

Sadiki, Larbi. "In Syria, the Government Is the Real Rebel." Al Jazeera English (July 31, 2011): http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/2011731113293285318.html

• Insight from Middle East expert, a lecturer at University of Exeter, UK
  

Dixon, Hugo. "Can Non-Violent Struggle Bring Down Syria’s Assad?" Breakingviews: Reuters (August 1, 2011): http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/2011/08/01/can-non-violent-struggle-bring-down-syrias-assad/

Hounshell, Blake and Josh Rogan. "The Last Stand of Bashar al-Assad?" The Cable : Foreign Policy (August 1, 2011): http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/01/the_last_stand_of_bashar_al_assad

Alhomayed, Tariq. "Syria: Closing Mosques and Launching Satellite Television Channels." Asharq Alawsat (August 2, 2011); http://www.asharq-e.com/print.asp?artid=id26110
Maclean, William. "Analysis: Syria Army Keeps Cohesion but Risks Overstretch." Reuters (August 2, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/02/us-syria-army-idUSTRE7713FK20110802

King, John. Interview with Susan Rice. "U.N. Ambassador Rice on the Violence in Syria." Real Clear Politics (August 4, 2011): http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/08/04/in_ambassador_rice_on_the_violence_in-syria_110842.html

Slim, Randa. "Where’s Syria’s Business Community." Foreign Policy (August 5, 2011): http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/05/wheres_syrias_business_community

Alhomayed, Tariq. "Is Walid Muallem Joking?" Asharq Alawsat (August 7, 2011): http://www.asharq-e.com/print.asp?artid=id26167

• Good piece for POV analysis, an Arab’s POV that considers the official Arab response to events in Syria–with a focus on Arabs as Arabs rather than as Muslims (though Islamic values of justice and respect for civilians is where he’s coming from–as shown in other essays). Note references to Iran and arms shipments from Tehran (reported elsewhere on this site).
  

RESOURCES: BREAKING NEWS

Mackey, Robert and Elizabeth Harris. "Video Shows Large Protest in Hama, Syrian City at Heart of Previous Uprising." The Lede: New York Times (July 1, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/video-shows-syrian-protesters-in-hama/

Shadid, Anthony. "Syrian President Fires Governor in Charge of a Restive City." New York Times (July 2, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/world/middleeast/03syria.html?scp=18&sq=shadid+hama&st=nyt

Amos, Deborah. "Protesters Gather in Hama." NPR (July 8, 2011): http://www.npr.org/2011/07/08/137709656/protesters-gather-in-hama-syria

Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. "Tanks Shell East Syrian City, 5 Killed." Reuters (July 31, 2011): http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/30/uk-syria-idUKTRE76S3YW20110730

Amos, Deborah. "Syrian Government Escalates Crackdown Ahead of Ramadan." NPR (July 31, 2011): http://www.npr.org/2011/07/31/138875992/syrian-government-escalates-crackdown-ahead-of-ramadan

"Scores Dead’ as Syrian Tanks Storm Hama City." Al Jazeera English (July 31, 2011): http://englishaljazeera.net/english/middleeast/2011/07/201173143432348733.html

Bilefsky, Dan. "Video from Deadly Raids in Syria." The Lede: New York Times (July 31, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/video-from-deadly-raids-in-syria/

Borzou Dargahi and Alexandra Sandels, "Syrian Forces Attack 4 Opposition Strongholds," Los Angeles Times (July 31, 2011): http://latimes.com/news/nationworld/la-fgw-syria-hama-20110801,0,7890854.story

Hammond, Andrew. "Arabs Angry Over Syria Crackdown but Governments Silent." Reuters (August 1, 2011): http://af.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFL6E7J11PT20110801

Amos, Deborah. "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death." NPR (August 2, 2011): http://www.npr.org/2011/08/02/138834930/syrian-opposition-echoes-cry-for-liberty-or-death

Ali, Nour and Ian Black. "Syrian Death Toll Rises in Crackdown." The Guardian (August 2, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/02/syria-deaths-protests-crackdown

"Al-Assad’s Reign Is Over," Asharq Alawsat (August 3, 2011): http://www.asharq-e.com/print.asp?artid=id26117.

Syria Unrest: Tanks ‘Advance’ on Beseiged City of Hama." BBC News (August 3, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14385981?print=true

Bakri, Nada and Rick Gladstone. "Casting Aside World Criticism, Syria Invades Town [online headline]." New York Times (August 3, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/world/middleeast/04syria.html?scp=1&sq=nada%20bakri%20rick%20gladstone%20syria&st=cse

Derhally, Massoud and Flavia Krause-Jackson. "Syrian Forces Shell Hama as UN Struggles for Agreement on Condeming Assad." Bloomberg (August 3, 2011): http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-03/syria-violence-escalates-as-un-struggles-for-agreement-on-condemning-assad.html

Goodman, David. "Video from Syria Shows Tanks in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (August 3, 2011):
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/video-from-syria-shows-tanks-in-hama/?scp=7&sq=syria&st=cse

Worsnip, Patrick. "U.N. Council Statement Condemns Use of Force." Reuters (August 3, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/04/us-syria-un-idUSTRE7724EB20110804.

Sly, Liz. "Syrian Troops, Tanks Push into Hama." Washington Post (August 3, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-troops-tanks-push-into-hama/2011/08/03/gIQAoZpsrI_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads

Bakri, Nada and Anthony Shadid. "Broadcasting Hama Ruins, Syria Says It Has Ended Revolt." New York Times (August 5, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/world/middleeast/06syria.html?scp=8&sq=syria&st=cse

Sly, Liz. "Syrian Forces Press Onslaught in Hama." Washington Post (August 4, 2011):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-forces-press-onslaught-in-hama/2011/08/04/gIQAy2QwuI_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads

Karouny, Mariam. "Syria’s Tribal Eastern Region Braces for Army Assault." Reuters (August 5, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/05/us-syria-east-idUSTRE77440720110805

VIDEO: "News Wrap: Syrian Regime Proclaims Victory in Hama Crackdown." PBS Newshour (August 5, 2011): http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec11/othernews_08-05.html

• Short video clips, but significant content on intensifying protests in Damascus (transcript available).

Knickeyer, Ellen. "Defiant Syrians Hold Huge Protests." Los Angeles Times (August 6, 2011): http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-syria-protests-20110806,0,2255646.story

"Syria Vows ‘Free Elections’ as Pressure Grows," Gulf News (August 6, 2011): http://gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/syria-vows-free-elections-as-pressure-grows-1.848183

"Syrian Troops Kill at Least 52 People." Gulf News (August 7): http://gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/syrian-troops-kill-at-least-52-people-1.848557

Shadid, Anthony. "Syrian Military Pressure Mounts on Another City." New York Times (August 7, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/world/middleeast/08syria.html?scp=2&sq=syria&st=cse

 NOTES    (For full citations see RESOURCES sections.)

1) A: Quoted in Simon Burns, "A Spiritual Experience: Sufi Dhikr at Muhieddine Mosque." Forward Magazine (February 13, 2011):
http://www.forwardsyria.com/story/407/A%20spiritual%20experience:%20Sufi%20dhikr%20at%20Muhieddine%20Mosque. Al Yacoubi is a prominent Syrian Islamic scholar, well-traveled, with many followers. He now lives in Damascus but in the 1990s he was the Mufti of Sweden. B: Quoted by Deborah Amos in "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death," NPR (August 2, 2011); in mid-March this fellow left grad school in Beirut to join the protest movement in Damascus. C: From "Way Out of the Syrian Crisis," Gulf News (July 22, 2011).

2) For example: David Ignatius, "Tom Donilon’s Arab Spring Challenge." Washington Post (April 26, 2011):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/tom-donilons-arab-spring-challenge/2011/04/26/AFWVE2sE_story.html; Liz Sly, "‘Doomsday Scenario’ if Syria Fails," Washington Post (May 1/2, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/unrest-in-syria-threatens-regional-stability/2011/05/01/AF3OQtUF_story.html; Mariam Karouny, "Analysis: Civil War Fears Grow in Syria," Reuters (June 10, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE7592T320110610

3) For an overview of the mosaic see my earlier post, "Syria’s Ancient and Modern Mosaic (Part I). The Alawites, about 10-12% of the population, are an offshoot of Shia Islam but historically resided outside the mainstream due to peculiar beliefs that suggest syncretism with other religious traditions (including Christianity); for a brief discussion see Christopherm Howse, "Secretive Sect of the Rulers of Syria," The Telegraph (August 5, 2011): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8684113/Secretive-sect-of-the-rulers-of-Syria.html.   They were mostly rural and poor prior to benefitting from the two Assad regimes. The Druze are abut 3% of the population. Despite having also emerged from Shia Islam, are more willing than the Alawites to accept a distinctive identity. The Christians, about 10% of the population, belong mostly to a number of Orthodox and Catholic denominations–and to different ethnic identities. More information will be presented in Part II (on mainstream Sunni and Shia Islam), Part III (Alawites, Druze, Christians and other religious identities), and Part IV (ethnic groups). In the meantime the presence in the army of both Alawites (dominating the officer class and a few crack units) and Sunnis (a few officers and many "foot-soldiers") is a critical factor; see William Maclean, "Analysis: Syria Army Keeps Cohesion but Risks Overstretch," Reuters (August 2, 2011).

4) In a speech on June 20 Assad talked about pursuing reform through national dialogue (convened, with little effect on July 10^th), but it elicited anger almost immediately on the streets–where protesters threw shoes at and stomped on his portrait. The next day Assad’s supporters came out in force, unfurling a massive flag, and though not everyone in the crowd was a true fan of the president, it was clear that he did have genuine supporters. But security forces then attacked a university dormitory, where students had refused to join these pro-Assad demonstrations. See NYT (6-21). For economic factors see Ausama Monajed’s comments in Hugo Dixon, "Can Non-Violent Struggle Bring Down Syria’s Assad?" Breakingviews: Reuters (August 1, 2011). Randa Slim, "Where’s Syria’s Business Community." Foreign Policy (August 5, 2011).

5) Lachlan Carmichael, "US Hedges Its bets on Syria,"AFP (April 2): http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmzQ9zxbgskrumsw9ON1Tu6VtdNw?docId=CNG.34b89149aa6e7d06680c9cf785978729.b21.  See also Ignatius (note 2).

6) Ali, Nour. "Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad." The Guardian (August 1, 2011). For a scholarly account see Aron Lund, "The Ghosts of Hama: The Bitter Legacy of Syria’s Failed 1979-1982 Revolution" (in RESOURCES). The minimum toll of 10,000 (most often cited) is based on Human Rights Watch data but estimates range up to 40,000.

7) Anthony Shadid, "Syrian President Fires Governor in Charge of a Restive City," New York Times (July 2, 2011).

8) Since the constitution requires that the president be a Muslim, when Hafez Assad took over in 1970 he arranged a formal recognition from Sunni clerics. Since then the Alawites appear to have moved closer to "orthodox" beliefs and practices. Bashar Assad’s wife is a Sunni. This will be discussed more in a subsequent post.

9) For the views of these young organizers, see especially Deborah Amos, Deborah, "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death," NPR (August 2, 2011). See also Ausama Monajed, "In Syria, an Opening for the West to Bring about Assad’s Downfall," Washington Post (June 26, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-syria-an-opening-for-the-west-to-bring-about-assads-downfall/2011/06/24/AGz4hcmH_story.html?wpisrc=nl_opinions.


10) Syrian human rights activists have acknowledged the sectarian aspect of these incidents but this view is not uncontested (others have blamed the regime for provoking them); Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/syria-troops-homs-security-crackdown; and Deborah Amos, "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death" NPR (August 2, 2011). In a opinion piece Hussein Shobokshi (apparently drawing on sources inside Syria) alleges that the regime has tried to incite violence between Sunnis and Alawites and between Muslims and Christians; see "Al-Assad’s Reign Is Over," Asharq Alawsat (August 3, 2011). U.S. Ambassdor Ford is remains convinced that the protesters are committed to peaceful tactics; see Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011). Some organizers have received training in non-violent tactics, as reported in Hugo Dixon, "Can Non-Violent Struggle Bring Down Syria’s Assad?" Breakingviews: Reuters (August 1, 2011).
11) Patrick Worsnip, "U.N. Council Statement Condems Use of Force." Reuters (August 3, 2011); John King, interview with Susan Rice, "U.N. Ambassador Rice on the Violence in Syria." Real Clear Politics (August 4, 2011).

12) Anna Fiifield, "‘Time to Think about the Day After Assad,’" Financial Times (August 2, 2011). Despite Assad’s recent military advances, several commentators see these as detrimental in the long-run; as reported by Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011). Syrian expert Andrew Tabler thinks that neither Assad’s political nor his military strategies are not working; see Ellen Knickmeyer, "Defiant Syrians Hold Huge Protests," Los Angeles Times (August 6, 2011). Kickmeyer quotes a Damacus lawyer, who labels Syria "a failed state." A draft of the party law (now officially promulgated) states that no parties based on religious, tribal or ethnic beliefs–nor any discriminating against a gender or a race would be recognized (in accordance with the Baath Party’s historically non-sectarian principles; see Liz Sly, "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms," Washington Post (July 25, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syria-permits-opposition-parties-on-restrictive-terms/2011/07/25/gIQAGiWyYI_story.html.  For elections and the arrest of the al-Bunni family, see Gulf News (August 6, 2011). The background of the al-Bunni’s is apparently Christian.

13) Among the abundant media coverage, see esp. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Tanks Shell East Syrian City, 5 Killed," Reuters (July 30, 2011); Borzou Dargahi and Alexandra Sandels, "Syrian Forces Attack 4 Opposition Strongholds," Los Angeles Times (July 31, 2011); Liz Sly and Joby Warrick, "Syrian Forces Intensify Assault on Hama," Washington Post (August 1, 2011); Massoud Derhally and Flavia Krause-Jackson, "Syrian Forces Shell Hama as UN Struggles for Agreement on Condeming Assad." Bloomberg (August 3, 2011); "Syria Unrest: Tanks ‘Advance’ on Besieged City of Hama," BBC News (August 3, 2011). For video footage see "Syrian Tanks Move into Hama, Drawing International Protest," Global Post (August 3, 2011); Dan Bilefsky, "Video from Deadly Raids in Syria." The Lede: New York Times (July 31, 2011). For the oil fields (which account for one-third of Syria’s export revenue), see Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011).  

14) Nour Ali, "Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad." The Guardian (August 1, 2011).

15) Liz Sly, Liz. "Protests Erupt Across Syria in Defiance of Crackdown." Washington Post (August 5, 2011). For video footage of these protests see esp. PBS Newshour (August 5, 2011). For chants (quoted from videos posted online), see Andrew Osborn, "Syria: Dimity Medvedev Warns Bashar al-Assad," The Telegraph (August 5, 2011): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8684255/Syria-Dmitry-Medvedev-warns-Bashar-al-Assad-to-prepare-for-sad-fate.html.  For Damascus see Ellen Knickmeyer, "Defiant Syrians Hold Huge Protests." Los Angeles Times (August 6, 2011). There have been mass protests in Damascus every night this week (according to "Alexander Page" on PBS).

16) For these tolls see various news articles for the week of August 1-7, including: Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Death Toll Rises in Crackdown." The Guardian (August 2, 2011); "Syrian Troops Kill at Least 52 People." Gulf News (August 7). For tolls as of June 28^th, see web site of Avaaz, an international human rights organization, URL: http://www.avaaz.org/act/media.php?press_id=262 (check site for updates). Updates are often provided by activists with contacts in Syria, such as those cited in Derhally/Krause-Jackson, (source of the 500 killed on the government side).

17) Anthony Shadid, "Syrian Military Pressure Mounts on Another City," New York Times (August 7, 2011).

18) For Ban Ki-Moon and the Turkish deputy prime minister, see Nada Bakri and Rick Gladstone, "Syria Sends in Tanks to Storm Center of Rebellious City," New York Times (August 3, 2011). Andrew Osborn,"Syria: Dimitry Medvedev warns Bashar al-Assad," The Telegraph (August 5, 2011) (see note 15). For the Arab world’s response see Andrew Hammond, "Arabs Angry Over Syria Crackdown but Governments Silent" Reuters (August 1, 2011); "Syria Vows ‘Free Elections’ as Pressure Grows," Gulf News (August 6, 2011); and opinion essays on the Asharq Alawsat site.

19) Nada Bakri and Anthony Shadid, "Syrians Strike Restive Cities, Killing Dozens," New York Times (August 1, 2011). Alhomayed, Tariq. "Syria: Closing Mosques and Launching Satellite Television Channels." Asharq Alawsat (August 2, 2011).

20) For access to arms see Mariam Karouny, "Syria’s Tribal Eastern Region Braces for Army Assault" Reuters (August 5, 2011); Shadid, "Syrian Military Pressure Mounts on Another City, New York Times (August 7, 2011).

21) Robert Mackey, "Video of a Syrian Protest Anthem." The Lede: New York Times (July 21): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/video-of-a-syrian-protest-anthem/. "Syria Vows ‘Free Elections’ as Pressure Grows," Gulf News (August 6, 2011).

22) Note esp. unnamed Damacus reporter with leading by-line (with Anna Fifield in Washington) in the Financial Times (August 4, 2011); Nidaa Hassan (The Guardian); Nour Ali (The Guardian); unnamed correspondent in Damascus (Los Angeles Times), as indicated in Knickmeyer; "Alexander Page" in the PBS segment.

23) Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011). Blake Hounshell and Josh Rogan, "The Last Stand of Bashar al-Assad?" The Cable (August 1, 2011). For Alawites as the key, see Bassma Kadmani, "To Topple Assad, It Takes a Minority," New York Times (August 1, 2011).

Who Will 'Eat' Syria? The Lion or the Alligator?

(Thanks for your patience. I’ve had to attend to some distracting events and projects this month. I intend to post regularly in the next few weeks–as school will be starting soon here in the US. I decided to post this update, with a title I couldn’t resist, as a prelude to my next post, "Syria’s Ancient and Modern Mosaic: Part II." This will allow me to reduce that post’s introduction. Also, its graphic organizer activity is adaptable as the situation evolves and could be modified to suit other cases. If you are new to this blog, check out the other posts on Syria for additional resources.)

INTRODUCTION

In Syria anti-regime protests are now in their fifth month. Tanks and snipers unleashed on civilians. Security forces dispatched around the country. More than 1600 protesters dead. As many as 12,000 arrested (with hundreds or thousands in detention). Camps of 10,000 refugees in Turkey and thousands in Lebanon, too. Entire families and villages displaced internally along the Turkish border. A few concessionary gestures by the government. Great skepticism about Assad’s willingness or ability to keep his promises--by activating them in ways that would bring about real change. An authoritarian, intransigent regime running up against a persistent, highly-charged grassroots protest movement. This is the Syrian uprising. (1)

Since the protests began in mid-March the news from Syria has teetered back and forth–from reports that anti-government protests are being met with ruthlessness and violence to news that the regime is offering yet another set of reforms; troops and tanks deployed to crackdown hard, then withdrawn or redeployed to other towns; President Assad’s call for dialogue one day, attacks on university students the next day; a constant series of anti-regime protests across most of the country, yet there are also pro-Assad demonstrations, especially in Damascus. Thus, more than a few outside observers have called the situation in Syria a stalemate.

During early July the foreign media's focus was on Hama, a city of 800,000 residents, where on July 1st (a Friday) there was a massive protest, involving perhaps upwards of 100,000 out on the streets. The next day the local governor was sacked because his attitude towards the protesters was too submissive. Then, on July 3, after troops and more than 90 tanks rolled back into Hama, tension in the city became almost palpable–since most residents feared a repeat of the violent government crackdown that had occurred in early June (when at least 65 demonstrators were killed). By July 5 (Tuesday) the security forces were beginning to push through the protesters’ makeshift barricades, leaving 24 dead and some 80 wounded. Anticipating more violence, people began to leave Hama for neighboring towns. No doubt they were anticipating an attempt to clear Hama, similar to the regime’s efforts to clear Jisr al-Shughur and other towns and villages in the province of Idleb in the northwest. (2)

A Fork in the Road?

As tensions were building up in Hama, it seemed that Syria had reached a fork in the road (3). Most people stayed in Hama, arming themselves with stones and erecting barricades of burning tires to keep the security forces out. An earlier call for a general strike had already shut down much of the city’s commercial activity. Were the security forces ready to use lethal force if, as expected, protesters would pour out onto the streets after prayers on Friday?

A sign that a dire situation might be unfolding was the decision of U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford to travel to Hama on July 7 (Thursday) and to stay in the city until Friday afternoon. This visit would be more than a fact-finding mission. As his spokesperson put it rather bluntly, on June 28th: "The violence needs to end thrughut Syria and a broader public process needs to begin." Furthermore there were indications that American diplomats in Syria had been engaging in back channel activity. (4)

So, what did happen in Hama on July 8th? No bloody massacre (5). That was a great relief to all concerned: the city’s residents, local organizers of the protest movement and their supporters, Ambassdor Ford and the US diplomatic corps (and, of course, the Obama administration), and also, presumably, President Assad and the regime’s loyalists. Having been a center of resistance in the early 1980s, Hama is a real "conundrum" from the point of view of the regime. President Bashar al-Assad does not really want another bloodbath in Hama, where in 1982 his father President Hafez al-Assad put down an Islamist revolt in which 20,000 (quite possibly many more) people were killed. For Assad another bloodbath in Hama would be a public relations and diplomatic disaster (6). Perhaps the regime senses that if it goes too far in Hama, the protesters will turn away from their mostly non-violent tactics. While the presence of Ambassdor Ford--and also the French ambassador--changed the dynamic on this particular Friday, the regime can now point to this "interference" as support for its view that the uprising is being encouraged by foreigners (as well as extremists). Perhaps Assad made a tactical decision to avoid a major escalation while foreign diplomats were on the scene. Their presence was strongly condemned by the regime.  In Damascus both the American and French embassies were attacked by pro-Assad elements. (7).

A sigh of relief, no massacre this time–but no resolution either. Syria was still positioned at what could have been a decisive turning point, since an unprecedented "national dialogue" was scheduled for July 10 (Sunday).  Reporters speculated about who would come--and who would stay away.  Two very prominent and well-respected opposition figures, Michel Kilo and Anwar al-Bunni, decided to forego any attempt at dialogue as long as the government had troops deployed around the country--for the obvious purpose of continuing the crackdown on protesters and intimidating the internal opposition. With few dissidents or opposition leaders willing to participate, the July 10th talks had little impact. (8)

Then, on July 15, once again, there were large protests after Friday prayers in many cities and towns, including large demonstrations fairly close to the center of Damascus. The next day (July 16) a meeting of 350 dissidents and opposition leaders was held in Istanbul, Turkey, but with very disappointing results.  The attendees were expected to create an organized, united front of intellectuals and Islamists who were living in exile and their counterparts who were working inside Syria, especially the young leaders and coordinators of the protests. In Istanbul, however, the Kurds walked out over a failure to recognize their non-Arab identity and tribal representatives also walked out. A parallel meeting supposed to take place in Damascus was called off, due to the danger posed by the security forces. (9)

The foreign media's focus has now shifted to Homs, Syria’s third largest city, described as "a flashpoint city." Last week (beginning on July 18) the violence in Homs escalated–with as many as 40 people killed there during clashes between security forces and protesters and in incidents reported as "sectarian" (a troubling development). These events inspired country-wide "solidarity with Homs" demonstrations on July 22 (Friday) that, for the first time included major demonstrations in Aleppo--as well as larger than ever protests in Damascus.   In those protests eleven people were killed, shot by the security forces. (10)

On Sunday (July 24) security forces attacked a village in Idleb (revealing that dissent is still popping up in parts of the northwest despite the weeks of repression), the government sent reinforcements to Homs, and there was another round of arrests of suspected organizers and protesters, particularly in Damascus (where both the increasing number of protests and their increasing proximity to the city center is worrying the regime). Also on Sunday the cabinet drafted a law that would permit, for the first time in nearly fifty years, the formation of political parties (other than those under the umbrella of the National Progressive Front). But this will be a hollow reform if it does not lead to other needed constitutional concessions. (11)

It seems that the regime’s strategy is to prevent any pockets of momentum from building up prior to the onset of Ramadan, the month of daytime fasting that begins on August 1st. Many observers are saying that Ramadan will be "a month of Fridays," when people will meet after evening prayers to break the fast and then participate in night-time demonstrations. A rumor is going around that Assad is planning yet another speech, to announce that his willingness to  remove the constitutional article that ensures the Baath Party’s dominance, after which he might call for presidential elections. Is this a change of tactics? Are these signs of Assad’s desperation on the eve of Ramadan? (12)

But from the vantage point of late July, it seems that Syria is still stalled at that proverbial fork in the road. Yet the process may be inching forward due to several unfolding factors. Sectarian tensions may emerge as a decisive factor–or they may be contained by leaders at the grassroots, who seem determined to operate inclusively and to adhere to a nationalist agenda.  Syria’s already unraveling economy may deteriorate more rapidly, so that even Iranian aid may prove insufficient to shore it up.   And if the economy collapses, Assad could easily lose the loyalty of the business elite, which would probably bring about his demise.  Another possibility is that Assad’s half-hearted, hesitant reforms might begin--slowly and incrementally--to make a difference, for example, by reassuring those who have kept hoping that sooner or later he would exchange his represser’s suit for that of a reformer. Whether limited reforms (such as the party law, which restricts new parties to those that can pass muster with a regime-appointed committee) will convince anyone in the opposition/dissident/protester camps to give Assad another chance is highly unlikely. The protesters demands have hardened since mid-March.  Most of those opposed to the regime would no doubt agree with Louay Hussein (a Damascus-based opposition figure) when he says: "Our struggle with the authorities in not over laws. It is a struggle over freedom." (13)

"Eating" Syria

One of the participants in the July 10th dialogue in Damascus was Dr. Mohammed Habash, a respected Islamic scholar and a political moderate. Prior to the meeting, when he was explaining to a reporter why he had decided to attend, he made this statement: "I believe it [overthrowing the president] will put us in the mouth of the alligator and will (lead us to some tragedy). So I believe we have to come round table to discuss about everything" (14).

Now when I heard this statement, it reminded me of a political metaphor used in the oral traditions of certain precolonial African kingdoms (and still heard, commonly, in modern political discourse). This is the metaphor of "eating the kingdom," which signified the decisive moment when a new king, after sidelining or defeating his rivals (often in a bloody succession war), asserted authority over the "old chiefs" of his predecessor, performed the required accession rituals, and thus acquired legitimacy in the eyes of his people. It is a very apt metaphor for Syria as a nation, whose people are seeking a democratic transition--in which the people through democratic institutions and elections would establish a legitimate government. In other words, the people themselves would "eat" Syria (the sovereign state).

So imagine a nation, slowly approaching a fork in history’s metaphorical highway (that is, its historical trajectory), the spot where it splits into two roads going forward. Looking ahead it sees danger standing in the middle of each road: take one road and face the maw of a hungry Lion, take the other and face the jaws of an aggresive Alligator. 

For Syria the Lion is the Assad regime (the name Assad means "lion") and, in a sense, the Assads have been "eating" Syria ever since Hafez Assad came to power in 1970. Bashar Assad inherited the political mantle (mane?) of his father, leaving behind the profession of ophthamology to "eat" the Syrian state (15). He pursued strategies of espousing secularism, protecting sectarian minorities (his fellow Alawites but also Christians, Druze, and Ismailis), and even cultivating relationships with moderate Sunni Muslims. Perhaps Assad can manipulate the current situation to increase sectarian tensions, turning this into an advantage, since then he might still offer, with some credibility, a stable government "improved" by a few reforms. He could also "eat" the uprising by using brute force or by a combination of force and attrition (if the protesters’ energy and enthusiasm wanes). Neither of these outcomes is very likely, however, at this juncture. In general the Syrian people are very skeptical.  They have little confidence in Assad’s ability to reform an authoritarian system of governance, and little confidence in his capacity to bring about national dialogue or reconciliation.

For Syria, the Alligator slithering in the roadway is the civil war that, if it breaks out, might swallow up the entire nation in years of chaos and sectarian strife. The regime’s propaganda plays up these possibilities when it argues that only it can provide a stable and safe environment (ironically, even as it is perpetrating violence on unarmed civilians and fomenting sectarian divisions). The violence in Homs, involving the numerically dominant Sunni Muslims and the Alawite sect (to which the Assads belong) is an ominous sign of what could become a destablizing and tragic situation. Syrians are very much aware of how Iraq sank into the mire of sectarian violence--since many Iraqis sought refuge in Syria, bringing their stories with them.

A significant proportion of the Syrian people have held back (stayed home or backed the uprising only surreptitiously) because they are "terrified about the morning after" (16). Residents of Damascus and Aleppo, and of the business and professional elite have been especially fearful, making the recent protests in both cities (and lives lost as security forces reacted) steps forward that will be closely watched inside and outside the county. What political rivalries will emerge if the Assad regime is toppled? Will older and younger opposition leaders somehow manage to work together or will their agendas diverge? Will Sunni Muslims dominate? Will vengeance be wrought not only on the regime loyalists but on Alawi communities regardless of their allegiance (or not) to regime? So there are many reasons to fear "the morning after."

Many political analysts have been pessimistic. Gary Gambill, for example, argues that "there are no plausible circumstances under which a democratic transition would constitute a rational choice for the embattled dictator" (17). In other words, Assad surely realizes that embarking on a democratic transition would eventually lead to his demise. Yet, he continues to offer the carrot of reforms, suggesting that he really doesn’t know what to do (as some commentators have suggested) (18). Thus, Gambill thinks that efforts by the Obama administration to nudge Assad towards a transition were futile. This conclusion has now been vindicated by Ambassador Ford’s solidarity with the protesters in Hama and by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statements after the pro-regime demonstrators attacked the US embassy in Damascus.

For Gambill, the key factor is "Syria’s unique minority-dominated power structure" that is dependent on "Alawite solidarity" and how Sunni loathing for the heterodox but privileged Alawites "feeds into the existential insecurities felt by most Alawites." (19).   Essentially, most Alawites can’t imagine that a Sunni dominated government would protect them. If Gambill is right, the Alligator’s jaws are primed for a feast.

I’m trying to stay realistic, which means recognizing the grave dangers represented by both the Lion and the Alligator. Yet, I keep searching the media for less pessimistic signs. Syria’s pro-democracy activists include people who are also heavily invested in human rights. These activists and protest organizers (through the Local Coordinating Committees and other grassroots groups) are working hard to keep the movement peaceful: "There are growing problems. But the violence is regime-provoked and we shouldn’t take this to mean there will be a civil war" (20).

So, what will happen next? Who will ‘"eat" Syria? Will the regime with its repressive and ruthless tactics devour the people and their aspirations, their hopes for a better future, their most admirable values (pro-democracy and human rights)? Will civil war swallow up an entire nation? 

But wait a minute, we must also entertain the notion that, in the long-run, the people will prevail. Although, inevitably, they won’t remain stalled at the fork indefinitely–sooner or later tevents will carry them forward along one road or the other--to face either the Lion or the Alligator.  It is possible that, regardless of the road forward, the people will evade or escape from the jaws so eager to consume them. With so many uncertainties, so many variant factors shaping the future, let’s not cast ourselves in the role of prophets. Pay close attention, follow events, analyze and speculate, yes, of course. Speak as prophets, no way.

"FORK IN THE ROAD" ACTIVITY

Using graphic organizers can help students think through new or difficult material. When asked to engage with multifaceted current events–taking place, in many instances, in an unfamiliar setting), we all can use mental maps to help us see more clearly and often it is a good tactic to make these tangible artifacts! This activity can be pursued now (when the outcome is still uncertain) OR it can be carried out later as a retrospective exercise. (With a bit of work you could also adapt it to another country’s fork in the road–using either a contemporary or historical case).

GRAPHIC ORGANIZER: Organize this as a small group project (using poster paper and markers or digital graphic software and/or projectable slides) OT turn it into a class project on a large bulletin board. Ask students to illustrate the fork-in-road/lion/alligator metaphor. This activity is straightforward enough for middle school students but expandable to any higher level (expecting more detail, more research). Please adapt and modify it to suit your class (a chance here to be creative!).

1) Begin with a Y-shaped road, on its side and pointing towards the right. Standing in the stem of the Y will be a representation of the Syrian people as both protesters/non-protesters (the protesters could be a cluster of stick figures carrying posters with slogans and/or Syrian flags). Send students to look at news media photos to find slogans or other suitable representations.

2) Students may add a text balloon or sidebar with a bullet list of the protesters’ demands. Be sure that they can tell you where their information is coming from.

3) To include those who would probably like to see reforms but are not out on the streets, students might add another group closer of stick figures. Again, they can add a balloon or sidebar to list the reforms that they are advocating, their reasons for staying off the streets, or even their support for boycotts or attempts at dialogue. Make sure that this content is grounded in identifiable sources.

4) Next, students should put a drawing or picture of a lion in one arm of the Y, an alligator in the other. These are the obstacles suggested the difficult choices–with uncertain of outcomes–facing the Syrian people.

5) Students can use the lion’s roar (another balloon) to sum up the Assad regime’s position. Around the lion they may place sidebars with examples of the regime’s tactics during the uprising.

6) The alligator’s gaping mouth can be attached to balloon that sums up the dangers of a civil war, including potential sectarian or ethnic strife or names of opposition organizations (that might emerge as rival political factions).

7) Ask students to think about possible outcomes if Syria manages to get around these obstacles. How could these be represented to the right of the Lion and Alligator? For example, showing Assad the Lion in a plane flying off into exile or in prison behind bars or people casting ballots in a democratic eledction. Perhaps the Alligator can be shown captured in a net or with his mouth tied shut to indicate that the threat of civil war might be neutralized. Again, people could be seated in a constitutional convention or participating in an election. Put BIG question marks beside these possible outcomes.

Recommended Resources
　
These will change over time and your set of news articles should be updated as needed. You may need to introduce the topic, for example, by drawing items from the BBC’s "Guide: Syria Crisis." 

Also, if possible, show recent protest footage. For these check what is available on The Lede (on the New York Times site) and on Al Jazeera English (http://aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/). The intensity of the protests is well-conveyed by the first video of what is now widely-recognized as the uprising’s anthem (see Resources: Recent News)

Among the articles listed above, these would be most useful in addressing the stalemate and its possible resolutions (the two paths forward):

• Marsh, Katherine.  "Syria's Silent Majority Will Deterimine Next Step as protests Grow." The Guardian (April 15, 2011).
• "An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by CAmille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011).
• Folkeson, Annika. "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests," BBC News (July 17, 2011).
• Abouzeid, Rania. "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy." TIME (July 19, 2011). 
• Ignatius, David. "Plotting a Post-Assad Road Map for Syria." Washington Post (July 20, 2011).
• Shadid, Anthony. "New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria." New York Times (July 24, 2011).

OTHER ACTIVITIES

READ/ANALYZE: In "Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama" Dominic Evans tries to explain why Hama is such a conundrum for the regime. Ask students to re-state the points that Evans is making. Then, based on broader information (including TV coverage), consider the credibility of this explanation. 　

READ/DISCUSS: Gary Gambil’s essay, "The Hard Man of Damascus," takes a very pessimistic view of the situation. Does Gambill think Assad’s call for a national dialogue is sincere? What motives might Assad have? Who are the soft-liners and hard-lines in Syria? Why does he think a "straight-up transition to democracy" is unlikely in Syria? What does he mean by "a pacted transition"? Why is such a transition also very unlikely in Syria? Think about how other analyists might counter this argument?

WORLD HISTORY: EXPLORE the history of the two pacted transitions that Gambill gives as his examples (South Africa and Chile) and then compare/contrast these cases. Also, think about how they differ from the Syrian uprising.

RESEARCH: Find out more about Michel Kilo, one of the opposition’s most venerable figures. Project a photo of Kilo (captured from the web) as a student presents a short oral report about him.

GENERAL RESOURCES

"Guide: Syria Crisis." BBC News (accessed July 23, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13855203

• Excellent place to start because it provides a concise overview of events since mid-March
• Includes a chart contrasting "What protesters want" with "What Assad has offered"
• Addresses sectarian, regional, and economic aspects of the crisis
• Click on "Protest Footage Mapped" for videos (from June protests; watch for update)
• Scroll down for more features and analysis, plus useful links

VIDEO: "Syria’s Youth Revolutionaries." Journeyman Pictures (12:18 mins). Go to YouTube or access at Weekly Standard (July 21, 2011): http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/syrias-youth-revolutionaries_577237.html

• Young activists explain what they are doing and why they are involved in the pro-democracy/anti-Assad movement; they describe the brutality of the security forces; all those featured are men but there are also women in the streets and behind the scenes
• Explain to students that these revolutionaries appear to be middle/upper class and well-educated, mostly involved in organizing demonstrations; grassroots protesters, drawn from a much broader socio-economic spectrum, include many of their less-educated peers

TIMELINE: Syria Unrest: Timeline of Protests and Crackdowns." The Telegraph (July 8, 2011):
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8626440/Syria-unrest-timeline-of-protests-and-crackdowns.html

• Needs an update but very useful as a overview of events from March 15th to July 8th.

Analysis

Marsh, Katherine. "Syria's Silent Majority Will Deterimine Next Step as protests Grow." The Guardian (April 15, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/syria-protests-silent-majority

• Silent majority is becoming a smaller portion of the population but this article sets out their reasons for holding back, with comments on Assad's strategy at the mid-April point in the uprising.

"An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by Camille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog//p=10574

Evans, Dominic.  "Analysis: Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama," Reuters (July 5, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/us-syria-hama-idUSTRE7644L020110705

Gambill, Gary. "The Hard Man of Damascus." Foreign Policy (July 6, 2011):
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/06/the_hard_man_of_damascus?page=0,1
Folkeson, Annika. "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests." BBC News (July 17, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14179188

Ignatius, David. "Plotting a Post-Assad Road Map for Syria." Washington Post (July 20, 2011):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/plotting-a-post-assad-road-map-for-syria/2011/07/20/gIQANBQcQI_story.html
VIDEO: "Would the West Interfere in Syria?" (24:22 mins). Aired on Inside Story (July 22, 2011): http://aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/07/201172392452703186.html

• Misleading title (refers to the last third or so of program)
• Episode begins with footage of protests on July 22, noting large protests in Homs and Damacus (where 20 were killed); how crackdown is continuing around the country
• Guests are George Jabbour (president of the Syrian UN Association, former advisor to Hafez al-Assad), Marwa Daoudy (scholar/lecturer at the Middle East Centre, Oxford University), and Radwan Ziadeh (director of the Damascus Centre for Human Rights and currently a visiting scholar in the US)
• Jabbour is hesitant to tell what he knows about what's happening (audio is poor, too); he emphasizes the need for reconciliaton
• Ziadeh speaks with a POV closest to that of the protesters
• Daoudy notes the effects of the regime’s "mixed signals" and thinks that the protests in Damascus on July 22 are a tipping point (but echoes Jabbour on the need for reconciliaton)
  

RESOURCES: RECENT NEWS (July 19-26)

Ali, Nour and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/syria-troops-homs-security-crackdown

Abouzeid, Rania. "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy." TIME (July 19, 2011): http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,2083769,00.html

Harris, Elizabeth. "Videos Appear to Show Violence in Syria." The Lede: New York Times (July 21, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/videos-appear-to-show-violence-in-syria/

Ali, Nour and Ian Black, "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime Adds to Death Toll." The Guardian (July 22): http://guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/22/mass-syrian-protest-assad-deaths

Weiss, Michael. "Sectarianism, or a Trap by Assad?" The Weekly Standard (July 22, 2011): http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/sectarianism-or-trap-assad_577266.html

Mackey, Robert. "Video of a Syrian Protest Anthem." The Lede: New York Times (July 21): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/video-of-a-syrian-protest-anthem/

• Two videos of protesters performing but the first one has English subtitles and better quality footage
• Preview for suitability (subtitles in first video call Bashar "an ass")
  check out Anthony Shadid’s July 22^nd article about this anthem

Shadid, Anthony. "Lyrical Message for Syrian Leader: ‘Come on, Bashar, Leave.’" New York Times (July 22, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/world/middleeast/22poet.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

Ali, Nour. "Syrian Troops Attack Village in Northwest, Activists Say." The Guardian (July 24, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/24/syrian-troops-attack-village-activists

Shadid, Anthony. "New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria." New York Times (July 24, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/world/middleeast/25syria.html?scp=2&sq=shadid%20syria%20new%20loyalties&st=cse

Sly, Liz. "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms." Washington Post (July 25, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syria-permits-opposition-parties-on-restrictive-terms/2011/07/25/gIQAGiWyYI_story.html


RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July)

For an overview of events in early July (as well as more recent coverage) check out posts on the Joshua Landis blog, Syria Comment, especially:

• "News Round Up (5 July 2011)." SyriaComment (July 5, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10573
• "News Round Up (7 July 2011)." SyriaComment (July 8, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10605

Shadid, Anthony. "Coalition of Factions from the Streets Fuels a New Opposition in Syria." New York Times (June 30, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html?scp=5&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

Shadid, Anthony. "With Police Absent, Protests Surge in Syrian City [Hama]." New York Times (July 1, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/middleeast/02syria.html?scp=4&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

Daragahi, Borzou and Roula Hajjar.  "Syrian Troops Roll into Hama, a Symbol of Antigovernment Activity."  Los Angeles Times  (July 5, 2011): http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-syria-sweep-20110705,0,3757510.story 

"‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Claims in Syria." Al Jazeera (July 6, 2011): http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/07/20117684729673824.html

Chulov, Martin. "Hama Is Beacon of Resistance 30 Years on from Massacre." The Guardian (July 6, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/06/hama-resistance-30-years-massacre

• For more excellent coverage of Syria and the Middle East by Martin Chulov, go to http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/martin-chulov

"Syrian Protests Hurl Stones at Troops in Key City." AP on NPR (July 7, 2011):
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=134658580

"Opposition Builds in Syria’s Capital, a Key Battleground." Wall Street Journal (July 7, 2011):
2011):http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304793504576431830115150202.html

Nisbet, Robert. "Dozens Arrested Ahead of Syria ‘Reform’ Summit." Sky News (July 7, 2011):
http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16025712

Shadid, Anthony. "Envoys Stay in Syrian City Where Protests Continue." New York Times (July 8, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/world/middleeast/09syria.html

Mackey, Robert. "U.S. Ambassador Greeted with Roses by Syrian Protesters in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (July 8, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/u-s-ambassador-greeted-with-roses-by-syrian-protesters

Daragahi, Borzou and Alexandra Sandels. "Thousands Protest in Hama Against Assad." Los Angeles Times (July 9, 2011): http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-syria-violence-20110709,0,347364.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fnews%2Fnationworld%2Fworld+%28L.A.+Times+-+World+News%29

Bakri, Nada. "Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies ..." New York Times (July 11, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/world/middleeast/12syria.html?scp=1&sq=clinton%20syria%20attacks%20embassy&st=cse

Landler, Mark and David E. Sanger. "White House, in Shift, turns Against Syrian Leader." New York Times (July 12, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/middleeast/13policy.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=clinton%20syria%20attacks%20embassy&st=cse

Shadid, Anthony. "Security Forces Open Fire on Syrian Protesters." New York Times (July 15): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/middleeast/16syria.html?scp=6&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

NOTES

For full citations (with URLs) see RESOURCES.  

1) For a sense of this uprising’s "contradictory signs" see Annika Folkeson, "Change of ‘Regime Tactics,’" BBC News (July 17, 2011). Statistics in this paragraph are ballpark figures that vary somewhat from source to source but the number of fatalities increases steadily. Figures provided by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (as reported in the Guardian on July 22): fatalities: 1419 civilians, 352 members of the security forces; more than 1300 arrested [a low figure that probaby does not include those who are no longer being detained]. Liz Sly, in "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms" (Washington Post: July 25, 2011), refers to human rights groups figures of 1600 deaths and 20,000 detentions. The number of refugees in Turkey may be decreasing as it is being reported that some people are returning to their homes in Syria.

2) See articles listed under RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July).

3) The lead-up to this fork began with President Assad’s speech on June 20th (his third attempt to address the crisis in Syria, more serious than those that had preceded it). What he tried to convey was that, finally, he was really "getting it" (that he understood the need for substantive rather than merely cosmetic reforms) and his call for dialogue was perceived by at least some members of the opposition as a positive step. He then allowed a meeting of opposition leaders to take place within Syria. It is also significant that, however unsatisfactory, a dialogue of sorts did occur on July 10.

4)  Ambassador Ford, who speaks Arabic, is well-informed about Syria and the region. Press briefings by his staff hint a these back channels.   See "Daily Press Briefing--June 28, 2011, " US Department of State  (June 28, 2011): http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/06/167237.htm [also the source of the quotation].
 
5) See RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July).

6) See Dominic Evans, "Analysis: Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama," Reuters (July 5, 2011). Also, "‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Claims in Syria." Al Jazeera (July 6, 2011). Nearly every news article about Hama mentions the 1982 massacre, as do many other reports and discussions of the Syrian uprising, making it clear that its symbolism resonates far beyond Syria.  See Martin Chulov and Nidaa Hassan, "Hama Is Beacon of Resistance 30 Years on from Massacre." The Guardian (July 6, 2011):

7) Anthony Shadid, "Envoys Stay in Syrian City Where Protests Continue," New York Times (July 8, 2011); Shadid quotes an activist who states explicitly that they felt protected by the Ambassdor Ford's presence.  For footage see Robert Mackey, U.S. Ambassador Greeted with Roses by Syrian Protesters in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (July 8, 2011). 

8) Both Kilo and al-Bunni are Christians (at least in a cultural sense) and both were imprisoned during the presidency of Bashar al-Assad.  See Ariel Zirulnick, "Syrian Activists Reject Assad's Call for Talks Sunda," Christian Science Monitor  (July 7, 2011):  http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0708/Syrian-activists-reject-Assad-s-call-for-talks-Sunday; "The Consultative Meeting for Syrian National Dialogue," Day Press  (July 8, 2011): http://www.dp-news.com/en/print/aspx?articleid=89415.  For the Syrian government's view see Mark Memmott, "Syrian Foreign Minister: Opposition Should Join 'Dialogue,'' NPR (July 5, 2011); http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/07/05/137628798/syrian-foreign-minister-opposition-should-join-dialogue

9) Anthony Shadid, "Security Forces Open Fire on Syrian Protesters." New York Times (July 15). For the dissension at this meeting see Rania Abouzeid, "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy," TIME (July 19, 2011).

10) See Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19); and "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime" The Guardian (July 22). For video footage see Elizabeth Harris in The Lede (July 21, 2011). The sectarian aspect in Homs is somewhat disputed (a matter I’ll discuss in my next post) but in the meantime see Michael Weiss, "Sectarianism, or a Trap by Assad?" in The Weekly Standard (July 22, 2011).

11) Nour Ali, Syrian Troops Attack Village in Northwest, Activists Say." The Guardian (July 24, 2011). For the rumor, see Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime." The Guardian (July 22).

12) By mid-July there was already a buzz about the regime’s changing tactics; see Annika Folkeson, "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests," BBC News (July 17, 2011). Andrew Tabler is among those describing the regime as desperate, thus willing to try new "Band-Aids"; see his piece, "Lights Out" in Foreign Policy (July 19, 2011). Also, Liz Sly, "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms," Washington Post (July 25).

13) For the state of the economy and how targeted sanctions might push the process along see Andrew Tabler, "Lights Out," Foreign Policy (July 19, 2011). Tabler writes from a well-defined policy perspective. He thinks that Washington should use its tools to push more strenuously towards the goal of ending the regime–in order to prevent the inevitable bloodshed of a prolonged transition. Hussein, as quoted in Nada Bakri, "Draft Reform Law in Syria Fails to Mollify Protesters," New York Times (July 25, 2011).

14) Habash, as quoted in Robert Nisbet, "Dozens Arrested Ahead of Syria ‘Reform’ Summit." Sky News (July 7, 2011). 

15) Bashar had not been groomed to "eat’ Syria but was thrust into that role because his brother Basil, the presumptive heir, was killed in a car crash in 1994. Thus, Bashar was weaker politically than he might have been and he had to deal with "old chiefs" of the preceding regime and his more aggressive brother Maher. For this reason it has been somewhat unclear to what extent he exercises power independently. Certainly, he has often been constrained by the regime’s hardlines. This has allowed moderates to cut Assad some slack, but less slack as he has continued to unleash the security forces.

16) Gary Gambill, The Hard Man of Damascus." Foreign Policy (July 6, 2011).

17) See note #16

18) Nada Bakri, "Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies ..." New York Times (July 11, 2011).  Landler and David E. Sanger. "White House, in Shift, turns Against Syrian Leader." New York Times (July 12, 2011).

19) This line of questioning was pursued by host of Inside Story episode that aired on July 22, 2011.

20) Anonymous dissident, quoted in Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19).  For a human rights activist' perspective see "An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by CAmille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011).