INTRODUCTION
"In Damascus, people of different religions have always known how to live together. From an early age we learn to distinguish our religions and ourselves, but not to hate other religions. We respect each other’s right to live together, and to share land, air and food. In this respect, Syria presents a model for the west on dealing with minorities."
Sheikh Muhammad Al Yaqoubi (1A)
"The advantage of having these demonstrations is that we are creating a Syrian identity."
25-year-old Damascus activist/protester (1B)
"A sectarian civil war on the Iraqi or Lebanese model is every Syrian’s nightmare. There must surely be another way out of the crisis."
Patrick Seale (1C)
A common view of Syria’s version of the Arab Spring is that it is unfolding amid fears that "Assad’s fall could bring a sectarian bloodbath" (3). These fears are not unfounded–but they are often exaggerated. Syrians are well aware of the sectarian violence that has plagued neighboring Lebanon and Iraq. Yet, any critical analysis needs to examine exactly how this bloodbath "boogeyman" has served the interests of President Bashar al-Assad–not only since mid-March, when the current uprising began in the town of Daraa–but for all the years of his presidency (since he succeeded his father President Hafez al-Assad in 2000).
For many years, with considerable skill, President Assad promoted the idea that he was first and foremost the defender of a tolerant social order–and it is true that many minorities in Syria have felt protected–at least in certain respects–by his policies. Moreover, he did reach out to moderate Sunni Muslims, as well as to Christians and Druze. But the favoritism shown towards his own Alawite community was resented–especially by less fortunate members of other communities and by those opposed to the Baath Party (in general) and to the Assads (in particular). Thus, when Syria’s pro-reform and pro-democracy protesters began to call upon President Assad to step down, those who had benefitted from his regime felt that their interests, and even their lives, were at risk (3).
Finding himself under pressure from protesters in nearly every corner of the country, Assad reiterated that only he could preserve Syria from an era of post-Assad sectarianism and intolerance (should his regime collapse). For the regime this notion has been an effective tool, shoring up its support among people who wanted desperately to believe Assad’s oft-repeated promises of reform. This message was aimed at members of religious and ethnic minorities–but resonated widely with the middle class professionals and the business elite, even those who were Sunni Muslims (4). Moreover, in the international arena it was also widely accepted that a post-Assad Syria would be a chaotic Syria, that could destabilize the entire region. This helps to explain the lagging response of the United States--as well as Israel’s unenthusiastic stance towards the possibility of regime change in Syria (5).
The Syrian uprising is now in its fifth month. Given Syria’s complicated religious and ethnic mosaic, news analysts have kept repeating, for all these weeks, that most of the protesters out on the streets are Sunni Muslims. Should this surprise us? Since the 1960s many Sunnis have denounced the Baath Party for its secularism. In the mid-1970s conservative Sunnis mounted a vocal and active opposition to the policies of President Hafez Assad, who then suppressed this movement with great force. This led to the Hama massacre in 1982 (when 10,000 or more were killed in the crackdown) (6).
By early July Anthony Shadid was reporting that "Hama has begun to emerge as a symbol of the uprising’s success" (7). And on every Friday in July there were large protests in Hama. It is these protests in Hama and in other cities and towns (Homs, Daraa, Jisr al-Shghour) that are well-known strongholds of Sunni conservatism that have given the Syrian uprising an Islamic (but not necessarily Islamist) dimension. When President Assad pointed to Islamists, Salafists, and their foreign backers as the instigators of the protest movement, he reinforced this view. That Islamists have consistently opposed the regimes of both Hafez and Bashar Assad is beyond dispute–and the animosity is deeply rooted–since the most conservative Sunnis still exclude the Alawi from the broader community of Muslims (8). Since the Assads and the regime’s inner circle are nearly all Alawites, it has been very easy for pundits to slip into a Sunni versus Alawite narrative when trying to explain the Syrian revolt.
Nevertheless, two demographic facts belie any characterization of the uprising as essentially Islamic (at the same time that they undermine the Sunni versus Alawite storyline). First, since Sunni Muslims dominate the country demographically, any political movement/ uprising/ revolution that managed to gain widespread popular support would have mostly Sunni feet on the ground. Therefore, it is necessary to look much more closely at what is motivating those who are calling for regime change. Secondly, the organizers of demonstrations have been mostly young people so there is a strong generational component to their activism (9). These young activists are surely, to some degree, out-of-sync with older political dissidents (who are often living abroad), but their political grievances are genuine: they are simply fed-up with an authoritarian regime–with its proclivity to arrest and torture people. They are savvy users of social media–as shown by how skillfully they have evaded the government’s news blackouts. Though they speak of democracy, it is true that their understanding of what democracy entails is incomplete. Yet, they are not unaware of Turkey’s democratic example. Of course, none of this is sufficient to remove the danger of sectarianism from any analysis. It is part of the Syrian reality–as recent sectarian incidents in Homs seem to suggest (10).
The Ramadan Offensive
In my previous post (July 28) I imagined Syria at a fork in the road, with its people facing the Lion of the Assad regime and the Alligator of civil war. Events since then have propelled the process forward in ways that are horrifying, so horrifying that the UN Security Council (after dallying for months) finally issued a statement condemning the violence in Syria (11).
Meanwhile the European Union and the US have imposed stricter economic and travel sanctions and the US is planning to take additional steps. U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford, who was in Washington this week, is urging the Obama administration to start thinking about how the US should respond when the Assad regime is toppled. At this point it is unclear what will happen next, but the Ramadan offensive is certainly changing the trajectory, perhaps towards more violence. Few believe that Assad will follow through with his reform agenda–that now includes multiparty elections, to be held before the end of 2011–when he has just arrested Walid al-Bunni, a venerable political dissident, and his sons–and while he is engaged in the most horrific crackdown yet, one that has now lasted more than a week. (12)
President Assad’s decision to launch a major offensive on July 31st –on the eve of Ramadan–shows how determined he is to suppress the uprising, regardless of the cost. Assad and his inner circle, fearful that the situation would get totally out of hand during Ramadan, ordered attacks by security forces on several several "hotspots" across Syria: Hama and Homs in center of the country, Deir al-Zour and Abu Kamal in the east, Daraa in the south, and Idleb in the northwest. On August 2 (Tuesday), in addition to a rising toll of dead and injured, hundreds of suspected organizers were arrested in the Damascus suburbs and in Zabadani (near the Lebanon border). By August 3rd, despite barricades hastily erected to keep them out, troops and tanks had penetrated the center of Hama, where they occupied Aasi Square. In addition to the 100 or so tanks in Hama, it was reported that about 200 tanks had surrounded the city of Deir al-Zour, where the shelling had begun on July 30th. Most of Syria’s oil fields are in the governorate of Deir al-Zour, which is also the home of many Sunni Muslim Bedouin with ties to their counterparts across the border in Iraq. Also of strategic importance in the east is the town of Abu Kamal, under attack since July 29thwhen security forces cut off its water, electricity, and communications. This eastern region Sunnis with close ties to fellow Sunnis in Iraq. Homs is strategically important too for its oil refinery and pipeline (bombed on July 29th). (13)
Assad’s priority, however, is putting down the revolt in Hama, with whatever brutality is necessary. The very large protest rally there on Friday (July 29th), followed by noisy gathering on Saturday night, provoked Assad but did not precipitate the assault on Sunday (July 31st)–which the regime might have been planning throughout July. The assault, from four directions-- with tanks shelling, machine guns rat-tatting, and snipers firing from roof tops--would last more than a week. By On Wednesday (August 3rd) the city’s water and electricity supplies have been cut and food and medicine were running short. Mostly unarmed civilians put up barricades and tried to keep the tanks from occupying the center of the city but eventually gave way. The tanks now have occupied Aasi Square and other key areas. (14).
On August 5th (last Friday) people across Syria voiced their solidarity with the besieged residents of Hama in protests tagged as "The Day of God With Us." In and around Damascus there many more than the usual number of protests, with crowds marching to chants of "Leave, Bashar" and "Hama, we are with you until death." No doubt more intense demonstrations, nearly every evening and spreading into the center of Damascus and those breaking out in Aleppo (hitherto mostly quiescent, due in part to its moderate Muslim and Christian merchant class–and to its Sufi heritage) is causing great anxiety in Assad’s inner circle. There were also large protests in Homs, Daraa, Qamishli in the north (a Kurdish area). It has been reported that In Homs security forces fired into a mosque and in Damascus they surrounded one. The defiance was remarkable in tank-surrounded Deir al-Zour, which is now feeling the brunt of Assad's wrath. (15)
The Ramadan offensive is unrelentless. During all of last week the violence kept escalating and the death toll mounting (though without reporters on the ground there is much uncertainty about the intensity of the shooting and shelling). On July 31st the death toll was already more than 100 (including 76 in Hama), by Tuesday (August 2) it had risen to at least 125, and by Friday (August 5) it may have been as high as 250 in Hama alone. These numbers must be added to counts reported previously (July 28th) of more than 1600 protesters and civilians killed, nearly 3000 people unaccounted for (i.e. disappeared), 26,000 arrested (often beaten and tortured), including some 12, 600 still in detention. It is also thought that more than 500 members of the security forces have also died in the violence. (16) On Sunday (August 7) more than 50 and perhaps as many as 70 people were killed in by the security forces. The death toll was highest in Deir al-Zour (reported as 42), indicating that the offensive is shift eastward. (16)
Despite the ferocity of the crackdown protests and resistance have continue in Hama, Homs, and other cities. It is as if the Syrian security forces are playing a game of "whack-a-mole" and perhaps they will becomes overstretched or exhausted before the protesters give up. Let's hope the government collapses before a emerges on the eastern front, where Deir al-Zour is now under heavy attack. (17)
The symbolism of the assault on Hama is inescapable. Assad can’t escape from the consequences of what he is doing there (at least not in the court of world opinion). This week Ban Ki-Moon rebuked Assad for having "lost all sense of humanity" and even Russian President Dimitry Medvedev issued a stern warning–while the Turks are becoming more and more disgusted (18). Though the Arab response has been muted, on Saturday the Gulf Cooperation Council called for an immediate end the bloodshed. If Hama epitomizes the conflict between the regime and conservative Sunni Muslims (as I think it does), what can he gain by sending tanks that are "blasting at the minarets of mosques." How can the launching of a religious satellite station begin to compensate for the deaths of so many unarmed (or very lightly armed, with a stick) civilians–who are mostly Muslims–or the seizure of mosques so that they can be used as barracks? (19) This only brings the sectarian feelings, especially anti-Alawite resentment, from the background to the foreground. It reminds both Syrians and foreign observers that Assad’s most reliable units of the security forces are dominated by Alawite loyalists.
For Muslims Ramadan is a time for prayer and spiritual reflection, for compassion and forgiveness. It is a time for reconciliation, not retribution and ruthlessness. Families, neighbors, and friends gather to break the fast together. People open their hearts and their pocketbooks, sharing what they have so that others may enjoy the bounty of Ramadan night-time feasting. (The obligation to give alms to the poor is one of the Five Pillars of Islam). That President Assad has launched a Ramadan offensive is highly offensive--not only to Muslims but to many other people of faith and good-will throughout the world.
The timing of this offensive is sure to anger Muslims across the board. If Sunni Muslims begin to perceive these assaults as the full force of an Alawite regime attacking centers of "true" Islam, this would surely increase the potential for sectarian strife. Another sobering possibility is that people will take up arms to defend themselves (especially in areas along the Iraq border, where access to firearms is less of a problem) (20).
At this fork in the road–at what may be a turning point–at what may be a tipping point for those who have withheld their support for the protesters but are now appalled by recent events–we may ask: Will the tide turn? Will those who have been neutral or passive cast their lot in with the protesters? Will Sunnis and others in the military defect? Will the business elite respond if economic begin to bite harder? If Assad becomes weaker, will political loyalties shift? How might the composition of the crowds out on the streets change?
Like other commentators, I’ve been curious about the extent of participation by members of minority groups (those who are not Muslim, not Sunni Muslim, not Arab). Who’s protesting? Who’s chanting, "Come on Bashar, just leave"? (21). Who’s still backing Assad and where do these die-hard supporters fit into the Syrian mosaic? Who’s willing to give him another chance? Who really believes that he will eventually permit a multi-party elections?
Answering these questions is difficult. As the Ramadan offensive continues, protesters and the Local Coordinating Committees are making extraordinary efforts just to inform the rest of the world about what people are facing out on the streets (tanks, artillery, snipers, lack of medical supplies). The biggest impediment for those based outside the country, who would like to know more about the participation (or not) of minorities is the absence of foreign journalists–since the government has had a policy of keeping them out. Thus the contributions of a few, often anonymous, reporters or stringers on the ground is extremely valuable (22). Additional information is funneled via out to dissidents and human rights activists, whose reporting may be somewhat selective (or their sources unverifiable). Although most Christians are holding back and some are ardent supports of President Assad, Syrian opposition leaders in their talks with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have assured her that the ranks of pro-democracy activists inside Syria do include Christians. In online media there are references, here and there, to Christians, Druze, and Kurdish protesters. It is also being reported that some Christians, Alawites, and a few Sunni businessmen are starting to ease away from their relationships with the Assads (Bashar, his brother Maher and their extended family of cousins and in-laws). (23)
(I will integrate whatever information I have gather into my future posts in this series, where appropriate.)
One of the great pitfalls of trying to understand what’s happening in Syria is the habit (especially in the West) of framing events in terms of two-sided, overly simplistic scenarios: i) Muslim vs. "the Rest"; ii) Sunnis vs. Alawites; iii) Sunnis vs. the Assads. A closer examination of Syria’s mosaic, including the diversity of its Islamic traditions, undermines these scenarios, even as each contains a measure of truth. That is coming in "Syria's Ancient and Modern Mosaic (Part II)."
ACTIVITIES
EXPLORE the Reuters "interactive" map and timeline to get a sense of how the Syrian uprising has developed--and sometimes stalled--over time. Good preparation for a current events discussion when school starts in the fall.
VIEW: Select footage to show in class to give students a sense of the scale of the demonstrations, their peaceful nature, and the brutality of the crackdown. Find clips on the CNN, Al Jazeera English , BBC News sites–in addition to those feature in The Lede (check previous posts on Syria for links to older material).
LISTEN: Deborah Amos is providing concise, interesting and accessible coverage on NPR [National Public Radio]. Select a recent item or a set (to provide more background) for a listening session in a social studies, history, or journalism class. (Some are listed in RESOURCES but search NPR for "syria deborah amos" for more items.)
READ/DISCUSS: To introduce the topic of the Syrian uprising and put it into a broader perspective assign Nour Ali’s article, This is a good place to start because it gives a very clear explanation of why what happened in Hama in 1982 resonates so deeply today (for both the people of Hama and the Assad regime).
- What do Syrians think of when they hear "Hama 1982"?
- What actions by the Muslim Brotherhood provoked the 1982 attack on Hama?
- Is this an example of a disproportionate response? Students should back up what their answer with details about the indiscriminate loss of life, the destruction (leveling) of large swathes of the city. Encourage them to use additional RESOURCES on Hama will help them answer this question.
- Why did people call this conflict the "war of the pyjamas"?
- How have people’s memories of 1982 "fueled" the current uprising, especially in Hama?
- Note how Mohamed's experience in 1982 connects with what he’s doing today. (The relevant parts could be extracted for a reading comprehension exercise, with this in mind, if you are unable to assign the entire article.)
- For "why Hama" Larbi Sadiki’s article also offers insight–that includes a discussion of the larger societal-political picture when he goes on to blame "four layers of power for what happened in Hama."
INVESTIGATE: Using Nour Ali’s article ("Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad") as a starting point. ASK: What clues do you find here about Hama’s ancient and pre-modern history? Then send them to the web to learn more. A Google search of "hama waterwheels syria" turns up the videos listed in RESOURCES and plenty of other good info. WORLD HISTORY: These wheels are an important component of the "Muslim Agricultural Revolution" so this provides an excellent past/present tie-in. When so much in Hama was destroyed, even mosques, the survival of the wheels sends a message about their great cultural significance.
MATH CLASS: Show the short video "Waterwheels of Hama" (just part of it would suffice). The largest wheels are 20 meters in diameter. ASK students to convert this to feet. Then ask them to compute (using either meters or feet) the circumference of a wheel of this size and the area of the space enclosed. NEXT, to connect the results of these calculations with the immense size the wheels, show "Salto de cabeza desde las norias de Hama" and pause when the clip shows the man walking at the top the wheel (unpause to show him jumping off). There’s plenty of info on the web to grab for an entire math lesson (e.g. using statistics about how much water a wheel can lift per hour or minute).
SPANISH CLASS ("Bell Ringer" activity): Show (or project/pause) the clip "Salto de cabeza desde las norias de Hama" and ask students to TRANSLATE the caption which appears below the video (distribute a paper copy or put it on white/black board).
- Caption text: "Escena captada en Hamma, Siria, donde los chavales se tiraban al río con apenas profundidad desde sus famosoas Norias de agua.
- Explain the historical link between Syria and Spain (the Umayyad dynasty).
READ/DISCUSS/DEBATE: As an alternative to the Seale article, assign Hugo Dixon’s "Can Non-Violent Struggle Bring Down Syria’s Assad?" Focus the discussion on the efficacy (or not) of non-violent tactics.
- An excellent article to use when studying Gandhi’s efforts in India or the Civil Rights movement in the US (or other cases that are part of your curriculum).
ANALYSIS: Speaking of POV, several op-ed contributions on the Asharq Alawsat provide excellent pieces for analysis. See especially those by Tariq Alhomayed. This news source has a very definite take on events in the Arab world, with a critical edge. Since the positions taken are clearly stated and strongly expressed, you can use items from this site to help students who find the concept of POV difficult.
GENERAL RESOURCES
"Recent Developments in Syria." Map and timeline [March 6 to August 3]. Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/interactive/idUSTRE77424P20110805?view=small&type=worldNews
- Excellent: map shows locations of all major protests. Drag bar to go back to March 6 (check especially what was happening on the Fridays).
- A governorate is a province. A handy map to consult when the names of provinces appear in news articles. Some province names are also names of cities, for example, Deir al-Zour.
- Blog of Joshua Landis, a Syrian expert (married to a Syrian Alawite woman), who is frequently quoted in the media.
- Great resource–since there are now 83 posts tagged "Syria Revolution 2011" (plus earlier posts for background). Posts are compendiums of Landis’s opinions (with links to news items), commentary on others’ opinions (with links, often excerpts or translations), and guest or re-published posts.
- See esp. opinion by editor-in-chief Tariq Alhomayed (a young but very experience journalist), who doesn’t pull any punches in his critiques of the Arab world’s responses to events in Syria. In addition to a BA in Media studies from King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Alhomayed has worked towards a Master’s degree from George Washington University (Washington D.C) but is now based in London.
Historical Background
Heck, "Religion and the Authoritarian State: The Case of Syria" (2005): http://www.ou.edu/mideast/Additional%20pages%20-%20non-catagory/Heck_Religion.and.the.Authoritarian.State.pdf
- Scholarly article with much important background info (college students could profit from reading part/all of it).
- Browse links on the Syrian Studies Association web site for more high-quality material: http://www.ou.edu/ssa/links.htm
Fisk, Robert. "Ghosts from the Past: Syria’s 30 Years of Fear." Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies (June 24, 2010): http://www.dchrs.org/english/news.php?id=98&idC=3
Lund, Aron. "The Ghosts of Hama: The Bitter Legacy of Syria’s Failed 1979-1982 Revolution." URL: http://old.silc.se/files/pdf/The%20Ghosts%20of%20Hama%20by%20Aron%20Lund.pdf
Ali, Nour. "Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad." The Guardian (August 1, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/01/hama-syrian-city-defy-assad
- Nour Ali is the pseudonym of a Damascus-based, very knowledgeable journalist.
VIDEO: "Salto de cabeza desde las norias de Hama." 0:33. YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rhpwRlYEtc&NR=1
Discussion and Commentary
(I decided to list these chronologically as opinions shift as events unfold, circumstances change.)
Seale, Patrick. "Way Out of the Syrian Crisis." Gulf News (July 22, 2011): http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/way-out-of-the-syrian-crisis-1.841275
- See also Joshua Landis commentary (http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=11084)
Sadiki, Larbi. "In Syria, the Government Is the Real Rebel." Al Jazeera English (July 31, 2011): http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/2011731113293285318.html
- Insight from Middle East expert, a lecturer at University of Exeter, UK
Hounshell, Blake and Josh Rogan. "The Last Stand of Bashar al-Assad?" The Cable : Foreign Policy (August 1, 2011): http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/01/the_last_stand_of_bashar_al_assad
Alhomayed, Tariq. "Syria: Closing Mosques and Launching Satellite Television Channels." Asharq Alawsat (August 2, 2011); http://www.asharq-e.com/print.asp?artid=id26110
Maclean, William. "Analysis: Syria Army Keeps Cohesion but Risks Overstretch." Reuters (August 2, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/02/us-syria-army-idUSTRE7713FK20110802
King, John. Interview with Susan Rice. "U.N. Ambassador Rice on the Violence in Syria." Real Clear Politics (August 4, 2011): http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/08/04/in_ambassador_rice_on_the_violence_in-syria_110842.html
Slim, Randa. "Where’s Syria’s Business Community." Foreign Policy (August 5, 2011): http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/05/wheres_syrias_business_community
Alhomayed, Tariq. "Is Walid Muallem Joking?" Asharq Alawsat (August 7, 2011): http://www.asharq-e.com/print.asp?artid=id26167
- Good piece for POV analysis, an Arab’s POV that considers the official Arab response to events in Syria–with a focus on Arabs as Arabs rather than as Muslims (though Islamic values of justice and respect for civilians is where he’s coming from–as shown in other essays). Note references to Iran and arms shipments from Tehran (reported elsewhere on this site).
RESOURCES: BREAKING NEWS
Mackey, Robert and Elizabeth Harris. "Video Shows Large Protest in Hama, Syrian City at Heart of Previous Uprising." The Lede: New York Times (July 1, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/video-shows-syrian-protesters-in-hama/
Shadid, Anthony. "Syrian President Fires Governor in Charge of a Restive City." New York Times (July 2, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/world/middleeast/03syria.html?scp=18&sq=shadid+hama&st=nyt
Amos, Deborah. "Protesters Gather in Hama." NPR (July 8, 2011): http://www.npr.org/2011/07/08/137709656/protesters-gather-in-hama-syria
Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. "Tanks Shell East Syrian City, 5 Killed." Reuters (July 31, 2011): http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/30/uk-syria-idUKTRE76S3YW20110730
Amos, Deborah. "Syrian Government Escalates Crackdown Ahead of Ramadan." NPR (July 31, 2011): http://www.npr.org/2011/07/31/138875992/syrian-government-escalates-crackdown-ahead-of-ramadan
"Scores Dead’ as Syrian Tanks Storm Hama City." Al Jazeera English (July 31, 2011): http://englishaljazeera.net/english/middleeast/2011/07/201173143432348733.html
Bilefsky, Dan. "Video from Deadly Raids in Syria." The Lede: New York Times (July 31, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/video-from-deadly-raids-in-syria/
Borzou Dargahi and Alexandra Sandels, "Syrian Forces Attack 4 Opposition Strongholds," Los Angeles Times (July 31, 2011): http://latimes.com/news/nationworld/la-fgw-syria-hama-20110801,0,7890854.story
Hammond, Andrew. "Arabs Angry Over Syria Crackdown but Governments Silent." Reuters (August 1, 2011): http://af.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFL6E7J11PT20110801
Amos, Deborah. "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death." NPR (August 2, 2011): http://www.npr.org/2011/08/02/138834930/syrian-opposition-echoes-cry-for-liberty-or-death
Ali, Nour and Ian Black. "Syrian Death Toll Rises in Crackdown." The Guardian (August 2, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/02/syria-deaths-protests-crackdown
"Al-Assad’s Reign Is Over," Asharq Alawsat (August 3, 2011): http://www.asharq-e.com/print.asp?artid=id26117.
Syria Unrest: Tanks ‘Advance’ on Beseiged City of Hama." BBC News (August 3, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14385981?print=true
Bakri, Nada and Rick Gladstone. "Casting Aside World Criticism, Syria Invades Town [online headline]." New York Times (August 3, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/world/middleeast/04syria.html?scp=1&sq=nada%20bakri%20rick%20gladstone%20syria&st=cse
Derhally, Massoud and Flavia Krause-Jackson. "Syrian Forces Shell Hama as UN Struggles for Agreement on Condeming Assad." Bloomberg (August 3, 2011): http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-03/syria-violence-escalates-as-un-struggles-for-agreement-on-condemning-assad.html
Goodman, David. "Video from Syria Shows Tanks in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (August 3, 2011):
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/video-from-syria-shows-tanks-in-hama/?scp=7&sq=syria&st=cse
Worsnip, Patrick. "U.N. Council Statement Condemns Use of Force." Reuters (August 3, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/04/us-syria-un-idUSTRE7724EB20110804.
Sly, Liz. "Syrian Troops, Tanks Push into Hama." Washington Post (August 3, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-troops-tanks-push-into-hama/2011/08/03/gIQAoZpsrI_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads
Bakri, Nada and Anthony Shadid. "Broadcasting Hama Ruins, Syria Says It Has Ended Revolt." New York Times (August 5, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/world/middleeast/06syria.html?scp=8&sq=syria&st=cse
Sly, Liz. "Syrian Forces Press Onslaught in Hama." Washington Post (August 4, 2011):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-forces-press-onslaught-in-hama/2011/08/04/gIQAy2QwuI_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads
Karouny, Mariam. "Syria’s Tribal Eastern Region Braces for Army Assault." Reuters (August 5, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/05/us-syria-east-idUSTRE77440720110805
VIDEO: "News Wrap: Syrian Regime Proclaims Victory in Hama Crackdown." PBS Newshour (August 5, 2011): http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec11/othernews_08-05.html
- Short video clips, but significant content on intensifying protests in Damascus (transcript available).
"Syria Vows ‘Free Elections’ as Pressure Grows," Gulf News (August 6, 2011): http://gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/syria-vows-free-elections-as-pressure-grows-1.848183
"Syrian Troops Kill at Least 52 People." Gulf News (August 7): http://gulfnews.com/news/region/syria/syrian-troops-kill-at-least-52-people-1.848557
Shadid, Anthony. "Syrian Military Pressure Mounts on Another City." New York Times (August 7, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/world/middleeast/08syria.html?scp=2&sq=syria&st=cse
NOTES (For full citations see RESOURCES sections.)
1) A: Quoted in Simon Burns, "A Spiritual Experience: Sufi Dhikr at Muhieddine Mosque." Forward Magazine (February 13, 2011):
http://www.forwardsyria.com/story/407/A%20spiritual%20experience:%20Sufi%20dhikr%20at%20Muhieddine%20Mosque. Al Yacoubi is a prominent Syrian Islamic scholar, well-traveled, with many followers. He now lives in Damascus but in the 1990s he was the Mufti of Sweden. B: Quoted by Deborah Amos in "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death," NPR (August 2, 2011); in mid-March this fellow left grad school in Beirut to join the protest movement in Damascus. C: From "Way Out of the Syrian Crisis," Gulf News (July 22, 2011).
2) For example: David Ignatius, "Tom Donilon’s Arab Spring Challenge." Washington Post (April 26, 2011):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/tom-donilons-arab-spring-challenge/2011/04/26/AFWVE2sE_story.html; Liz Sly, "‘Doomsday Scenario’ if Syria Fails," Washington Post (May 1/2, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/unrest-in-syria-threatens-regional-stability/2011/05/01/AF3OQtUF_story.html; Mariam Karouny, "Analysis: Civil War Fears Grow in Syria," Reuters (June 10, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE7592T320110610
3) For an overview of the mosaic see my earlier post, "Syria’s Ancient and Modern Mosaic (Part I). The Alawites, about 10-12% of the population, are an offshoot of Shia Islam but historically resided outside the mainstream due to peculiar beliefs that suggest syncretism with other religious traditions (including Christianity); for a brief discussion see Christopherm Howse, "Secretive Sect of the Rulers of Syria," The Telegraph (August 5, 2011): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8684113/Secretive-sect-of-the-rulers-of-Syria.html. They were mostly rural and poor prior to benefitting from the two Assad regimes. The Druze are abut 3% of the population. Despite having also emerged from Shia Islam, are more willing than the Alawites to accept a distinctive identity. The Christians, about 10% of the population, belong mostly to a number of Orthodox and Catholic denominations–and to different ethnic identities. More information will be presented in Part II (on mainstream Sunni and Shia Islam), Part III (Alawites, Druze, Christians and other religious identities), and Part IV (ethnic groups). In the meantime the presence in the army of both Alawites (dominating the officer class and a few crack units) and Sunnis (a few officers and many "foot-soldiers") is a critical factor; see William Maclean, "Analysis: Syria Army Keeps Cohesion but Risks Overstretch," Reuters (August 2, 2011).
4) In a speech on June 20 Assad talked about pursuing reform through national dialogue (convened, with little effect on July 10th), but it elicited anger almost immediately on the streets–where protesters threw shoes at and stomped on his portrait. The next day Assad’s supporters came out in force, unfurling a massive flag, and though not everyone in the crowd was a true fan of the president, it was clear that he did have genuine supporters. But security forces then attacked a university dormitory, where students had refused to join these pro-Assad demonstrations. See NYT (6-21). For economic factors see Ausama Monajed’s comments in Hugo Dixon, "Can Non-Violent Struggle Bring Down Syria’s Assad?" Breakingviews: Reuters (August 1, 2011). Randa Slim, "Where’s Syria’s Business Community." Foreign Policy (August 5, 2011).
5) Lachlan Carmichael, "US Hedges Its bets on Syria,"AFP (April 2): http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmzQ9zxbgskrumsw9ON1Tu6VtdNw?docId=CNG.34b89149aa6e7d06680c9cf785978729.b21. See also Ignatius (note 2).
6) Ali, Nour. "Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad." The Guardian (August 1, 2011). For a scholarly account see Aron Lund, "The Ghosts of Hama: The Bitter Legacy of Syria’s Failed 1979-1982 Revolution" (in RESOURCES). The minimum toll of 10,000 (most often cited) is based on Human Rights Watch data but estimates range up to 40,000.
7) Anthony Shadid, "Syrian President Fires Governor in Charge of a Restive City," New York Times (July 2, 2011).
8) Since the constitution requires that the president be a Muslim, when Hafez Assad took over in 1970 he arranged a formal recognition from Sunni clerics. Since then the Alawites appear to have moved closer to "orthodox" beliefs and practices. Bashar Assad’s wife is a Sunni. This will be discussed more in a subsequent post.
9) For the views of these young organizers, see especially Deborah Amos, Deborah, "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death," NPR (August 2, 2011). See also Ausama Monajed, "In Syria, an Opening for the West to Bring about Assad’s Downfall," Washington Post (June 26, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-syria-an-opening-for-the-west-to-bring-about-assads-downfall/2011/06/24/AGz4hcmH_story.html?wpisrc=nl_opinions.
10) Syrian human rights activists have acknowledged the sectarian aspect of these incidents but this view is not uncontested (others have blamed the regime for provoking them); Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/syria-troops-homs-security-crackdown; and Deborah Amos, "Syrian Opposition Echoes Cry for Liberty or Death" NPR (August 2, 2011). In a opinion piece Hussein Shobokshi (apparently drawing on sources inside Syria) alleges that the regime has tried to incite violence between Sunnis and Alawites and between Muslims and Christians; see "Al-Assad’s Reign Is Over," Asharq Alawsat (August 3, 2011). U.S. Ambassdor Ford is remains convinced that the protesters are committed to peaceful tactics; see Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011). Some organizers have received training in non-violent tactics, as reported in Hugo Dixon, "Can Non-Violent Struggle Bring Down Syria’s Assad?" Breakingviews: Reuters (August 1, 2011).
11) Patrick Worsnip, "U.N. Council Statement Condems Use of Force." Reuters (August 3, 2011); John King, interview with Susan Rice, "U.N. Ambassador Rice on the Violence in Syria." Real Clear Politics (August 4, 2011).
12) Anna Fiifield, "‘Time to Think about the Day After Assad,’" Financial Times (August 2, 2011). Despite Assad’s recent military advances, several commentators see these as detrimental in the long-run; as reported by Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011). Syrian expert Andrew Tabler thinks that neither Assad’s political nor his military strategies are not working; see Ellen Knickmeyer, "Defiant Syrians Hold Huge Protests," Los Angeles Times (August 6, 2011). Kickmeyer quotes a Damacus lawyer, who labels Syria "a failed state." A draft of the party law (now officially promulgated) states that no parties based on religious, tribal or ethnic beliefs–nor any discriminating against a gender or a race would be recognized (in accordance with the Baath Party’s historically non-sectarian principles; see Liz Sly, "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms," Washington Post (July 25, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syria-permits-opposition-parties-on-restrictive-terms/2011/07/25/gIQAGiWyYI_story.html. For elections and the arrest of the al-Bunni family, see Gulf News (August 6, 2011). The background of the al-Bunni’s is apparently Christian.
13) Among the abundant media coverage, see esp. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Tanks Shell East Syrian City, 5 Killed," Reuters (July 30, 2011); Borzou Dargahi and Alexandra Sandels, "Syrian Forces Attack 4 Opposition Strongholds," Los Angeles Times (July 31, 2011); Liz Sly and Joby Warrick, "Syrian Forces Intensify Assault on Hama," Washington Post (August 1, 2011); Massoud Derhally and Flavia Krause-Jackson, "Syrian Forces Shell Hama as UN Struggles for Agreement on Condeming Assad." Bloomberg (August 3, 2011); "Syria Unrest: Tanks ‘Advance’ on Besieged City of Hama," BBC News (August 3, 2011). For video footage see "Syrian Tanks Move into Hama, Drawing International Protest," Global Post (August 3, 2011); Dan Bilefsky, "Video from Deadly Raids in Syria." The Lede: New York Times (July 31, 2011). For the oil fields (which account for one-third of Syria’s export revenue), see Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011).
14) Nour Ali, "Hama–The City That’s Defying Assad." The Guardian (August 1, 2011).
15) Liz Sly, Liz. "Protests Erupt Across Syria in Defiance of Crackdown." Washington Post (August 5, 2011). For video footage of these protests see esp. PBS Newshour (August 5, 2011). For chants (quoted from videos posted online), see Andrew Osborn, "Syria: Dimity Medvedev Warns Bashar al-Assad," The Telegraph (August 5, 2011): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8684255/Syria-Dmitry-Medvedev-warns-Bashar-al-Assad-to-prepare-for-sad-fate.html. For Damascus see Ellen Knickmeyer, "Defiant Syrians Hold Huge Protests." Los Angeles Times (August 6, 2011). There have been mass protests in Damascus every night this week (according to "Alexander Page" on PBS).
16) For these tolls see various news articles for the week of August 1-7, including: Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Death Toll Rises in Crackdown." The Guardian (August 2, 2011); "Syrian Troops Kill at Least 52 People." Gulf News (August 7). For tolls as of June 28th, see web site of Avaaz, an international human rights organization, URL: http://www.avaaz.org/act/media.php?press_id=262 (check site for updates). Updates are often provided by activists with contacts in Syria, such as those cited in Derhally/Krause-Jackson, (source of the 500 killed on the government side).
17) Anthony Shadid, "Syrian Military Pressure Mounts on Another City," New York Times (August 7, 2011).
18) For Ban Ki-Moon and the Turkish deputy prime minister, see Nada Bakri and Rick Gladstone, "Syria Sends in Tanks to Storm Center of Rebellious City," New York Times (August 3, 2011). Andrew Osborn,"Syria: Dimitry Medvedev warns Bashar al-Assad," The Telegraph (August 5, 2011) (see note 15). For the Arab world’s response see Andrew Hammond, "Arabs Angry Over Syria Crackdown but Governments Silent" Reuters (August 1, 2011); "Syria Vows ‘Free Elections’ as Pressure Grows," Gulf News (August 6, 2011); and opinion essays on the Asharq Alawsat site.
19) Nada Bakri and Anthony Shadid, "Syrians Strike Restive Cities, Killing Dozens," New York Times (August 1, 2011). Alhomayed, Tariq. "Syria: Closing Mosques and Launching Satellite Television Channels." Asharq Alawsat (August 2, 2011).
20) For access to arms see Mariam Karouny, "Syria’s Tribal Eastern Region Braces for Army Assault" Reuters (August 5, 2011); Shadid, "Syrian Military Pressure Mounts on Another City, New York Times (August 7, 2011).
21) Robert Mackey, "Video of a Syrian Protest Anthem." The Lede: New York Times (July 21): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/video-of-a-syrian-protest-anthem/. "Syria Vows ‘Free Elections’ as Pressure Grows," Gulf News (August 6, 2011).
22) Note esp. unnamed Damacus reporter with leading by-line (with Anna Fifield in Washington) in the Financial Times (August 4, 2011); Nidaa Hassan (The Guardian); Nour Ali (The Guardian); unnamed correspondent in Damascus (Los Angeles Times), as indicated in Knickmeyer; "Alexander Page" in the PBS segment.
23) Lachlan Carmichael, "Syria Protesters Ask Obama to Demand Assad Resign," AFP (August 3, 2011). Blake Hounshell and Josh Rogan, "The Last Stand of Bashar al-Assad?" The Cable (August 1, 2011). For Alawites as the key, see Bassma Kadmani, "To Topple Assad, It Takes a Minority," New York Times (August 1, 2011).
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