INTRODUCTION
During the past couple of weeks President Bashar al-Assad of Syria has launched a crackdown on anti-government protesters with such vehemence that he has any remnant of legitimacy in the arena of world opinion. Assad seems determined to do whatever it takes to reassert control over every corner of the country, but the future of his regime--and thus the future of Syria--is still very much in play.
Assad has argued that only his regime can guarantee the safety of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities. We might say that he’s playing the "minority card" now as a way to prop up his regime, for in the past he more or less prohibited any discussion of "sectarianism." In the mainstream Western media, especially in the earlier phases of the uprising, many commentators seemed to accept Assad’s argument and it did have some credibility–much more before the onslaught of his troops and tanks. Of course, there are plenty of reasons to be concerned. We know what happened in Iraq. We’ve heard about the recent of attacks on Copts in Egypt. And I’ve shuddered when trying to imagine what might happen to Syria’s Alawites, if Assad falls and they are caught up in a backlash. (1)
If the regime collapses, will Syria’s mosaic of ethnic and religious minorities disintegrate? At this point any analysis must remain open-ended and realistic. I recommend that we don’t jump to too conclusions about the "fragility of Syria’s social fabric" (2).
The situation in Syria has been escalating steadily since mid-March. After three months of protests, to which the Assad regime has responded with arrests, beatings, live ammunition, tanks and artillery, the death toll is now more than 1300 (more than 1400 according to some sources). As many as 10,000 have been arrested, including street protesters, opposition politicians, human rights activists, community leaders, and children. In Homs (and probably elsewhere), when space ran out due to the large number of detainees, the government had to convert schools into "holding pens." With so many men in detention, women began turning out to keep the movement going. In several towns they have organized "women-only" demonstrations and in Banias two were died at such an event–shot by the security forces. Hundreds have died during the last ten days in the brutal crackdown in the northwest. (3)
After the security forces manage to subdue a targeted town or region, they typically move on, leaving a smaller force behind. Thus the focus of the crackdown keeps on shifting from one locale to another. So after using force to re-take Jisr al-Shugur in the northwest, the regime sent troops and tanks towards a strategic town on the road between Aleppo and Damascus–as well Deir al-Zour on the Euphrates River and other towns in the east close to the border with Iraq. Protesters, however, have remained defiant despite their losses (killed, wounded, arrested), and soon return to the streets though often on a smaller scale or at several locations (instead of one large gathering)–so that the names of towns such as Homs and Dara’a keep popping in and out of the news. (See Resources: Breaking News).
Now there are reports of more defections from the army (in addition to those alleged in Jisr al-Shugur). Rumor has it that only large-scale defections of officers as well as foot-soldiers can save the day for the opposition. In any case, commentators have questioned the reliabliity of these reports, which anti-Assad activists may be exaggerating as a way to further erode the government’s position? (4)
So far the feeble international response has not had much of an affect. The Turkish administration of Prime Minister Erdogan, perhaps best-positioned to influence President Assad, is running out of patience. Prime Minister Erdogan, who now speaks of Syrian "savagery," has allowed nearly 10,000 Syrian refugees to enter Turkey and pledged to keep the border open. At the UN the Security Council’s failure to act is attributed to the veto power invested in Russia and China. Four weeks ago President Obama challenged Assad to "lead the transition" or "get out of the way." Yet Assad is doing neither--and Obama isn’t doing anything to stop the violence (as he had suggested in the speech that he would) (5). The latest development, highly significant, is the Arab League’s condemnation of the violence in Syria–which elicited an angry response from the Syrian government (6).
According to a report coming out of Syria, President Assad will address the nation on Sunday (or perhaps Monday). This comes on the heels of a massive pro-Assad demonstration in Damascus on June 15th (7). Will President Assad, once acclaimed inside and outside of Syria as a reformer, actually announce any substantive reforms? In the early weeks of the uprising he seemed to be vacillating between token reforms and repressive violence. Was he vacillating out of an inability to see clearly what was happening? How could he not realize that the senseless killing of unarmed civilians–even women and children--would only provoke a stronger response, capable of seriously endangered his regime?
Assad has considerable support, especially from those with much to lose if he is ousted. Prominent among his supporters are members of Syria’s minority communities. The Alawites, to whom the Assad family belongs, are but one piece of the Syrian mosaic but they feel threatened–not without reason--by their minority status and by their collusion with a repressive regime. What is less discussed in the media is Assad’s support among the Sunni middle and upper class residents of Damascus and Aleppo (the second largest city). Is Assad’s imminent speech a last ditch effort to consolidate this support? His critics aren’t expecting it to make much of a difference in how he runs the country.
The situation is serious and rapidly evolving. For outside observers (analysts, pundits, journalists) what is particularly frustrating is their inability to verify reports coming out of Syria–as the regime is not permitting foreign reporters to operate within the county. To put recent events into perspective I recommend listing to The Economist’s interview with Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East studies at the University of Oklahoma (see Resources). Although sometimes criticized for being too sympathetic to Syrian government point of view (he is married to a Syrian), Landis is very knowledgeable about Syria and its people. his assessment here is cautious that and balanced. What he presents here is a cautious and balanced assessment is a nuanced and measured view of the sectarian dimension of politics in Syria. As he explained on his blog (June 15): "This is not my title. I wouldn't have chosen it. The struggle in Syria has not yet become and [sic] overt sectarian struggle as happened in Lebanon or Iraq."
Identities Past and Present
What makes the protests in Syria so different from other manifestations of the Arab Spring is the country’s complicated demographic mosaic. This mosaic is the residue of many centuries of accumulating ethnic and religious identities–further complicated by cross-cutting political and ideological points of view. These are all further shaped by social and economic differences, such as urban versus rural lifestyles, income disparities--and perhaps very significantly in a country where more than 36% of the population is age 10-24–by a generation gap between the aspirations and worldviews of young people and those of their parents and grandparents (8).
Circumstances change, politics evolve, an ethnic identity in the foreground at one point in time recedes into the background at another, then re-emerges at still another. All of this is fodder for historians to chew on. We cannot begin to understand events in Syria–or speculate about possible outcomes–without acknowledging the complexity of the country’s co-existing identities. And, like people everywhere, Syrians have multiple, sometimes shifting and nearly always context-dependent, identities.
Ideally, I’d like to explore the many dimensions of Syria’s conserved, constrained, and contested identities. How and why have the processes of constructing identity changed over time? And what has been retained even as change was occurring? This series of posts is a mere beginning.
From the perspective of world history Syrian history is a treasure house of processes and patterns, an exemplar for almost any topic of general importance. "The cultural heritage of the Syrians rflects the evolved cultures of the East and the West over the long sweep of history" (9). As a crossroads of cultures and caravans, Syria is heavy with layers of historical baggage going back to ancient times. "Greater Syria" (as a geographical concept) stretches to the Mediterranean to encompass both modern Syria and Lebanon and parts of Turkey (10). Its history includes Phoenician city-states, Pax Roman emporia, the Umayyad Caliphate, Crusader enclaves, and incorporation into the Mamluk and Ottoman Empires (and of course much more). In textbook maps of the ancient world central and eastern Syria correspond to northern Mesopotamia. Indeed, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that roughly define "the Land between the Rivers" have their sources in the region just north of Syria and Syria’s mountainous regions are part of the "uplands and hilly flanks" of the Fertile Crescent.
There were Jews in Syria before the Common Era and thriving Jewish and Christian communities there in the early centuries of the Common Era’s first millennium. Islam arrived very early and by the 660s CE Damascus was the capital of the Caliphate. For centuries Greater Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire but Arab Revolt (1916) helped to bring about the Ottoman collapse, the peoples of this region had to contend with French and British rivalry over the spoils and both Lebanon and Syria fell under the French mandate. The French pursued a divide and rule policy, empowering minorities such as the Alawites and Druze, in ways that fostered divisiveness (11).
Throughout many upheavals, conquests, invasions, sectarian tensions, and persecutions the ancestors of modern Syrians have sustained themselves and passed on their traditions. Some communities have fared better than others: some have declined in numerically or proportionally while others have flourished. In daily life ancient languages gave way over time to Arabic (with a few exceptions). Minority communities survived by resorting to strategies that ran the gamut from serving the powerful, to retreating to rural villages, to practicing taqiyya (dissimulation, i.e. hiding one’s true identity or beliefs). The more I learn about the history of the Syrian mosaic the easier it becomes to imagine a vast repertoire of strategies. How have these have played out during the forty-odd years of the Assad regime, including the current uprising? How might they contribute (or not) to the new politics of a post-Assad era--if President Assad is overthrown?
Is the Syrian mosaic crumbling? Is the connective grout between its pieces eroding? That’s one way to look at the situation. Increasingly, as protests continue, Syria looks more and more like a country divided into two parts: one part pro-Assad (the Assad family, its core supporters, and most Alawites), the other anti-Assad (mostly Sunni Muslims). Yet, as Joshua Landis explains, this oversimplifies the situation (12). While many minority communities seem to fall into the pro-government camp, since their leaders have favored stability, in the run-up to the current crisis the call for reform has perhaps been more broadly disseminated than a survey of those out on the streets would suggest. In other words, the silent minorities and even the pro-Assad demonstrators of June 15th, may harbor dissident elements that, despite their preferring reform over rupture, could turn against Assad (13).
All of these questions are part of a broader theme we might call "the politics of managing the mosaic." So, how has the Assad regime managed Syria’s diversity? Quite well, actually. And herein lies a profound tragedy. Malise Ruthven concludes her review of Brooke Allen’s The Other Side of the Mirror: An American Travels Through Syria, with the poignant observation:
Visiting several mosques, churches, and shrines, she provides impressive testimony of the country’s religious diversity and the regime’s commitment to religious freedom. It would be tragic if the pursuit of democracy led to the shredding of this bright human canopy, where religious and cultural differences seem to have flourished under the iron grip of a minority sectarian regime. (14)At the time of independence from France in 1946, the ideals of the Baath Party were those of nationalism, pan-Arabism, and secularism. Over the years the balance of these has varied, but when the Baathists came to power in 1963, they were quite willing to co-opt any group willing to abide by its non-sectarian policies. When Hafez Assad took over in 1970, his primary goal was to create stablity in a country plagued by coups for more than two decades. Of course, he brought many of his fellow Alawites into the government, but he also reached out to Christians and Druze and, by adhering more closely to Sunni Muslim beliefs and practices, he won supporters among the Sunni majority. His strategy worked--with one exception, the Sunnis who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. And the results were tragic–as attested by the killings in Jisr al-Shugur in 1980 and the massacre in Hama in 1982.
Since becoming president in 2000 Bashar Assad has had consider success in gaining the loyalty of the Christian and Druze minorities, yet he has been more wary of the more conservative, Brotherhood-leaning Sunnis. His decision in 2005 to enact economic reforms was undoubtedly motivated in part by a need to curry favor among the urban commercial classes, regardless of their sectarian identities. Those who benefitted the most, however, were family members, highly-placed bureaucrats, and the Baathist elite, most notably his cousin Rami Makhlouf. This week Makhlouf, the richest businessman in Syria, announced that he would henceforth devote himself to charity (though it is not at all clear that he is really forsaking his commercial ties). I see this as yet another indicator of the regime’s grasp of the economic currents running through the uprising (15).
I intend to take up "managing the mosaic" in detail in a later post. First, however, I think it is necessary to provide information about the consitutent pieces of the mosaic. While this picture is by no means complete (due to time constraints and the nature of the readily available sources), I will present it in Parts II and III. In the meantime, here is a chart of the religious and ethnic identities to be included in those posts:
RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES MUSLIMS
ALAWITES DRUZE CHRISTIANS
JEWS (a small number in Damascus and Aleppo) YAZIDIS | ETHNIC IDENTITIES SYRIAN ARABS
KURDS ASSYRIANS (Syriacs/Chaldeans) ARMENIANS CIRCASSIANS TURKMEN GREEKS DOM PALESTINIAN ARABS (refugees) IRAQI ARABS (refugees) IRAQI ASSYRIANS (refugees) |
ACTIVITIES
Though school is out in the US, I’m presenting these in a "pedagogical present" format.
READ: Use "After All This Bloodshed" to introduce what’s been happening in Syria. Call attention to the grassroots statement about "national unity." Why, then, is there also a looming "spectre of sectarian violence"?
SHOW the short video "Thomas L. Friedman on Hama, Syria, 1982" to set the stage for discussion of the situation in Syria.
RESEARCH/CREATE: To illustrate the Syrian mosaic use Alissa Everett’s account of her visit to Damascus (or simply explain that Damascus has a cultural heritage that is Jewish, Christian, and Muslim). Then send students to find images online and create their own SLIDESHOW or PowerPoint about cultural diversity in Damascus or Aleppo.
READ/DISCUSS: Assign "Promise of Arab Uprisings" in a global studies, history, civics/government, journalism, or language arts class. In this short piece NYT reporters Shadid and Kirkpatrick pull together their observations around the theme of diversity and the urgent need for "a new sense of national identity built on the idea of citizenship."
SEARCH/RESEARCH: Ask students to go to the NYT site and find other articles by Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick. Where have they reported from the "frontlines of history"? ASK: How do you think their reporting has influenced how they think about identity and citizenship?
READ/DISCUSS/RESEARCH: An exploding Syria would affect the entire region. First read Thomas Friedman’s "They Shoot Horses, Don’t They?" and ASK students to list what he thinks the repercussions will be. In an advanced class, as the next step, hand out the relevant portions of the Reva Bhala’s "Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis." EXPAND the topic with an online search for more information about the possible impact on Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq (a suitable homework assignment). Then discuss in class the likelihood of these possible outcomes. Encourage students to think about the POV of their sources (since an Israeli speculating on, for example, the impact on Lebanon would no doubt be quite different from what a Lebanese might predict).
GENERAL RESOURCES
"Timeline: Syria." BBC News (May 21, 2011): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/827580.stm
"Syria Demographics Profile 2011." Index Mundi: http://www.indexmundi.com/syria/demographics_profile.html (based on CIA World Factbook, as of December 30, 2011).
Syrian Studies Association: Links: http://www.ou.edu/ssa/links.htm
- Check out scholarly articles, esp. Paul Heck, "Religion and the Authoritarian State: The Case of Syria" (2005): http://www.ou.edu/mideast/Additional%20pages%20-%20non-catagory/Heck_Religion.and.the.Authoritarian.State.pdf
Centre for Syrian Studies: Links: (School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews): http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/css/links/
SyriaComment.com: http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2004/08/iraqi-christians-fleeing-to-syria.htm
Creative Syria:http://www.creativesyria.com/
- Link from SyriaComment.com
- Two photo collections, including a set of historical photos going back as far as 1850
Forward Magazine: http://www.forwardsyria.com/
- "Born from the firm conviction that the only way is forward in Syrian and other options do not exist, Forward Magazine is the only balanced, local, and reliable source of infomration on Syria in the English language. ... It does not distort factors nor does it falsify realities. Simply, it looks at the bright side of things, while pointing to the shortcomings, with the objective of change and reform, rather than cynicism."
- First issue, 5 January 2007. Online and print edition.
Maps
"Syria." URL: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia02/syria_sm02.gif
- Major towns with place-names formally transcribed (but some important protest localities are not shown)
- Best map (though it doesn’t show towns where most recent protests and crackdowns have occurred).
- Earlier NYT map with timeline (covers protests from March 21 to April 22, 2011)
"A Sectarian Look at Syrian Unrest." URL: http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/4-4-11-Syria_Unrest.jpg
- Excellent color coded map of major pieces of the mosaic (but shows only the protest localities up to about May 4th)
- A governorate may also be called a province. Use this map to locate governorates/provinces mentioned in news sources.
Analysis and Commentary
Shadid, Anthony and David D. Kirkpatrick. "Promise of Arab Uprisings Is Threatened by Divisions." New York Times (May 21, 2011):
Friedman, Thomas. "They Shoot Horses, Don’t They?" New York Times (May 21, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/opinion/22friedman.html?ref=thomaslfriedman
Bhalla, Reva. "Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis." Stratfor (May 5, 2011): http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis
- Important background on Assad regime's Alawite "pillar" (with emphasis on Alawites in the military).
- Provides a geopolitical analysis of the regional context.
Yassin-Kassab, Robin. "After All This Bloodshed, There Is No Going Back for Syria." The Guardian (June 16, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/16/bloodshed-syria-regime-change
RESOURCES: BREAKING NEWS
Stack, Liam. "Syrian Troops Retake Control of Rebellious Town in North Town." New York Times (June 12, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/middleeast/13syria.html?ref=syria
Landis, Joshua. "What happened at Jisr al-Shagur?" Syria Comment (June 13, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10202
- Commentary by Landis plus extracts/links to numerous news articles and commentary dating from June 9-13.
Daragahi, Borzou. "Syrians Vent Rage in Tent Camps on Border with Turkey." Los Angeles Times (June 14, 2011): http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/14/world/la-fg-syria-crackdown-20110615
Starr, Stephen. "With Flag Rally, Syria Papers over Rifts." Washington Post (June 15, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/with-flag-rally-syria-papers-over-rifts/2011/06/15/AGkZnMWH_story.html
Shadid, Anthony. "Reviled Tycoon, Assad’s Cousin, Resigns in Syria." New York Times (June 16, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/world/middleeast/17syria.html?scp=12&sq=syria&st=nyt
Stack, Liam. "For Syrian Refugees, Shelter of a Precarious Sort." New York Times (June 16, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/world/middleeast/17border.html?ref=syria
Shadid, Anthony. "Violent Clashes as Thousands Protest in Cities Across Syria." New York Times (June 17, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/middleeast/18syria.html?scp=5&sq=syria&st=nyt
Sly, Liz. "Pressure on Syria’s Assad Intensifies as Protests Persist." Washington Post (June 17, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-business-tycoon-resigns-in-concession-to-protesters/2011/06/17/AGCWydYH_story.html
Stack, Liam. "Syrian Town Is Strained By Flood of Refugees." New York Times (June 17, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/middleeast/18border.html?ref=middleeast
RESOURCES: RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY
"Syria: International Religious Freedom Report 2006." U.S. Department of State (2006): http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71432.htm
VIDEO: "Thomas L. Friedman on Hama, Syria, 1982." New York Times (May 6, 2011): http://video.nytimes.com/video/2011/05/06/opinion/100000000808191/opinion--thomas-l-friedman-on-syria.html?scp=6&sq=friedman&st=cse
- Good, short (only 1:53 mins.) introduction to the uprising in Syria; Friedman was in Hama at the time of the massacre and also wrote about what he saw in from Beirut to Jerusalem (19–)
AUDIO: "Joshua Landis on the Syrian Regime: Deeply Sectarian." The Economist (June 14, 2011): http://www.economist.com/node/21521962
Everett, Alissa. "Damascus, Syria Before the Strife." Marin Magazine (May 2011): http://www.marinmagazine.com/Marin-Magazine/May-2011/Ancient-Splendor/
- Very accessible article, introducing the ancient city’s Muslim, Christian, and Jewish sites
Elhadj, Elie, Ph.D. Post. Creative Forum (April 17, 2009): http://www.creativesyria.com/syriabloggers/?p=73
- Ms. Elhadj makes provocative references to Martin Luther, asking whether a Muslim reformer of Luther’s stature might emerge in Syria (given its history of religious tolerance and modernation). Read the 74 comments as you have enough time!
- Opportunity to bring the possibility of a Muslim reformation into a a discussion of the Reformation in Europe.
Ismail, Salwa. "Syria and the Sectarian ‘Plot.’" The Guardian (April 28, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/28/syria-media-sectarian-plot
Chaulia, Sreeram. "Minority Cloud Looms Over Arab Summer." Asia Times (June 14, 2011): http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF14Ak01.html
NOTES
1) See Resources: Breaking News. For an overview of the minority/mosaic theme applied to current events in Syria see Sreeram Chaulia, "Minority Cloud Looms Over Arab Summer" and Salwa Ismail, "Syria and the Sectarian ‘Plot’" (both in Resources: Religious and Ethnic Diversity).
2) An opinion partly based on Salwa Ismail’s discussion of the regime’s manipulation of national unity theme in its rhetoric (see Resources).
3) See Resources: Breaking News; Peter Beaumont, "Syria’s Defiant Women Risk All to Protest Against President Bashar al-Assad." The Guardian (May 21, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/21/syria-women-unrest-repression?intcmp=239. Many women and children have fled from the towns and villages of the northwest, recently under attack by government forces. In addition to the refugees in Turkey and Lebanon there are increasing numbers of internally displaced people (see esp. Liam Stack, "For Syrian Refugees" and "Syrian Town Is Strained" and Borzou Daragahi, "Syrians Vent Rage").
4) For skepticism about the scale of army defections see Joshua Landis, "What Happened at Jisr al-Shagour?" But seemingly credible accounts have been trickling out more recently; see "Witness Describes Scene in Jisr al-Shugur," Al Jazeera English (June 11, 2011): http://english.aljazera.net/news/middleeasst/2011/06/2011611121655786792.html; Ipek Yezdani, "Soldier Describes Syrian Unrest After Defecting," Hurriyet Daily News (June 15, 2011): http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=soldier-describes-syrian-unrest-after-defecting
5) Although the French government has explicitly pointed out Assad’s loss of legitimacy, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has made similar statements. For Turkey articles covering Syrian refugees and also Delphine Strauss, "Turkey Grows Impatient with Ally," Financial Times (June 15, 2011). For criticism of Obama's lack of action see "Silence on Syria," editorial in the Washington Post (June 15, 2011).
6) "Arab league Condemns Syria for First Time," UPI (June 15, 2011): http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2011/06/15/Arab-league-condemns-syria-for-first-time
7) Widely reported, but for a good photo see Stephen Starr, "With Flag Rally, Syria Papers over Rifts" (Resources: Breaking News).
8) "Syria: Youth and Adolescents," United Nations Population Fund: http://www.unfa.org.sy/en/content.aspx?s=4 (data perhaps dating to 2004?). Over 35% are in the 0-14 years cohort (see "Syria Demographics Profile 2011" in General Resources).
9) Elie Elhdaj (Resources: Relgious and Ethnic Diversity).
10) This is a restricted definition of "Greater Syria." During the Ottoman period "Syria" included included a much larger area.
11) There is considerable literature on Fr colonialism and its creation of "states within the state" in the territory of its mandate.
12) Steve Inskeep, interview with Joshua Landis. "Protesters Want Changes to Syria’s Power Structure." NPR (April 27): http://www.npr.org/2011/04/27/135760793/protests-disrupt-syrias-power-structure?ps=cprs
13) For example, reports of Christians in protests. Opposition figures in exile who run the gamut from members of the Muslim Brotherhood to secularists, Christians, Kurds, and even a close relative of President Assad.
14) Malise Ruthven, "Storm Over Syria," The New York Review of Books (June 9, 2011). Not available online to non-subscribers.
15) Anthony Shadid, "Reviled Tycoon, Assad’s Cousin, Resigns in Syria" (Resources: Breaking News). For extensive discussion /coverage of this resignation and of the Syrian economy and the "bite" of sanctions see Joshua Landis, "Rami Makhlouf," Syria Comment (June 16, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog?p=10287
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