Who Will 'Eat' Syria? The Lion or the Alligator?

(Thanks for your patience. I’ve had to attend to some distracting events and projects this month. I intend to post regularly in the next few weeks–as school will be starting soon here in the US. I decided to post this update, with a title I couldn’t resist, as a prelude to my next post, "Syria’s Ancient and Modern Mosaic: Part II." This will allow me to reduce that post’s introduction. Also, its graphic organizer activity is adaptable as the situation evolves and could be modified to suit other cases. If you are new to this blog, check out the other posts on Syria for additional resources.)

INTRODUCTION

In Syria anti-regime protests are now in their fifth month. Tanks and snipers unleashed on civilians. Security forces dispatched around the country. More than 1600 protesters dead. As many as 12,000 arrested (with hundreds or thousands in detention). Camps of 10,000 refugees in Turkey and thousands in Lebanon, too. Entire families and villages displaced internally along the Turkish border. A few concessionary gestures by the government. Great skepticism about Assad’s willingness or ability to keep his promises--by activating them in ways that would bring about real change. An authoritarian, intransigent regime running up against a persistent, highly-charged grassroots protest movement. This is the Syrian uprising. (1)

Since the protests began in mid-March the news from Syria has teetered back and forth–from reports that anti-government protests are being met with ruthlessness and violence to news that the regime is offering yet another set of reforms; troops and tanks deployed to crackdown hard, then withdrawn or redeployed to other towns; President Assad’s call for dialogue one day, attacks on university students the next day; a constant series of anti-regime protests across most of the country, yet there are also pro-Assad demonstrations, especially in Damascus. Thus, more than a few outside observers have called the situation in Syria a stalemate.

During early July the foreign media's focus was on Hama, a city of 800,000 residents, where on July 1st (a Friday) there was a massive protest, involving perhaps upwards of 100,000 out on the streets. The next day the local governor was sacked because his attitude towards the protesters was too submissive. Then, on July 3, after troops and more than 90 tanks rolled back into Hama, tension in the city became almost palpable–since most residents feared a repeat of the violent government crackdown that had occurred in early June (when at least 65 demonstrators were killed). By July 5 (Tuesday) the security forces were beginning to push through the protesters’ makeshift barricades, leaving 24 dead and some 80 wounded. Anticipating more violence, people began to leave Hama for neighboring towns. No doubt they were anticipating an attempt to clear Hama, similar to the regime’s efforts to clear Jisr al-Shughur and other towns and villages in the province of Idleb in the northwest. (2)

A Fork in the Road?

As tensions were building up in Hama, it seemed that Syria had reached a fork in the road (3). Most people stayed in Hama, arming themselves with stones and erecting barricades of burning tires to keep the security forces out. An earlier call for a general strike had already shut down much of the city’s commercial activity. Were the security forces ready to use lethal force if, as expected, protesters would pour out onto the streets after prayers on Friday?

A sign that a dire situation might be unfolding was the decision of U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford to travel to Hama on July 7 (Thursday) and to stay in the city until Friday afternoon. This visit would be more than a fact-finding mission. As his spokesperson put it rather bluntly, on June 28th: "The violence needs to end thrughut Syria and a broader public process needs to begin." Furthermore there were indications that American diplomats in Syria had been engaging in back channel activity. (4)

So, what did happen in Hama on July 8th? No bloody massacre (5). That was a great relief to all concerned: the city’s residents, local organizers of the protest movement and their supporters, Ambassdor Ford and the US diplomatic corps (and, of course, the Obama administration), and also, presumably, President Assad and the regime’s loyalists. Having been a center of resistance in the early 1980s, Hama is a real "conundrum" from the point of view of the regime. President Bashar al-Assad does not really want another bloodbath in Hama, where in 1982 his father President Hafez al-Assad put down an Islamist revolt in which 20,000 (quite possibly many more) people were killed. For Assad another bloodbath in Hama would be a public relations and diplomatic disaster (6). Perhaps the regime senses that if it goes too far in Hama, the protesters will turn away from their mostly non-violent tactics. While the presence of Ambassdor Ford--and also the French ambassador--changed the dynamic on this particular Friday, the regime can now point to this "interference" as support for its view that the uprising is being encouraged by foreigners (as well as extremists). Perhaps Assad made a tactical decision to avoid a major escalation while foreign diplomats were on the scene. Their presence was strongly condemned by the regime.  In Damascus both the American and French embassies were attacked by pro-Assad elements. (7).

A sigh of relief, no massacre this time–but no resolution either. Syria was still positioned at what could have been a decisive turning point, since an unprecedented "national dialogue" was scheduled for July 10 (Sunday).  Reporters speculated about who would come--and who would stay away.  Two very prominent and well-respected opposition figures, Michel Kilo and Anwar al-Bunni, decided to forego any attempt at dialogue as long as the government had troops deployed around the country--for the obvious purpose of continuing the crackdown on protesters and intimidating the internal opposition. With few dissidents or opposition leaders willing to participate, the July 10th talks had little impact. (8)

Then, on July 15, once again, there were large protests after Friday prayers in many cities and towns, including large demonstrations fairly close to the center of Damascus. The next day (July 16) a meeting of 350 dissidents and opposition leaders was held in Istanbul, Turkey, but with very disappointing results.  The attendees were expected to create an organized, united front of intellectuals and Islamists who were living in exile and their counterparts who were working inside Syria, especially the young leaders and coordinators of the protests. In Istanbul, however, the Kurds walked out over a failure to recognize their non-Arab identity and tribal representatives also walked out. A parallel meeting supposed to take place in Damascus was called off, due to the danger posed by the security forces. (9)

The foreign media's focus has now shifted to Homs, Syria’s third largest city, described as "a flashpoint city." Last week (beginning on July 18) the violence in Homs escalated–with as many as 40 people killed there during clashes between security forces and protesters and in incidents reported as "sectarian" (a troubling development). These events inspired country-wide "solidarity with Homs" demonstrations on July 22 (Friday) that, for the first time included major demonstrations in Aleppo--as well as larger than ever protests in Damascus.   In those protests eleven people were killed, shot by the security forces. (10)

On Sunday (July 24) security forces attacked a village in Idleb (revealing that dissent is still popping up in parts of the northwest despite the weeks of repression), the government sent reinforcements to Homs, and there was another round of arrests of suspected organizers and protesters, particularly in Damascus (where both the increasing number of protests and their increasing proximity to the city center is worrying the regime). Also on Sunday the cabinet drafted a law that would permit, for the first time in nearly fifty years, the formation of political parties (other than those under the umbrella of the National Progressive Front). But this will be a hollow reform if it does not lead to other needed constitutional concessions. (11)

It seems that the regime’s strategy is to prevent any pockets of momentum from building up prior to the onset of Ramadan, the month of daytime fasting that begins on August 1st. Many observers are saying that Ramadan will be "a month of Fridays," when people will meet after evening prayers to break the fast and then participate in night-time demonstrations. A rumor is going around that Assad is planning yet another speech, to announce that his willingness to  remove the constitutional article that ensures the Baath Party’s dominance, after which he might call for presidential elections. Is this a change of tactics? Are these signs of Assad’s desperation on the eve of Ramadan? (12)

But from the vantage point of late July, it seems that Syria is still stalled at that proverbial fork in the road. Yet the process may be inching forward due to several unfolding factors. Sectarian tensions may emerge as a decisive factor–or they may be contained by leaders at the grassroots, who seem determined to operate inclusively and to adhere to a nationalist agenda.  Syria’s already unraveling economy may deteriorate more rapidly, so that even Iranian aid may prove insufficient to shore it up.   And if the economy collapses, Assad could easily lose the loyalty of the business elite, which would probably bring about his demise.  Another possibility is that Assad’s half-hearted, hesitant reforms might begin--slowly and incrementally--to make a difference, for example, by reassuring those who have kept hoping that sooner or later he would exchange his represser’s suit for that of a reformer. Whether limited reforms (such as the party law, which restricts new parties to those that can pass muster with a regime-appointed committee) will convince anyone in the opposition/dissident/protester camps to give Assad another chance is highly unlikely. The protesters demands have hardened since mid-March.  Most of those opposed to the regime would no doubt agree with Louay Hussein (a Damascus-based opposition figure) when he says: "Our struggle with the authorities in not over laws. It is a struggle over freedom." (13)

"Eating" Syria

One of the participants in the July 10th dialogue in Damascus was Dr. Mohammed Habash, a respected Islamic scholar and a political moderate. Prior to the meeting, when he was explaining to a reporter why he had decided to attend, he made this statement: "I believe it [overthrowing the president] will put us in the mouth of the alligator and will (lead us to some tragedy). So I believe we have to come round table to discuss about everything" (14).

Now when I heard this statement, it reminded me of a political metaphor used in the oral traditions of certain precolonial African kingdoms (and still heard, commonly, in modern political discourse). This is the metaphor of "eating the kingdom," which signified the decisive moment when a new king, after sidelining or defeating his rivals (often in a bloody succession war), asserted authority over the "old chiefs" of his predecessor, performed the required accession rituals, and thus acquired legitimacy in the eyes of his people. It is a very apt metaphor for Syria as a nation, whose people are seeking a democratic transition--in which the people through democratic institutions and elections would establish a legitimate government. In other words, the people themselves would "eat" Syria (the sovereign state).

So imagine a nation, slowly approaching a fork in history’s metaphorical highway (that is, its historical trajectory), the spot where it splits into two roads going forward. Looking ahead it sees danger standing in the middle of each road: take one road and face the maw of a hungry Lion, take the other and face the jaws of an aggresive Alligator. 

For Syria the Lion is the Assad regime (the name Assad means "lion") and, in a sense, the Assads have been "eating" Syria ever since Hafez Assad came to power in 1970. Bashar Assad inherited the political mantle (mane?) of his father, leaving behind the profession of ophthamology to "eat" the Syrian state (15). He pursued strategies of espousing secularism, protecting sectarian minorities (his fellow Alawites but also Christians, Druze, and Ismailis), and even cultivating relationships with moderate Sunni Muslims. Perhaps Assad can manipulate the current situation to increase sectarian tensions, turning this into an advantage, since then he might still offer, with some credibility, a stable government "improved" by a few reforms. He could also "eat" the uprising by using brute force or by a combination of force and attrition (if the protesters’ energy and enthusiasm wanes). Neither of these outcomes is very likely, however, at this juncture. In general the Syrian people are very skeptical.  They have little confidence in Assad’s ability to reform an authoritarian system of governance, and little confidence in his capacity to bring about national dialogue or reconciliation.

For Syria, the Alligator slithering in the roadway is the civil war that, if it breaks out, might swallow up the entire nation in years of chaos and sectarian strife. The regime’s propaganda plays up these possibilities when it argues that only it can provide a stable and safe environment (ironically, even as it is perpetrating violence on unarmed civilians and fomenting sectarian divisions). The violence in Homs, involving the numerically dominant Sunni Muslims and the Alawite sect (to which the Assads belong) is an ominous sign of what could become a destablizing and tragic situation. Syrians are very much aware of how Iraq sank into the mire of sectarian violence--since many Iraqis sought refuge in Syria, bringing their stories with them.

A significant proportion of the Syrian people have held back (stayed home or backed the uprising only surreptitiously) because they are "terrified about the morning after" (16). Residents of Damascus and Aleppo, and of the business and professional elite have been especially fearful, making the recent protests in both cities (and lives lost as security forces reacted) steps forward that will be closely watched inside and outside the county. What political rivalries will emerge if the Assad regime is toppled? Will older and younger opposition leaders somehow manage to work together or will their agendas diverge? Will Sunni Muslims dominate? Will vengeance be wrought not only on the regime loyalists but on Alawi communities regardless of their allegiance (or not) to regime? So there are many reasons to fear "the morning after."

Many political analysts have been pessimistic. Gary Gambill, for example, argues that "there are no plausible circumstances under which a democratic transition would constitute a rational choice for the embattled dictator" (17). In other words, Assad surely realizes that embarking on a democratic transition would eventually lead to his demise. Yet, he continues to offer the carrot of reforms, suggesting that he really doesn’t know what to do (as some commentators have suggested) (18). Thus, Gambill thinks that efforts by the Obama administration to nudge Assad towards a transition were futile. This conclusion has now been vindicated by Ambassador Ford’s solidarity with the protesters in Hama and by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statements after the pro-regime demonstrators attacked the US embassy in Damascus.

For Gambill, the key factor is "Syria’s unique minority-dominated power structure" that is dependent on "Alawite solidarity" and how Sunni loathing for the heterodox but privileged Alawites "feeds into the existential insecurities felt by most Alawites." (19).   Essentially, most Alawites can’t imagine that a Sunni dominated government would protect them. If Gambill is right, the Alligator’s jaws are primed for a feast.

I’m trying to stay realistic, which means recognizing the grave dangers represented by both the Lion and the Alligator. Yet, I keep searching the media for less pessimistic signs. Syria’s pro-democracy activists include people who are also heavily invested in human rights. These activists and protest organizers (through the Local Coordinating Committees and other grassroots groups) are working hard to keep the movement peaceful: "There are growing problems. But the violence is regime-provoked and we shouldn’t take this to mean there will be a civil war" (20).

So, what will happen next? Who will ‘"eat" Syria? Will the regime with its repressive and ruthless tactics devour the people and their aspirations, their hopes for a better future, their most admirable values (pro-democracy and human rights)? Will civil war swallow up an entire nation? 

But wait a minute, we must also entertain the notion that, in the long-run, the people will prevail. Although, inevitably, they won’t remain stalled at the fork indefinitely–sooner or later tevents will carry them forward along one road or the other--to face either the Lion or the Alligator.  It is possible that, regardless of the road forward, the people will evade or escape from the jaws so eager to consume them. With so many uncertainties, so many variant factors shaping the future, let’s not cast ourselves in the role of prophets. Pay close attention, follow events, analyze and speculate, yes, of course. Speak as prophets, no way.

"FORK IN THE ROAD" ACTIVITY

Using graphic organizers can help students think through new or difficult material. When asked to engage with multifaceted current events–taking place, in many instances, in an unfamiliar setting), we all can use mental maps to help us see more clearly and often it is a good tactic to make these tangible artifacts! This activity can be pursued now (when the outcome is still uncertain) OR it can be carried out later as a retrospective exercise. (With a bit of work you could also adapt it to another country’s fork in the road–using either a contemporary or historical case).

GRAPHIC ORGANIZER: Organize this as a small group project (using poster paper and markers or digital graphic software and/or projectable slides) OT turn it into a class project on a large bulletin board. Ask students to illustrate the fork-in-road/lion/alligator metaphor. This activity is straightforward enough for middle school students but expandable to any higher level (expecting more detail, more research). Please adapt and modify it to suit your class (a chance here to be creative!).

1) Begin with a Y-shaped road, on its side and pointing towards the right. Standing in the stem of the Y will be a representation of the Syrian people as both protesters/non-protesters (the protesters could be a cluster of stick figures carrying posters with slogans and/or Syrian flags). Send students to look at news media photos to find slogans or other suitable representations.

2) Students may add a text balloon or sidebar with a bullet list of the protesters’ demands. Be sure that they can tell you where their information is coming from.

3) To include those who would probably like to see reforms but are not out on the streets, students might add another group closer of stick figures. Again, they can add a balloon or sidebar to list the reforms that they are advocating, their reasons for staying off the streets, or even their support for boycotts or attempts at dialogue. Make sure that this content is grounded in identifiable sources.

4) Next, students should put a drawing or picture of a lion in one arm of the Y, an alligator in the other. These are the obstacles suggested the difficult choices–with uncertain of outcomes–facing the Syrian people.

5) Students can use the lion’s roar (another balloon) to sum up the Assad regime’s position. Around the lion they may place sidebars with examples of the regime’s tactics during the uprising.

6) The alligator’s gaping mouth can be attached to balloon that sums up the dangers of a civil war, including potential sectarian or ethnic strife or names of opposition organizations (that might emerge as rival political factions).

7) Ask students to think about possible outcomes if Syria manages to get around these obstacles. How could these be represented to the right of the Lion and Alligator? For example, showing Assad the Lion in a plane flying off into exile or in prison behind bars or people casting ballots in a democratic eledction. Perhaps the Alligator can be shown captured in a net or with his mouth tied shut to indicate that the threat of civil war might be neutralized. Again, people could be seated in a constitutional convention or participating in an election. Put BIG question marks beside these possible outcomes.

Recommended Resources
　
These will change over time and your set of news articles should be updated as needed. You may need to introduce the topic, for example, by drawing items from the BBC’s "Guide: Syria Crisis." 

Also, if possible, show recent protest footage. For these check what is available on The Lede (on the New York Times site) and on Al Jazeera English (http://aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/). The intensity of the protests is well-conveyed by the first video of what is now widely-recognized as the uprising’s anthem (see Resources: Recent News)

Among the articles listed above, these would be most useful in addressing the stalemate and its possible resolutions (the two paths forward):

• Marsh, Katherine.  "Syria's Silent Majority Will Deterimine Next Step as protests Grow." The Guardian (April 15, 2011).
• "An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by CAmille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011).
• Folkeson, Annika. "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests," BBC News (July 17, 2011).
• Abouzeid, Rania. "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy." TIME (July 19, 2011). 
• Ignatius, David. "Plotting a Post-Assad Road Map for Syria." Washington Post (July 20, 2011).
• Shadid, Anthony. "New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria." New York Times (July 24, 2011).

OTHER ACTIVITIES

READ/ANALYZE: In "Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama" Dominic Evans tries to explain why Hama is such a conundrum for the regime. Ask students to re-state the points that Evans is making. Then, based on broader information (including TV coverage), consider the credibility of this explanation. 　

READ/DISCUSS: Gary Gambil’s essay, "The Hard Man of Damascus," takes a very pessimistic view of the situation. Does Gambill think Assad’s call for a national dialogue is sincere? What motives might Assad have? Who are the soft-liners and hard-lines in Syria? Why does he think a "straight-up transition to democracy" is unlikely in Syria? What does he mean by "a pacted transition"? Why is such a transition also very unlikely in Syria? Think about how other analyists might counter this argument?

WORLD HISTORY: EXPLORE the history of the two pacted transitions that Gambill gives as his examples (South Africa and Chile) and then compare/contrast these cases. Also, think about how they differ from the Syrian uprising.

RESEARCH: Find out more about Michel Kilo, one of the opposition’s most venerable figures. Project a photo of Kilo (captured from the web) as a student presents a short oral report about him.

GENERAL RESOURCES

"Guide: Syria Crisis." BBC News (accessed July 23, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13855203

• Excellent place to start because it provides a concise overview of events since mid-March
• Includes a chart contrasting "What protesters want" with "What Assad has offered"
• Addresses sectarian, regional, and economic aspects of the crisis
• Click on "Protest Footage Mapped" for videos (from June protests; watch for update)
• Scroll down for more features and analysis, plus useful links

VIDEO: "Syria’s Youth Revolutionaries." Journeyman Pictures (12:18 mins). Go to YouTube or access at Weekly Standard (July 21, 2011): http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/syrias-youth-revolutionaries_577237.html

• Young activists explain what they are doing and why they are involved in the pro-democracy/anti-Assad movement; they describe the brutality of the security forces; all those featured are men but there are also women in the streets and behind the scenes
• Explain to students that these revolutionaries appear to be middle/upper class and well-educated, mostly involved in organizing demonstrations; grassroots protesters, drawn from a much broader socio-economic spectrum, include many of their less-educated peers

TIMELINE: Syria Unrest: Timeline of Protests and Crackdowns." The Telegraph (July 8, 2011):
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8626440/Syria-unrest-timeline-of-protests-and-crackdowns.html

• Needs an update but very useful as a overview of events from March 15th to July 8th.

Analysis

Marsh, Katherine. "Syria's Silent Majority Will Deterimine Next Step as protests Grow." The Guardian (April 15, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/syria-protests-silent-majority

• Silent majority is becoming a smaller portion of the population but this article sets out their reasons for holding back, with comments on Assad's strategy at the mid-April point in the uprising.

"An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by Camille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog//p=10574

Evans, Dominic.  "Analysis: Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama," Reuters (July 5, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/us-syria-hama-idUSTRE7644L020110705

Gambill, Gary. "The Hard Man of Damascus." Foreign Policy (July 6, 2011):
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/06/the_hard_man_of_damascus?page=0,1
Folkeson, Annika. "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests." BBC News (July 17, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14179188

Ignatius, David. "Plotting a Post-Assad Road Map for Syria." Washington Post (July 20, 2011):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/plotting-a-post-assad-road-map-for-syria/2011/07/20/gIQANBQcQI_story.html
VIDEO: "Would the West Interfere in Syria?" (24:22 mins). Aired on Inside Story (July 22, 2011): http://aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/07/201172392452703186.html

• Misleading title (refers to the last third or so of program)
• Episode begins with footage of protests on July 22, noting large protests in Homs and Damacus (where 20 were killed); how crackdown is continuing around the country
• Guests are George Jabbour (president of the Syrian UN Association, former advisor to Hafez al-Assad), Marwa Daoudy (scholar/lecturer at the Middle East Centre, Oxford University), and Radwan Ziadeh (director of the Damascus Centre for Human Rights and currently a visiting scholar in the US)
• Jabbour is hesitant to tell what he knows about what's happening (audio is poor, too); he emphasizes the need for reconciliaton
• Ziadeh speaks with a POV closest to that of the protesters
• Daoudy notes the effects of the regime’s "mixed signals" and thinks that the protests in Damascus on July 22 are a tipping point (but echoes Jabbour on the need for reconciliaton)
  

RESOURCES: RECENT NEWS (July 19-26)

Ali, Nour and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/syria-troops-homs-security-crackdown

Abouzeid, Rania. "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy." TIME (July 19, 2011): http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,2083769,00.html

Harris, Elizabeth. "Videos Appear to Show Violence in Syria." The Lede: New York Times (July 21, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/videos-appear-to-show-violence-in-syria/

Ali, Nour and Ian Black, "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime Adds to Death Toll." The Guardian (July 22): http://guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/22/mass-syrian-protest-assad-deaths

Weiss, Michael. "Sectarianism, or a Trap by Assad?" The Weekly Standard (July 22, 2011): http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/sectarianism-or-trap-assad_577266.html

Mackey, Robert. "Video of a Syrian Protest Anthem." The Lede: New York Times (July 21): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/video-of-a-syrian-protest-anthem/

• Two videos of protesters performing but the first one has English subtitles and better quality footage
• Preview for suitability (subtitles in first video call Bashar "an ass")
  check out Anthony Shadid’s July 22^nd article about this anthem

Shadid, Anthony. "Lyrical Message for Syrian Leader: ‘Come on, Bashar, Leave.’" New York Times (July 22, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/world/middleeast/22poet.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

Ali, Nour. "Syrian Troops Attack Village in Northwest, Activists Say." The Guardian (July 24, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/24/syrian-troops-attack-village-activists

Shadid, Anthony. "New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria." New York Times (July 24, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/world/middleeast/25syria.html?scp=2&sq=shadid%20syria%20new%20loyalties&st=cse

Sly, Liz. "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms." Washington Post (July 25, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syria-permits-opposition-parties-on-restrictive-terms/2011/07/25/gIQAGiWyYI_story.html


RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July)

For an overview of events in early July (as well as more recent coverage) check out posts on the Joshua Landis blog, Syria Comment, especially:

• "News Round Up (5 July 2011)." SyriaComment (July 5, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10573
• "News Round Up (7 July 2011)." SyriaComment (July 8, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10605

Shadid, Anthony. "Coalition of Factions from the Streets Fuels a New Opposition in Syria." New York Times (June 30, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html?scp=5&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

Shadid, Anthony. "With Police Absent, Protests Surge in Syrian City [Hama]." New York Times (July 1, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/middleeast/02syria.html?scp=4&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

Daragahi, Borzou and Roula Hajjar.  "Syrian Troops Roll into Hama, a Symbol of Antigovernment Activity."  Los Angeles Times  (July 5, 2011): http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-syria-sweep-20110705,0,3757510.story 

"‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Claims in Syria." Al Jazeera (July 6, 2011): http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/07/20117684729673824.html

Chulov, Martin. "Hama Is Beacon of Resistance 30 Years on from Massacre." The Guardian (July 6, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/06/hama-resistance-30-years-massacre

• For more excellent coverage of Syria and the Middle East by Martin Chulov, go to http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/martin-chulov

"Syrian Protests Hurl Stones at Troops in Key City." AP on NPR (July 7, 2011):
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=134658580

"Opposition Builds in Syria’s Capital, a Key Battleground." Wall Street Journal (July 7, 2011):
2011):http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304793504576431830115150202.html

Nisbet, Robert. "Dozens Arrested Ahead of Syria ‘Reform’ Summit." Sky News (July 7, 2011):
http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16025712

Shadid, Anthony. "Envoys Stay in Syrian City Where Protests Continue." New York Times (July 8, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/world/middleeast/09syria.html

Mackey, Robert. "U.S. Ambassador Greeted with Roses by Syrian Protesters in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (July 8, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/u-s-ambassador-greeted-with-roses-by-syrian-protesters

Daragahi, Borzou and Alexandra Sandels. "Thousands Protest in Hama Against Assad." Los Angeles Times (July 9, 2011): http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-syria-violence-20110709,0,347364.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fnews%2Fnationworld%2Fworld+%28L.A.+Times+-+World+News%29

Bakri, Nada. "Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies ..." New York Times (July 11, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/world/middleeast/12syria.html?scp=1&sq=clinton%20syria%20attacks%20embassy&st=cse

Landler, Mark and David E. Sanger. "White House, in Shift, turns Against Syrian Leader." New York Times (July 12, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/middleeast/13policy.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=clinton%20syria%20attacks%20embassy&st=cse

Shadid, Anthony. "Security Forces Open Fire on Syrian Protesters." New York Times (July 15): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/middleeast/16syria.html?scp=6&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse

NOTES

For full citations (with URLs) see RESOURCES.  

1) For a sense of this uprising’s "contradictory signs" see Annika Folkeson, "Change of ‘Regime Tactics,’" BBC News (July 17, 2011). Statistics in this paragraph are ballpark figures that vary somewhat from source to source but the number of fatalities increases steadily. Figures provided by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (as reported in the Guardian on July 22): fatalities: 1419 civilians, 352 members of the security forces; more than 1300 arrested [a low figure that probaby does not include those who are no longer being detained]. Liz Sly, in "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms" (Washington Post: July 25, 2011), refers to human rights groups figures of 1600 deaths and 20,000 detentions. The number of refugees in Turkey may be decreasing as it is being reported that some people are returning to their homes in Syria.

2) See articles listed under RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July).

3) The lead-up to this fork began with President Assad’s speech on June 20th (his third attempt to address the crisis in Syria, more serious than those that had preceded it). What he tried to convey was that, finally, he was really "getting it" (that he understood the need for substantive rather than merely cosmetic reforms) and his call for dialogue was perceived by at least some members of the opposition as a positive step. He then allowed a meeting of opposition leaders to take place within Syria. It is also significant that, however unsatisfactory, a dialogue of sorts did occur on July 10.

4)  Ambassador Ford, who speaks Arabic, is well-informed about Syria and the region. Press briefings by his staff hint a these back channels.   See "Daily Press Briefing--June 28, 2011, " US Department of State  (June 28, 2011): http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/06/167237.htm [also the source of the quotation].
 
5) See RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July).

6) See Dominic Evans, "Analysis: Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama," Reuters (July 5, 2011). Also, "‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Claims in Syria." Al Jazeera (July 6, 2011). Nearly every news article about Hama mentions the 1982 massacre, as do many other reports and discussions of the Syrian uprising, making it clear that its symbolism resonates far beyond Syria.  See Martin Chulov and Nidaa Hassan, "Hama Is Beacon of Resistance 30 Years on from Massacre." The Guardian (July 6, 2011):

7) Anthony Shadid, "Envoys Stay in Syrian City Where Protests Continue," New York Times (July 8, 2011); Shadid quotes an activist who states explicitly that they felt protected by the Ambassdor Ford's presence.  For footage see Robert Mackey, U.S. Ambassador Greeted with Roses by Syrian Protesters in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (July 8, 2011). 

8) Both Kilo and al-Bunni are Christians (at least in a cultural sense) and both were imprisoned during the presidency of Bashar al-Assad.  See Ariel Zirulnick, "Syrian Activists Reject Assad's Call for Talks Sunda," Christian Science Monitor  (July 7, 2011):  http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0708/Syrian-activists-reject-Assad-s-call-for-talks-Sunday; "The Consultative Meeting for Syrian National Dialogue," Day Press  (July 8, 2011): http://www.dp-news.com/en/print/aspx?articleid=89415.  For the Syrian government's view see Mark Memmott, "Syrian Foreign Minister: Opposition Should Join 'Dialogue,'' NPR (July 5, 2011); http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/07/05/137628798/syrian-foreign-minister-opposition-should-join-dialogue

9) Anthony Shadid, "Security Forces Open Fire on Syrian Protesters." New York Times (July 15). For the dissension at this meeting see Rania Abouzeid, "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy," TIME (July 19, 2011).

10) See Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19); and "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime" The Guardian (July 22). For video footage see Elizabeth Harris in The Lede (July 21, 2011). The sectarian aspect in Homs is somewhat disputed (a matter I’ll discuss in my next post) but in the meantime see Michael Weiss, "Sectarianism, or a Trap by Assad?" in The Weekly Standard (July 22, 2011).

11) Nour Ali, Syrian Troops Attack Village in Northwest, Activists Say." The Guardian (July 24, 2011). For the rumor, see Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime." The Guardian (July 22).

12) By mid-July there was already a buzz about the regime’s changing tactics; see Annika Folkeson, "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests," BBC News (July 17, 2011). Andrew Tabler is among those describing the regime as desperate, thus willing to try new "Band-Aids"; see his piece, "Lights Out" in Foreign Policy (July 19, 2011). Also, Liz Sly, "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms," Washington Post (July 25).

13) For the state of the economy and how targeted sanctions might push the process along see Andrew Tabler, "Lights Out," Foreign Policy (July 19, 2011). Tabler writes from a well-defined policy perspective. He thinks that Washington should use its tools to push more strenuously towards the goal of ending the regime–in order to prevent the inevitable bloodshed of a prolonged transition. Hussein, as quoted in Nada Bakri, "Draft Reform Law in Syria Fails to Mollify Protesters," New York Times (July 25, 2011).

14) Habash, as quoted in Robert Nisbet, "Dozens Arrested Ahead of Syria ‘Reform’ Summit." Sky News (July 7, 2011). 

15) Bashar had not been groomed to "eat’ Syria but was thrust into that role because his brother Basil, the presumptive heir, was killed in a car crash in 1994. Thus, Bashar was weaker politically than he might have been and he had to deal with "old chiefs" of the preceding regime and his more aggressive brother Maher. For this reason it has been somewhat unclear to what extent he exercises power independently. Certainly, he has often been constrained by the regime’s hardlines. This has allowed moderates to cut Assad some slack, but less slack as he has continued to unleash the security forces.

16) Gary Gambill, The Hard Man of Damascus." Foreign Policy (July 6, 2011).

17) See note #16

18) Nada Bakri, "Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies ..." New York Times (July 11, 2011).  Landler and David E. Sanger. "White House, in Shift, turns Against Syrian Leader." New York Times (July 12, 2011).

19) This line of questioning was pursued by host of Inside Story episode that aired on July 22, 2011.

20) Anonymous dissident, quoted in Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19).  For a human rights activist' perspective see "An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by CAmille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011).

Al Jadid: A True Gem

(This was supposed to be a short post, to fill in while I continued working on Part II of "Syria’s Ancient and Modern Mosaic." Like most recent posts it kept growing because I kept tracking down related items on the Web. Since summer is supposedly a good time to explore both online and offline, I hope you will take time to visit Al Jadid online, finding there not only its own riches but pathways to print media resources and novels, perhaps some you might find in your local library. Enjoy!)

UPDATE: I've added Mohammad Ali Atassi's eloquent, heart-wrenching but hopeful New York Times (June 27, 2011) op-ed piece to the Resources.

INTRODUCTION

"Shu iktashaft?" (What was your big discovery?). My big discovery last week was Al Jadid, a gem I found online while searching for sources on Islam in Syria.

Al Jadid is a quarterly print magazine devoted to Arab culture and the arts. It contains much topical material relevant to courses in world literature, art history, world history, and global affairs–much of it available in a very generous online archive. Its scope spans the Arab world, including the Arab diaspora. It is an excellent source of information about Arab-Americans, their literature, and issues related to being Arab or Arab-American (while living in the US and trying to connect or re-connect with Arab culture and history). Author Amy Wilentz discovered here "a wealth of opinion and information that no one else is publishing in English."

Elie Chalala, the editor of Al Jadid, was born in Lebanon, where he lived in Beirut until he left for the US about 30 years ago. He is a widely respected academic, with a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California Los Angeles. If you Google him, you’ll find not only his syllabi but long lists resources he has put online for his courses (see his Santa Monica College page: http://homepage.smc.edu/chalala_elie/).

Each issue has been put together, intentionally, to challenge conventional ideas about Arab culture, arts, and intellectual trends. The editor and staff are proud that Al Jadid has "covered scores of Arab intellectuals and artists under fire from the state or extremists" and that it has featured "lively debates between secular and religious, traditional and modernist voices" (see "About" on the home page). Elie Chalala is keenly aware of how context, and in particular politics and geopolitics, shapes cultural expression:

"In the U.S. we’ve had the demonizing and marginalizing of Arabs; in the Arab world, we have censorship issues, wars, civil strife, the vestiges of the colonial mentality, and the endless peace process. All of these factors impact and shape culture, and often find their most poignant, elegant expression in the arts."

For the current issue go to the home page (http://www.aljadid.com/). Running across the top is a menu from which you can access lists of essays and features, book reviews, interviews, and much more. Sample these lists and, thanks to serendipity, I bet you’ll find great material to consult as background when preparing lessons or that you can use directly with students (mostly high school and above). What’s most exciting (especially if you are unfamiliar with, for example, modern Arab literature in translation) is discovering the work of a new author or bumping into a fresh ideas. To entice you to explore Al Jadid, I’m going to present a few examples, but I won’t provide the URLs (so you’ll have to look for them on the site and, I hope, discover other useful items while you are there).

Essays and Features

When I printed the list (with a fairly small font), it ran to ten pages! There are numerous articles by Syrian writers, journalists, and academics. Scattered throughout the list are articles by Elie Chalala himself, a real boon since their peer-reviewed counterparts are mostly behind pay-walls or in JSTOR. (By the way, if you want to verify that Chalala is a real scholar, search Google Scholar.)

Another frequent contributor is Mohammad Ali Atassi, a Syrian journalist based in Beirut, whose comments on current events I’d already encountered in mainstream media (NPR, Los Angeles Times) and on the blog Syria Comment). Where did he fit into the spectrum of Middle East opinion? Curious to learn more about him, I searched the web and discovered that his family--prominent in Homs since the 16th century--included historical figures of major importance during much of the 20th century. (So I suggest sending students to do a similar search.)

The following articles give some sense of the variety of topics covered in Al Jadid:

1) Michael Teague’s "Syria Open Sesame?" is a timely piece for all of us who are current events buffs. Teague’s critique of four articles from the New York Times (a reputable newspaper despite its warts) reveals how media reaches out for a theme, ties it to a particular event or trend, and then adopts it as a framing device for a wild assortment of stories. This is a recurrent problem in US media, where reporters struggle to cast complex stories in terms that they imagine will make sense to ordinary Americans. Teague suggests that Kareem Fahim and other NYT journalists were so intrigued by signs that Syria was finally "opening up" that they ignored signs pointing in the opposite direction. Thus he finds Fahim’s reportage perceptive but out-of-balance. Only one of the four articles is properly described as "new analysis," however; the others are what we’d call human interest stories. Of course, when it comes to writing feature articles, journalists working for US media, must always ask themselves: What will catch the attention of American readers? In short, while I’d don’t entirely agree with Teague’s critique, I do think he raises very important issues, such as the influence of Washington and the US foreign policy establishment on media analysis of what’s happening in key regions or countries.

An additional benefit of using Teague’s article as a platform for a media literacy exercise (see Activities) is that it ties so directly into current events, especially the Fahim article about the Syrian government’s treatment of its resident Islamists.

2) An article of special interest to world literature and history instructors is Simone Fattal’s "The Passing of a Great Syrian Writer: Ilfat Idilbi, 1912-2007." Idilbi, born in Damascus and one of its beloved "cultural pillars," stands out as a pioneer among Arab women writers and as a nationalist and a feminist. Her novel Sabriya: Damascus Bitter Sweet is set during the revolt against the French in the 1920s (when Syria was a French mandate). The setting of her last book, The Story of My Grandfather, gives readers a vivid portrait of Ottoman Damascus during the late 19th century. I’m putting both books on my personal reading list, but I’ll start with Sabriya since it is easy to see how it would fit into a world history course (or a seminar in European imperialism), where it might be paired with a novel set in French Indochina or French West Africa. Both books are available in new and used copies from online vendors.
　

Interviews

1) For anyone wanting an introduction to Sufism, Sabah Zwein’s interview with Stefan Reichmuth is very informative. Reichmuth, a professor of Islamic Studies, gives a concise explanation of Sufi doctrine and clarifies the changing status of Sufism in the Ottoman Empire. What I found most valuable, however, was his brief discussion of Sufism as "a kind of civic organization" appealing to people outside the formal political structure but also serving as a bridging institution for immigrant communities. This approach to Sufism brings it into a broader analysis of civil society (where I now suspect it belongs).

2) Rebecca Joubin’s interview, "Syrian Artist Walid Agha Searches for the Spirit of the Letters," introduces the work of a fascinating artist. What intrigued me, as an instructor of world history, was Agha’s early exposure to a very deep tradition of Assyrian decorative art that, amazingly, he was exposed to as a child and his experimentation with Sumerian and Assyrian script in his highly original calligraphy. His work illustrates how cultural traditions are renewed through what Jan Vansina calls "repetition with difference."

Book Reviews

What makes this section invaluable are the reviews of books published in Arabic, whose content would otherwise be unavailable to many of us. In addition to the specialized information that we may glean from such reviews their true value lies in how they expose us the perspectives of books written for Arab audiences and thus shaped by concerns and issues that Arab writers and intellectuals deem important.

The list gives you the title of the review and its author--rather than title of the book under review and its author. So you’ll have to scan the lists and try to guess what the book may be about. This just makes exploring the list more enjoyable–though if pressed for time you might miss something good the first time around.

Here are three examples from the book review section:

1) Andrea Sahlal-Esa, "Rethinking the Mediterranean," reviews a book for all you world history fans (fanatics?). It was fairly easy to guess that the book itself might be a somewhat updated version of Breudel’s classic. Certainly, Iain Chambers's Mediterranean Crossings: The Politics of an Interrupted Modernity (Duke University Press, 2008) is a worthy companion and one with "a long overdue reclamation of the often hidden Arabic and Islamic history" of the region. If you haven’t already consulted this book, reading this review will convince you to put it high on your list.

2) In "Burdened Histories" Bhakati Shringarpure examines Anne Nivat’s The Wake of War: Encounters with the People of Iraq and Afghanistan (Beacon Press, 2005). Nivat is a reporter, as the reviewer puts it, "committed to long durations of travel and sustained conversations," which makes this book potentially a source of primary material for use in global studies as well as history classes. I also encourage language and reading teachers to take a look at this review and Nivat's book, where you’ll probably discover material adaptable to use in class.   The review leaves the impression that Nivat is a masterful writer of vignettes so doing an analysis of her craftsmanship might find a place in composition classes.

3) What drew me to Michael Najjar’s "Embracing Inbetweenness" was the title’s implicit mystery. In between what? This is a review of Sarah M. A. Gualtieri’s amazing book, Between Arab and White: Race and Ethnicity in the Early Syrian American Diaspora (University of California Press, 2009).

Now I’m generally familiar with how genes have flowed from nearly all directions into the Arab gene pool (an Arab being anyone who self-identifies as Arab). When I see curly-haired, café au lait Libyans, Yemenis, and Iraqis I suspect that this may be due to a remote genetic infusion from the Bilad as-Sudan or the Zanj coast or even further afield. (The Syrian firebrand, red-headed and fair-skinned preacher, Shaykh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, represents the other extreme of the continuum!) I was also generally aware of the racial conundrum that Middle Easterners and South Asians posed (still pose) in race conscious America. Yet this review refers briefly to an event in 1929 that I would not have imagined. Read the review and then get the book, where Gualtieri shares this and other horrifying stories.

ACTIVITIES

DISCUSS: Elie Chalala, when asked why he decided to make Arab literature and arts the focus of Al Jadid, gave this answer: "I think literature, anywhere in the world, provides an escape from political oppression. ... Literature remains the only area in society where individuals can escape the yoke of the state and express themselves." Use this quote to jump-start a discussion of any novel or short-story that reflects the experience of an author living in or writing about an authoritarian state.

MEDIA LITERACY PROJECT: First, assign Michael Teague’s article, "Syria Open Sesame?" DISCUSS the article to make sure that students understand Teague’s main points and can identify the issues he is raising. Then ask students to find and read the four NYT that he critiques (or three, if you want to omit Robert F. Worth’s article). If your students need to practice searching for specific items, send them to the NYT site to find and print the articles (rather than giving them the URLs, which are listed in Resources for your convenience). WRITE: After reading the NYT articles, students should evaluate Teague’s critique (that is, do a critique of the critique). Do they think Teague being fair in his analysis? Do they agree with Teague? Perhaps, they partly do, partly don’t. Ask students to write essays presenting their original analysis, stressing tha they must explain their points with specific reference to Teague and to the NYT articles. For advanced high school students this is a good exercise that will prepare them for critical reading and expository writing at the college-level.

RESEARCH: Explain to students that when evaluating online sources it is desirable to obtain background biographical information about the authors to have a better sense of what may be shaping their perspectives and opinions. Since Muhammad Ali Atassi is a frequent contributor to Al Jadid articles, send students to the Web to find out more about him and his family. Who was his father? Why is he based in Lebanon rather than Syria? What films has he made and what are they about?

I’d like to suggest that you PREVIEW/SELECT an excerpt from either of Atassi’s documentaries to show in class. However, a quick check online suggested that these are not (yet) readily available–though I suspect that a DVD of "Waiting for Abu Zayed" may soon appear (so keep checking).

DISCUSS: In "Waiting for Abu Zayd" Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd makes these provocative, insightful observations: "The intellectual who claims ownership of the Truth is the other leg of the dictator. When an intellectual claims to own the Truth he becomes the dictator’s servant."  The quote is from Jim Quilty’s film review (see Resources). What a piquant quote to turn students’ attention to the predicament of intellectuals in societieties where the cost of "speaking out" is so high! ASK: What does Abu Zayd mean by "ownership of the Truth"? Can you think of instances today or in the past where people assert (have asserted) that "own" the only true ideas? What kinds of service to a dictator is Abu Zayd talking about? ASK for historical examples (what popped into my mind was the book Theologians under Hitler by Robert P. Ericksen). Where is this happening today? (Perhaps in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad’s spokesperson Boutheina Shabaan’s intentions may be good but the results may prove tragic.). And aren’t there also insidious relationships between intellectuals and politicians in "democratic" countries, too?

SEARCH online for more information about Syrian writer Ulfat Idilbi. Note that "Ulfat" (the spelling you will find online) is the transliteration used when her novels were translated and published in English. Students should find, rather easily, the obituary published in The Guardian. Ask them to read it to discover why, when she married at age 17, she decided to use her husband’s name. (Note that the Al Jadid article does not appear in a Google search unless you switch to the alternate spelling.)

FIND/EXAMINE closely online examples of the art work of Walid Agha. DISCUSS: What makes Agha’s art both traditional and modern at the same time? Refer to clues in the interview but try to connect these to visual elements in the examples.

RESOURCES

Al Jadid: A Review & Record of Arab Culture and Art: http://www.aljadid.com/

Gheytanchi, Elham. "More Than That." Interview with Elie Chalala. The Iranian (December 23, 2002): http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2002/December/Chalala/index.html

　
Mohammad Ali Atassi

Atassi,Mohammad Ali.  "My Syria, Awake Again After 40 Years."  New York Times (June 27, 2011):
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/opinion/27Atassi.html?scp=1&sq=mohammad%20atassi&st=cse

"Syria Steps Up Crackdown on Protesters." NPR (April 25, 2011): http://www.npr

• Michele Norris, speaking with Deborah Amos and Mohammed Ali Atassi about a letter signed by more than 100 Syrian journalists and intellectuals (both inside/outside the country) in which they condemn the violence in Syria

Atassi, Mohammad Ali. "What the People Want ..." Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America: Perspectives: http://www.boell-meo.org/downloads/Perspectives_02-04_Mohammed_Ali_Atassi.pdf

• Atassi discusses the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, putting these into a larger context and taking issue with certain conventional views about Arab politics, the potential for revolution, and the Islamist factor. Translated from Arabic.
• "We are a political non-profit organization striving to promote democracy, civil society, equality and a healthy environment internationally. Headquarterd in Berlin/Germany, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung has 28 offices worldwide and cooperates with more than 200 partners in more than 60 countries."

Wright, Robin. Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East. Penguin, 2008.   Partially available at Google Books: search Atassi.

• Wright reveals that he is the son of Nurreddin al-Atassi, the president of Syria who was ousted by Hafez Assad in 1970 (p. 214)

"Atassi." Abitabout: http://www.abitabout.com/Atassi

• Family history based (apparently) on information from the Atassi family site; this family claims descent from Prophet Muhammad; their roots in Homs, where they were the recognized muftis, go back to the 16^th century.

FILM: "Ibn al-Aam." A documentary by Mohammad Al Atassi, 2001.

• About Riad al-Turk, a Syrian communist turned social democrat, whose life of political dissent and years of imprisonment shed much light on decades of Syrian politics. (An online search will bring up his commentary on recent events in the Middle East.)

FILM: "Waiting for Abu Zayd." A documentary by Mohammad Al Atassi. 2010. Arabic with English subtitles. 82 minutes.

• Atassi’s "portrait of a liberal Islamic scholar who dared to challenge conservative Islamic trends from within Islam." After Abu Zayd was "condemned for apostasy in Egypt on the grounds of his rational writings on the Qur’an, in which he places the religious text in a historical and cultural context," he and his wife left for the Netherlands, where he taught at Leiden University. Using footage shot over six years, Atassi strove to capture both Abu Zayd’s ideas and his interaction with the media. Abu Zayd died suddenly in 2010, shortly after the film was completed.
• For a brief biographical note on Atassi and a photo: http://www.dox-box.org/2011/index.php?ang=2&&page=show&dir=items&ex=2&year=2011&cid=7&fid=57 (also the source of the info/quotes in previous bullet).

FILM REVIEW: Jim Quilty, "Putting Flesh and Blood into a liberal Vision of Islam." The Daily Star: Lebanon (September 18, 2010): http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Culture/Film/Sep/18/Putting-flesh-and-blood-into-a-liberal-vision-of-Islam.ashx#axzz1QKpn4y62


Articles Critiqued by Michael Teague

Fahim, Kareem. "Syria’s Solidarity With Islamists Ends at Home." New York Times (September 3, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middleeast/04syria.html?scp=3&sq=kareem%20fahim%20syria%202010&st=cse

Fahim, Kareem, and Nawara Mafoud. "Damascus Journal: Evenings of Poetry Provide a Space for New Voices." New York Times (September 19, 2010): http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/world/middleeast/20poetry.html?scp=2&sq=kareem%20fahim%20syria%202010&st=cse

Fahim, Kareem. "Doors Start to Open to Activists in Syria." New York Times (August 28, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/world/middleeast/29syria.html?scp=1&sq=kareem%20fahim%20syria%202010&st=cse

Worth, Robert F. "The Saturday Profile: Syrian Actress Tests Boundaries Again." New York Times (October 1, 2010): http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/world/middleeast/02actress.html?scp=1&sq=robert%20worth%20syrian%20actress&st=cse

　
Ulfat Idilbi

Clark, Peter. "Ulfat Idilbi: Renowned Syrian Fiction Writer, Lecturer and Feminist." The Guardian (April 19, 2007): http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2007/apr/19/guardianobituaries.booksobituaries/print

Moubayed, Sami. "Farewell Sabriya." Mideast Views: http://mideastviews.com/print.php?art=196

McPhee, Jenny. Review of Sabriya: Damascus Bitter Sweet. New York Times (September 7, 1997): http://nytimes.com/books/97/09/07/bib/970907.rv104334.html

Mohja, Kahf. "The Silence of Contemporary Syrian Literature." World Literature Today (2001). URL: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/Print/Article.aspx?id=80500168

• For discussion of Idilbi’s work go to the section "The Poetics of Syrian Silence" (about half-way through the article).
• An article for teachers and advanced students.

Walid Agha

Albareh Art Gallery: Walid Agha. http://www.albareh.com/Albareh/Walid%20Agha.html

• For a detailed list of Agha’s numerous exhibitions and six examples of his work.

Syrian Art Directory. http://www.syriaart.com/new/index.php?page=viewArtist&id=51

• Photo of the artist (list of exhibitions, same as above) and four examples of his work.

Syria's Ancient and Modern Mosaic (Part I)

(This topic is so complex that it has kept me busy for several weeks. Issues of identity and its construction interest me a great deal, which is why I’ve decided to pursue what is morphing into a major piece of research. In the meantime, here is the first installment of an overview that, I hope, will help you sort out Syria’s fascinating – byzantine with a small "b"– mosaic. Information presented below is subject to revision and, as I learn more, I will correct any mistakes or misconceptions in an update.)

INTRODUCTION

During the past couple of weeks President Bashar al-Assad of Syria has launched a crackdown on anti-government protesters with such vehemence that he has any remnant of legitimacy in the arena of world opinion. Assad seems determined to do whatever it takes to reassert control over every corner of the country, but the future of his regime--and thus the future of Syria--is still very much in play.

Assad has argued that only his regime can guarantee the safety of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities. We might say that he’s playing the "minority card" now as a way to prop up his regime, for in the past he more or less prohibited any discussion of "sectarianism." In the mainstream Western media, especially in the earlier phases of the uprising, many commentators seemed to accept Assad’s argument and it did have some credibility–much more before the onslaught of his troops and tanks. Of course, there are plenty of reasons to be concerned. We know what happened in Iraq. We’ve heard about the recent of attacks on Copts in Egypt. And I’ve shuddered when trying to imagine what might happen to Syria’s Alawites, if Assad falls and they are caught up in a backlash. (1)

If the regime collapses, will Syria’s mosaic of ethnic and religious minorities disintegrate? At this point any analysis must remain open-ended and realistic. I recommend that we don’t jump to too conclusions about the "fragility of Syria’s social fabric" (2).

The situation in Syria has been escalating steadily since mid-March. After three months of protests, to which the Assad regime has responded with arrests, beatings, live ammunition, tanks and artillery, the death toll is now more than 1300 (more than 1400 according to some sources). As many as 10,000 have been arrested, including street protesters, opposition politicians, human rights activists, community leaders, and children. In Homs (and probably elsewhere), when space ran out due to the large number of detainees, the government had to convert schools into "holding pens." With so many men in detention, women began turning out to keep the movement going. In several towns they have organized "women-only" demonstrations and in Banias two were died at such an event–shot by the security forces. Hundreds have died during the last ten days in the brutal crackdown in the northwest. (3)

After the security forces manage to subdue a targeted town or region, they typically move on, leaving a smaller force behind. Thus the focus of the crackdown keeps on shifting from one locale to another. So after using force to re-take Jisr al-Shugur in the northwest, the regime sent troops and tanks towards a strategic town on the road between Aleppo and Damascus–as well Deir al-Zour on the Euphrates River and other towns in the east close to the border with Iraq. Protesters, however, have remained defiant despite their losses (killed, wounded, arrested), and soon return to the streets though often on a smaller scale or at several locations (instead of one large gathering)–so that the names of towns such as Homs and Dara’a keep popping in and out of the news. (See Resources: Breaking News).

Now there are reports of more defections from the army (in addition to those alleged in Jisr al-Shugur). Rumor has it that only large-scale defections of officers as well as foot-soldiers can save the day for the opposition. In any case, commentators have questioned the reliabliity of these reports, which anti-Assad activists may be exaggerating as a way to further erode the government’s position? (4)

So far the feeble international response has not had much of an affect. The Turkish administration of Prime Minister Erdogan, perhaps best-positioned to influence President Assad, is running out of patience. Prime Minister Erdogan, who now speaks of Syrian "savagery," has allowed nearly 10,000 Syrian refugees to enter Turkey and pledged to keep the border open. At the UN the Security Council’s failure to act is attributed to the veto power invested in Russia and China. Four weeks ago President Obama challenged Assad to "lead the transition" or "get out of the way." Yet Assad is doing neither--and Obama isn’t doing anything to stop the violence (as he had suggested in the speech that he would) (5). The latest development, highly significant, is the Arab League’s condemnation of the violence in Syria–which elicited an angry response from the Syrian government (6).

According to a report coming out of Syria, President Assad will address the nation on Sunday (or perhaps Monday). This comes on the heels of a massive pro-Assad demonstration in Damascus on June 15th (7). Will President Assad, once acclaimed inside and outside of Syria as a reformer, actually announce any substantive reforms? In the early weeks of the uprising he seemed to be vacillating between token reforms and repressive violence. Was he vacillating out of an inability to see clearly what was happening? How could he not realize that the senseless killing of unarmed civilians–even women and children--would only provoke a stronger response, capable of seriously endangered his regime?

Assad has considerable support, especially from those with much to lose if he is ousted. Prominent among his supporters are members of Syria’s minority communities. The Alawites, to whom the Assad family belongs, are but one piece of the Syrian mosaic but they feel threatened–not without reason--by their minority status and by their collusion with a repressive regime. What is less discussed in the media is Assad’s support among the Sunni middle and upper class residents of Damascus and Aleppo (the second largest city). Is Assad’s imminent speech a last ditch effort to consolidate this support? His critics aren’t expecting it to make much of a difference in how he runs the country. 

The situation is serious and rapidly evolving. For outside observers (analysts, pundits, journalists) what is particularly frustrating is their inability to verify reports coming out of Syria–as the regime is not permitting foreign reporters to operate within the county. To put recent events into perspective I recommend listing to The Economist’s interview with Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East studies at the University of Oklahoma (see Resources). Although sometimes criticized for being too sympathetic to Syrian government point of view (he is married to a Syrian), Landis is very knowledgeable about Syria and its people. his assessment here is cautious that and balanced. What he presents here is a cautious and balanced assessment is a nuanced and measured view of the sectarian dimension of politics in Syria. As he explained on his blog (June 15): "This is not my title. I wouldn't have chosen it. The struggle in Syria has not yet become and [sic] overt sectarian struggle as happened in Lebanon or Iraq."
  　
Identities Past and Present

What makes the protests in Syria so different from other manifestations of the Arab Spring is the country’s complicated demographic mosaic. This mosaic is the residue of many centuries of accumulating ethnic and religious identities–further complicated by cross-cutting political and ideological points of view. These are all further shaped by social and economic differences, such as urban versus rural lifestyles, income disparities--and perhaps very significantly in a country where more than 36% of the population is age 10-24–by a generation gap between the aspirations and worldviews of young people and those of their parents and grandparents (8).

Circumstances change, politics evolve, an ethnic identity in the foreground at one point in time recedes into the background at another, then re-emerges at still another. All of this is fodder for historians to chew on. We cannot begin to understand events in Syria–or speculate about possible outcomes–without acknowledging the complexity of the country’s co-existing identities. And, like people everywhere, Syrians have multiple, sometimes shifting and nearly always context-dependent, identities.

Ideally, I’d like to explore the many dimensions of Syria’s conserved, constrained, and contested identities. How and why have the processes of constructing identity changed over time? And what has been retained even as change was occurring? This series of posts is a mere beginning.

From the perspective of world history Syrian history is a treasure house of processes and patterns, an exemplar for almost any topic of general importance. "The cultural heritage of the Syrians rflects the evolved cultures of the East and the West over the long sweep of history" (9). As a crossroads of cultures and caravans, Syria is heavy with layers of historical baggage going back to ancient times. "Greater Syria" (as a geographical concept) stretches to the Mediterranean to encompass both modern Syria and Lebanon and parts of Turkey (10). Its history includes Phoenician city-states, Pax Roman emporia, the Umayyad Caliphate, Crusader enclaves, and incorporation into the Mamluk and Ottoman Empires (and of course much more). In textbook maps of the ancient world central and eastern Syria correspond to northern Mesopotamia. Indeed, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that roughly define "the Land between the Rivers" have their sources in the region just north of Syria and Syria’s mountainous regions are part of the "uplands and hilly flanks" of the Fertile Crescent.

There were Jews in Syria before the Common Era and thriving Jewish and Christian communities there in the early centuries of the Common Era’s first millennium. Islam arrived very early and by the 660s CE Damascus was the capital of the Caliphate. For centuries Greater Syria was part of the Ottoman Empire but Arab Revolt (1916) helped to bring about the Ottoman collapse, the peoples of this region had to contend with French and British rivalry over the spoils and both Lebanon and Syria fell under the French mandate. The French pursued a divide and rule policy, empowering minorities such as the Alawites and Druze, in ways that fostered divisiveness (11).

Throughout many upheavals, conquests, invasions, sectarian tensions, and persecutions the ancestors of modern Syrians have sustained themselves and passed on their traditions. Some communities have fared better than others: some have declined in numerically or proportionally while others have flourished. In daily life ancient languages gave way over time to Arabic (with a few exceptions). Minority communities survived by resorting to strategies that ran the gamut from serving the powerful, to retreating to rural villages, to practicing taqiyya (dissimulation, i.e. hiding one’s true identity or beliefs). The more I learn about the history of the Syrian mosaic the easier it becomes to imagine a vast repertoire of strategies. How have these have played out during the forty-odd years of the Assad regime, including the current uprising? How might they contribute (or not) to the new politics of a post-Assad era--if President Assad is overthrown?

Is the Syrian mosaic crumbling? Is the connective grout between its pieces eroding? That’s one way to look at the situation. Increasingly, as protests continue, Syria looks more and more like a country divided into two parts: one part pro-Assad (the Assad family, its core supporters, and most Alawites), the other anti-Assad (mostly Sunni Muslims). Yet, as Joshua Landis explains, this oversimplifies the situation (12). While many minority communities seem to fall into the pro-government camp, since their leaders have favored stability, in the run-up to the current crisis the call for reform has perhaps been more broadly disseminated than a survey of those out on the streets would suggest. In other words, the silent minorities and even the pro-Assad demonstrators of June 15th, may harbor dissident elements that, despite their preferring reform over rupture, could turn against Assad (13).

All of these questions are part of a broader theme we might call "the politics of managing the mosaic." So, how has the Assad regime managed Syria’s diversity? Quite well, actually. And herein lies a profound tragedy. Malise Ruthven concludes her review of Brooke Allen’s The Other Side of the Mirror: An American Travels Through Syria, with the poignant observation:

Visiting several mosques, churches, and shrines, she provides impressive testimony of the country’s religious diversity and the regime’s commitment to religious freedom. It would be tragic if the pursuit of democracy led to the shredding of this bright human canopy, where religious and cultural differences seem to have flourished under the iron grip of a minority sectarian regime. (14)

At the time of independence from France in 1946, the ideals of the Baath Party were those of nationalism, pan-Arabism, and secularism. Over the years the balance of these has varied, but when the Baathists came to power in 1963, they were quite willing to co-opt any group willing to abide by its non-sectarian policies. When Hafez Assad took over in 1970, his primary goal was to create stablity in a country plagued by coups for more than two decades. Of course, he brought many of his fellow Alawites into the government, but he also reached out to Christians and Druze and, by adhering more closely to Sunni Muslim beliefs and practices, he won supporters among the Sunni majority. His strategy worked--with one exception, the Sunnis who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. And the results were tragic–as attested by the killings in Jisr al-Shugur in 1980 and the massacre in Hama in 1982.
Since becoming president in 2000 Bashar Assad has had consider success in gaining the loyalty of the Christian and Druze minorities, yet he has been more wary of the more conservative, Brotherhood-leaning Sunnis. His decision in 2005 to enact economic reforms was undoubtedly motivated in part by a need to curry favor among the urban commercial classes, regardless of their sectarian identities. Those who benefitted the most, however, were family members, highly-placed bureaucrats, and the Baathist elite, most notably his cousin Rami Makhlouf. This week Makhlouf, the richest businessman in Syria, announced that he would henceforth devote himself to charity (though it is not at all clear that he is really forsaking his commercial ties). I see this as yet another indicator of the regime’s grasp of the economic currents running through the uprising (15).

I intend to take up "managing the mosaic" in detail in a later post. First, however, I think it is necessary to provide information about the consitutent pieces of the mosaic. While this picture is by no means complete (due to time constraints and the nature of the readily available sources), I will present it in Parts II and III. In the meantime, here is a chart of the religious and ethnic identities to be included in those posts:

RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES MUSLIMS SUNNI MUSLIMS SALAFISTS/ISLAMISTS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD SUFIS SHIA MUSLIMS [TWELVERS] ISMAILI MUSLIMS ALAWITES 　 DRUZE 　 CHRISTIANS ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS SYRIAC CHRISTIANS CATHOLIC (UNIATE) CHRISTIANS PROTESTANT/EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS 　 JEWS (a small number in Damascus and Aleppo) 　 YAZIDIS

ETHNIC IDENTITIES SYRIAN ARABS  BEDOUIN ALAWITES DRUZE some CHRISTIANS KURDS 　 ASSYRIANS (Syriacs/Chaldeans) 　 ARMENIANS 　 CIRCASSIANS 　 TURKMEN 　 GREEKS 　 DOM 　 PALESTINIAN ARABS (refugees) 　 IRAQI ARABS (refugees) 　 IRAQI ASSYRIANS (refugees)

ACTIVITIES

Though school is out in the US, I’m presenting these in a "pedagogical present" format. 

READ: Use "After All This Bloodshed" to introduce what’s been happening in Syria. Call attention to the grassroots statement about "national unity." Why, then, is there also a looming "spectre of sectarian violence"?

SHOW the short video "Thomas L. Friedman on Hama, Syria, 1982" to set the stage for discussion of the situation in Syria.

RESEARCH/CREATE: To illustrate the Syrian mosaic use Alissa Everett’s account of her visit to Damascus (or simply explain that Damascus has a cultural heritage that is Jewish, Christian, and Muslim). Then send students to find images online and create their own SLIDESHOW or PowerPoint about cultural diversity in Damascus or Aleppo.

READ/DISCUSS: Assign "Promise of Arab Uprisings" in a global studies, history, civics/government, journalism, or language arts class. In this short piece NYT reporters Shadid and Kirkpatrick pull together their observations around the theme of diversity and the urgent need for "a new sense of national identity built on the idea of citizenship."

SEARCH/RESEARCH: Ask students to go to the NYT site and find other articles by Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick. Where have they reported from the "frontlines of history"? ASK: How do you think their reporting has influenced how they think about identity and citizenship?

READ/DISCUSS/RESEARCH: An exploding Syria would affect the entire region. First read Thomas Friedman’s "They Shoot Horses, Don’t They?" and ASK students to list what he thinks the repercussions will be. In an advanced class, as the next step, hand out the relevant portions of the Reva Bhala’s "Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis." EXPAND the topic with an online search for more information about the possible impact on Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq (a suitable homework assignment). Then discuss in class the likelihood of these possible outcomes. Encourage students to think about the POV of their sources (since an Israeli speculating on, for example, the impact on Lebanon would no doubt be quite different from what a Lebanese might predict).

GENERAL RESOURCES

"Timeline: Syria." BBC News (May 21, 2011): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/827580.stm

"Syria Demographics Profile 2011." Index Mundi: http://www.indexmundi.com/syria/demographics_profile.html (based on CIA World Factbook, as of December 30, 2011).
　

Syrian Studies Association: Links: http://www.ou.edu/ssa/links.htm

• Check out scholarly articles, esp. Paul Heck, "Religion and the Authoritarian State: The Case of Syria" (2005): http://www.ou.edu/mideast/Additional%20pages%20-%20non-catagory/Heck_Religion.and.the.Authoritarian.State.pdf

Centre for Syrian Studies: Links: (School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews): http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/css/links/

SyriaComment.com: http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2004/08/iraqi-christians-fleeing-to-syria.htm

Creative Syria:http://www.creativesyria.com/

• Link from SyriaComment.com
• Two photo collections, including a set of historical photos going back as far as 1850

Forward Magazine: http://www.forwardsyria.com/

• "Born from the firm conviction that the only way is forward in Syrian and other options do not exist, Forward Magazine is the only balanced, local, and reliable source of infomration on Syria in the English language. ... It does not distort factors nor does it falsify realities. Simply, it looks at the bright side of things, while pointing to the shortcomings, with the objective of change and reform, rather than cynicism."
• First issue, 5 January 2007. Online and print edition.

Maps

"Syria." URL: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia02/syria_sm02.gif

• Major towns with place-names formally transcribed (but some important protest localities are not shown)

"Protests Emerge from Many Corners of Syria’s Diverse Population." URL: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/01/world/middleeast/01syria-map.html?ref=middleeast

• Best map (though it doesn’t show towns where most recent protests and crackdowns have occurred).

"Protests Across Syria." URL: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/04/23/world/middleeast/syria-graphic.html?ref=syria

• Earlier NYT map with timeline (covers protests from March 21 to April 22, 2011)

"A Sectarian Look at Syrian Unrest." URL: http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/4-4-11-Syria_Unrest.jpg

• Excellent color coded map of major pieces of the mosaic (but shows only the protest localities up to about May 4^th)

"Syria: Governorates." URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Syria-blank-governorates.png

• A governorate may also be called a province. Use this map to locate governorates/provinces mentioned in news sources.

Analysis and Commentary

Shadid, Anthony and David D. Kirkpatrick. "Promise of Arab Uprisings Is Threatened by Divisions." New York Times (May 21, 2011):

Friedman, Thomas. "They Shoot Horses, Don’t They?" New York Times (May 21, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/opinion/22friedman.html?ref=thomaslfriedman

Bhalla, Reva. "Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis." Stratfor (May 5, 2011): http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis

• Important background on Assad regime's Alawite "pillar" (with emphasis on Alawites in the military).
• Provides a geopolitical analysis of the regional context.

Ozcan, Nihat Ali. "When Will Things (Hopefully) Get Better in Syria?" Hurriyet Daily News (June 15, 2011): http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?=when-will-things-hopefully–get-better-in syria

Yassin-Kassab, Robin. "After All This Bloodshed, There Is No Going Back for Syria." The Guardian (June 16, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/16/bloodshed-syria-regime-change


RESOURCES: BREAKING NEWS

Stack, Liam. "Syrian Troops Retake Control of Rebellious Town in North Town." New York Times (June 12, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/middleeast/13syria.html?ref=syria

Landis, Joshua. "What happened at Jisr al-Shagur?" Syria Comment (June 13, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10202

• Commentary by Landis plus extracts/links to numerous news articles and commentary dating from June 9-13.

Shadid, Anthony. "Syrian Unrest Stirs Fear of Deeper Sectarian Divide." New York Times (June 13, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/world/middleeast/14syria.html?ref=syria

Daragahi, Borzou. "Syrians Vent Rage in Tent Camps on Border with Turkey." Los Angeles Times (June 14, 2011): http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/14/world/la-fg-syria-crackdown-20110615

Starr, Stephen. "With Flag Rally, Syria Papers over Rifts." Washington Post (June 15, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/with-flag-rally-syria-papers-over-rifts/2011/06/15/AGkZnMWH_story.html

Shadid, Anthony. "Reviled Tycoon, Assad’s Cousin, Resigns in Syria." New York Times (June 16, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/world/middleeast/17syria.html?scp=12&sq=syria&st=nyt

Stack, Liam. "For Syrian Refugees, Shelter of a Precarious Sort." New York Times (June 16, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/world/middleeast/17border.html?ref=syria

Shadid, Anthony. "Violent Clashes as Thousands Protest in Cities Across Syria." New York Times (June 17, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/middleeast/18syria.html?scp=5&sq=syria&st=nyt

Sly, Liz. "Pressure on Syria’s Assad Intensifies as Protests Persist." Washington Post (June 17, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-business-tycoon-resigns-in-concession-to-protesters/2011/06/17/AGCWydYH_story.html

Stack, Liam. "Syrian Town Is Strained By Flood of Refugees." New York Times (June 17, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/middleeast/18border.html?ref=middleeast


RESOURCES: RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY

"Syria: International Religious Freedom Report 2006." U.S. Department of State (2006): http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71432.htm

VIDEO: "Thomas L. Friedman on Hama, Syria, 1982." New York Times (May 6, 2011): http://video.nytimes.com/video/2011/05/06/opinion/100000000808191/opinion--thomas-l-friedman-on-syria.html?scp=6&sq=friedman&st=cse

• Good, short (only 1:53 mins.) introduction to the uprising in Syria; Friedman was in Hama at the time of the massacre and also wrote about what he saw in from Beirut to Jerusalem (19–)

AUDIO: "Joshua Landis on the Syrian Regime: Deeply Sectarian." The Economist (June 14, 2011): http://www.economist.com/node/21521962

Everett, Alissa. "Damascus, Syria Before the Strife." Marin Magazine (May 2011): http://www.marinmagazine.com/Marin-Magazine/May-2011/Ancient-Splendor/

• Very accessible article, introducing the ancient city’s Muslim, Christian, and Jewish sites

Elhadj, Elie, Ph.D.   Post. Creative Forum (April 17, 2009): http://www.creativesyria.com/syriabloggers/?p=73

• Ms. Elhadj makes provocative references to Martin Luther, asking whether a Muslim reformer of Luther’s stature might emerge in Syria (given its history of religious tolerance and modernation). Read the 74 comments as you have enough time!
• Opportunity to bring the possibility of a Muslim reformation into a a discussion of the Reformation in Europe.

Ismail, Salwa. "Syria and the Sectarian ‘Plot.’" The Guardian (April 28, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/28/syria-media-sectarian-plot

Chaulia, Sreeram. "Minority Cloud Looms Over Arab Summer." Asia Times (June 14, 2011): http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF14Ak01.html

NOTES

1) See Resources: Breaking News. For an overview of the minority/mosaic theme applied to current events in Syria see Sreeram Chaulia, "Minority Cloud Looms Over Arab Summer" and Salwa Ismail, "Syria and the Sectarian ‘Plot’" (both in Resources: Religious and Ethnic Diversity).

2) An opinion partly based on Salwa Ismail’s discussion of the regime’s manipulation of national unity theme in its rhetoric (see Resources).

3) See Resources: Breaking News; Peter Beaumont, "Syria’s Defiant Women Risk All to Protest Against President Bashar al-Assad." The Guardian (May 21, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/21/syria-women-unrest-repression?intcmp=239. Many women and children have fled from the towns and villages of the northwest, recently under attack by government forces. In addition to the refugees in Turkey and Lebanon there are increasing numbers of internally displaced people (see esp. Liam Stack, "For Syrian Refugees" and "Syrian Town Is Strained" and Borzou Daragahi, "Syrians Vent Rage").

4) For skepticism about the scale of army defections see Joshua Landis, "What Happened at Jisr al-Shagour?" But seemingly credible accounts have been trickling out more recently; see "Witness Describes Scene in Jisr al-Shugur," Al Jazeera English (June 11, 2011): http://english.aljazera.net/news/middleeasst/2011/06/2011611121655786792.html; Ipek Yezdani, "Soldier Describes Syrian Unrest After Defecting," Hurriyet Daily News (June 15, 2011): http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=soldier-describes-syrian-unrest-after-defecting

5) Although the French government has explicitly pointed out Assad’s loss of legitimacy, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has  made similar statements. For Turkey articles covering Syrian refugees and also Delphine Strauss, "Turkey Grows Impatient with Ally," Financial Times (June 15, 2011).  For criticism of Obama's lack of action see "Silence on Syria," editorial in the Washington Post (June 15, 2011).

6) "Arab league Condemns Syria for First Time," UPI (June 15, 2011): http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2011/06/15/Arab-league-condemns-syria-for-first-time

7) Widely reported, but for a good photo see Stephen Starr, "With Flag Rally, Syria Papers over Rifts" (Resources: Breaking News).

8) "Syria: Youth and Adolescents," United Nations Population Fund: http://www.unfa.org.sy/en/content.aspx?s=4 (data perhaps dating to 2004?). Over 35% are in the 0-14 years cohort (see "Syria Demographics Profile 2011" in General Resources).

9) Elie Elhdaj (Resources: Relgious and Ethnic Diversity).

10) This is a restricted definition of "Greater Syria."   During the Ottoman period "Syria" included included a much larger area.

11) There is considerable literature on Fr colonialism and its creation of "states within the state" in the territory of its mandate.

12) Steve Inskeep, interview with Joshua Landis. "Protesters Want Changes to Syria’s Power Structure." NPR (April 27): http://www.npr.org/2011/04/27/135760793/protests-disrupt-syrias-power-structure?ps=cprs

13) For example, reports of Christians in protests.  Opposition figures in exile who run the gamut from members of the Muslim Brotherhood to secularists, Christians, Kurds, and even a close relative of President Assad.

14) Malise Ruthven, "Storm Over Syria," The New York Review of Books (June 9, 2011).  Not available online to non-subscribers. 

15) Anthony Shadid, "Reviled Tycoon, Assad’s Cousin, Resigns in Syria" (Resources: Breaking News).  For extensive discussion /coverage of this resignation and of the Syrian economy and the "bite" of sanctions see Joshua Landis, "Rami Makhlouf," Syria Comment (June 16, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog?p=10287