INTRODUCTION
In Syria anti-regime protests are now in their fifth month. Tanks and snipers unleashed on civilians. Security forces dispatched around the country. More than 1600 protesters dead. As many as 12,000 arrested (with hundreds or thousands in detention). Camps of 10,000 refugees in Turkey and thousands in Lebanon, too. Entire families and villages displaced internally along the Turkish border. A few concessionary gestures by the government. Great skepticism about Assad’s willingness or ability to keep his promises--by activating them in ways that would bring about real change. An authoritarian, intransigent regime running up against a persistent, highly-charged grassroots protest movement. This is the Syrian uprising. (1)
Since the protests began in mid-March the news from Syria has teetered back and forth–from reports that anti-government protests are being met with ruthlessness and violence to news that the regime is offering yet another set of reforms; troops and tanks deployed to crackdown hard, then withdrawn or redeployed to other towns; President Assad’s call for dialogue one day, attacks on university students the next day; a constant series of anti-regime protests across most of the country, yet there are also pro-Assad demonstrations, especially in Damascus. Thus, more than a few outside observers have called the situation in Syria a stalemate.
During early July the foreign media's focus was on Hama, a city of 800,000 residents, where on July 1st (a Friday) there was a massive protest, involving perhaps upwards of 100,000 out on the streets. The next day the local governor was sacked because his attitude towards the protesters was too submissive. Then, on July 3, after troops and more than 90 tanks rolled back into Hama, tension in the city became almost palpable–since most residents feared a repeat of the violent government crackdown that had occurred in early June (when at least 65 demonstrators were killed). By July 5 (Tuesday) the security forces were beginning to push through the protesters’ makeshift barricades, leaving 24 dead and some 80 wounded. Anticipating more violence, people began to leave Hama for neighboring towns. No doubt they were anticipating an attempt to clear Hama, similar to the regime’s efforts to clear Jisr al-Shughur and other towns and villages in the province of Idleb in the northwest. (2)
A Fork in the Road?
As tensions were building up in Hama, it seemed that Syria had reached a fork in the road (3). Most people stayed in Hama, arming themselves with stones and erecting barricades of burning tires to keep the security forces out. An earlier call for a general strike had already shut down much of the city’s commercial activity. Were the security forces ready to use lethal force if, as expected, protesters would pour out onto the streets after prayers on Friday?
A sign that a dire situation might be unfolding was the decision of U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford to travel to Hama on July 7 (Thursday) and to stay in the city until Friday afternoon. This visit would be more than a fact-finding mission. As his spokesperson put it rather bluntly, on June 28th: "The violence needs to end thrughut Syria and a broader public process needs to begin." Furthermore there were indications that American diplomats in Syria had been engaging in back channel activity. (4)
So, what did happen in Hama on July 8th? No bloody massacre (5). That was a great relief to all concerned: the city’s residents, local organizers of the protest movement and their supporters, Ambassdor Ford and the US diplomatic corps (and, of course, the Obama administration), and also, presumably, President Assad and the regime’s loyalists. Having been a center of resistance in the early 1980s, Hama is a real "conundrum" from the point of view of the regime. President Bashar al-Assad does not really want another bloodbath in Hama, where in 1982 his father President Hafez al-Assad put down an Islamist revolt in which 20,000 (quite possibly many more) people were killed. For Assad another bloodbath in Hama would be a public relations and diplomatic disaster (6). Perhaps the regime senses that if it goes too far in Hama, the protesters will turn away from their mostly non-violent tactics. While the presence of Ambassdor Ford--and also the French ambassador--changed the dynamic on this particular Friday, the regime can now point to this "interference" as support for its view that the uprising is being encouraged by foreigners (as well as extremists). Perhaps Assad made a tactical decision to avoid a major escalation while foreign diplomats were on the scene. Their presence was strongly condemned by the regime. In Damascus both the American and French embassies were attacked by pro-Assad elements. (7).
A sigh of relief, no massacre this time–but no resolution either. Syria was still positioned at what could have been a decisive turning point, since an unprecedented "national dialogue" was scheduled for July 10 (Sunday). Reporters speculated about who would come--and who would stay away. Two very prominent and well-respected opposition figures, Michel Kilo and Anwar al-Bunni, decided to forego any attempt at dialogue as long as the government had troops deployed around the country--for the obvious purpose of continuing the crackdown on protesters and intimidating the internal opposition. With few dissidents or opposition leaders willing to participate, the July 10th talks had little impact. (8)
Then, on July 15, once again, there were large protests after Friday prayers in many cities and towns, including large demonstrations fairly close to the center of Damascus. The next day (July 16) a meeting of 350 dissidents and opposition leaders was held in Istanbul, Turkey, but with very disappointing results. The attendees were expected to create an organized, united front of intellectuals and Islamists who were living in exile and their counterparts who were working inside Syria, especially the young leaders and coordinators of the protests. In Istanbul, however, the Kurds walked out over a failure to recognize their non-Arab identity and tribal representatives also walked out. A parallel meeting supposed to take place in Damascus was called off, due to the danger posed by the security forces. (9)
The foreign media's focus has now shifted to Homs, Syria’s third largest city, described as "a flashpoint city." Last week (beginning on July 18) the violence in Homs escalated–with as many as 40 people killed there during clashes between security forces and protesters and in incidents reported as "sectarian" (a troubling development). These events inspired country-wide "solidarity with Homs" demonstrations on July 22 (Friday) that, for the first time included major demonstrations in Aleppo--as well as larger than ever protests in Damascus. In those protests eleven people were killed, shot by the security forces. (10)
On Sunday (July 24) security forces attacked a village in Idleb (revealing that dissent is still popping up in parts of the northwest despite the weeks of repression), the government sent reinforcements to Homs, and there was another round of arrests of suspected organizers and protesters, particularly in Damascus (where both the increasing number of protests and their increasing proximity to the city center is worrying the regime). Also on Sunday the cabinet drafted a law that would permit, for the first time in nearly fifty years, the formation of political parties (other than those under the umbrella of the National Progressive Front). But this will be a hollow reform if it does not lead to other needed constitutional concessions. (11)
It seems that the regime’s strategy is to prevent any pockets of momentum from building up prior to the onset of Ramadan, the month of daytime fasting that begins on August 1st. Many observers are saying that Ramadan will be "a month of Fridays," when people will meet after evening prayers to break the fast and then participate in night-time demonstrations. A rumor is going around that Assad is planning yet another speech, to announce that his willingness to remove the constitutional article that ensures the Baath Party’s dominance, after which he might call for presidential elections. Is this a change of tactics? Are these signs of Assad’s desperation on the eve of Ramadan? (12)
But from the vantage point of late July, it seems that Syria is still stalled at that proverbial fork in the road. Yet the process may be inching forward due to several unfolding factors. Sectarian tensions may emerge as a decisive factor–or they may be contained by leaders at the grassroots, who seem determined to operate inclusively and to adhere to a nationalist agenda. Syria’s already unraveling economy may deteriorate more rapidly, so that even Iranian aid may prove insufficient to shore it up. And if the economy collapses, Assad could easily lose the loyalty of the business elite, which would probably bring about his demise. Another possibility is that Assad’s half-hearted, hesitant reforms might begin--slowly and incrementally--to make a difference, for example, by reassuring those who have kept hoping that sooner or later he would exchange his represser’s suit for that of a reformer. Whether limited reforms (such as the party law, which restricts new parties to those that can pass muster with a regime-appointed committee) will convince anyone in the opposition/dissident/protester camps to give Assad another chance is highly unlikely. The protesters demands have hardened since mid-March. Most of those opposed to the regime would no doubt agree with Louay Hussein (a Damascus-based opposition figure) when he says: "Our struggle with the authorities in not over laws. It is a struggle over freedom." (13)
"Eating" Syria
One of the participants in the July 10th dialogue in Damascus was Dr. Mohammed Habash, a respected Islamic scholar and a political moderate. Prior to the meeting, when he was explaining to a reporter why he had decided to attend, he made this statement: "I believe it [overthrowing the president] will put us in the mouth of the alligator and will (lead us to some tragedy). So I believe we have to come round table to discuss about everything" (14).
Now when I heard this statement, it reminded me of a political metaphor used in the oral traditions of certain precolonial African kingdoms (and still heard, commonly, in modern political discourse). This is the metaphor of "eating the kingdom," which signified the decisive moment when a new king, after sidelining or defeating his rivals (often in a bloody succession war), asserted authority over the "old chiefs" of his predecessor, performed the required accession rituals, and thus acquired legitimacy in the eyes of his people. It is a very apt metaphor for Syria as a nation, whose people are seeking a democratic transition--in which the people through democratic institutions and elections would establish a legitimate government. In other words, the people themselves would "eat" Syria (the sovereign state).
So imagine a nation, slowly approaching a fork in history’s metaphorical highway (that is, its historical trajectory), the spot where it splits into two roads going forward. Looking ahead it sees danger standing in the middle of each road: take one road and face the maw of a hungry Lion, take the other and face the jaws of an aggresive Alligator.
For Syria the Lion is the Assad regime (the name Assad means "lion") and, in a sense, the Assads have been "eating" Syria ever since Hafez Assad came to power in 1970. Bashar Assad inherited the political mantle (mane?) of his father, leaving behind the profession of ophthamology to "eat" the Syrian state (15). He pursued strategies of espousing secularism, protecting sectarian minorities (his fellow Alawites but also Christians, Druze, and Ismailis), and even cultivating relationships with moderate Sunni Muslims. Perhaps Assad can manipulate the current situation to increase sectarian tensions, turning this into an advantage, since then he might still offer, with some credibility, a stable government "improved" by a few reforms. He could also "eat" the uprising by using brute force or by a combination of force and attrition (if the protesters’ energy and enthusiasm wanes). Neither of these outcomes is very likely, however, at this juncture. In general the Syrian people are very skeptical. They have little confidence in Assad’s ability to reform an authoritarian system of governance, and little confidence in his capacity to bring about national dialogue or reconciliation.
For Syria, the Alligator slithering in the roadway is the civil war that, if it breaks out, might swallow up the entire nation in years of chaos and sectarian strife. The regime’s propaganda plays up these possibilities when it argues that only it can provide a stable and safe environment (ironically, even as it is perpetrating violence on unarmed civilians and fomenting sectarian divisions). The violence in Homs, involving the numerically dominant Sunni Muslims and the Alawite sect (to which the Assads belong) is an ominous sign of what could become a destablizing and tragic situation. Syrians are very much aware of how Iraq sank into the mire of sectarian violence--since many Iraqis sought refuge in Syria, bringing their stories with them.
A significant proportion of the Syrian people have held back (stayed home or backed the uprising only surreptitiously) because they are "terrified about the morning after" (16). Residents of Damascus and Aleppo, and of the business and professional elite have been especially fearful, making the recent protests in both cities (and lives lost as security forces reacted) steps forward that will be closely watched inside and outside the county. What political rivalries will emerge if the Assad regime is toppled? Will older and younger opposition leaders somehow manage to work together or will their agendas diverge? Will Sunni Muslims dominate? Will vengeance be wrought not only on the regime loyalists but on Alawi communities regardless of their allegiance (or not) to regime? So there are many reasons to fear "the morning after."
Many political analysts have been pessimistic. Gary Gambill, for example, argues that "there are no plausible circumstances under which a democratic transition would constitute a rational choice for the embattled dictator" (17). In other words, Assad surely realizes that embarking on a democratic transition would eventually lead to his demise. Yet, he continues to offer the carrot of reforms, suggesting that he really doesn’t know what to do (as some commentators have suggested) (18). Thus, Gambill thinks that efforts by the Obama administration to nudge Assad towards a transition were futile. This conclusion has now been vindicated by Ambassador Ford’s solidarity with the protesters in Hama and by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statements after the pro-regime demonstrators attacked the US embassy in Damascus.
For Gambill, the key factor is "Syria’s unique minority-dominated power structure" that is dependent on "Alawite solidarity" and how Sunni loathing for the heterodox but privileged Alawites "feeds into the existential insecurities felt by most Alawites." (19). Essentially, most Alawites can’t imagine that a Sunni dominated government would protect them. If Gambill is right, the Alligator’s jaws are primed for a feast.
I’m trying to stay realistic, which means recognizing the grave dangers represented by both the Lion and the Alligator. Yet, I keep searching the media for less pessimistic signs. Syria’s pro-democracy activists include people who are also heavily invested in human rights. These activists and protest organizers (through the Local Coordinating Committees and other grassroots groups) are working hard to keep the movement peaceful: "There are growing problems. But the violence is regime-provoked and we shouldn’t take this to mean there will be a civil war" (20).
So, what will happen next? Who will ‘"eat" Syria? Will the regime with its repressive and ruthless tactics devour the people and their aspirations, their hopes for a better future, their most admirable values (pro-democracy and human rights)? Will civil war swallow up an entire nation?
But wait a minute, we must also entertain the notion that, in the long-run, the people will prevail. Although, inevitably, they won’t remain stalled at the fork indefinitely–sooner or later tevents will carry them forward along one road or the other--to face either the Lion or the Alligator. It is possible that, regardless of the road forward, the people will evade or escape from the jaws so eager to consume them. With so many uncertainties, so many variant factors shaping the future, let’s not cast ourselves in the role of prophets. Pay close attention, follow events, analyze and speculate, yes, of course. Speak as prophets, no way.
"FORK IN THE ROAD" ACTIVITY
Using graphic organizers can help students think through new or difficult material. When asked to engage with multifaceted current events–taking place, in many instances, in an unfamiliar setting), we all can use mental maps to help us see more clearly and often it is a good tactic to make these tangible artifacts! This activity can be pursued now (when the outcome is still uncertain) OR it can be carried out later as a retrospective exercise. (With a bit of work you could also adapt it to another country’s fork in the road–using either a contemporary or historical case).
GRAPHIC ORGANIZER: Organize this as a small group project (using poster paper and markers or digital graphic software and/or projectable slides) OT turn it into a class project on a large bulletin board. Ask students to illustrate the fork-in-road/lion/alligator metaphor. This activity is straightforward enough for middle school students but expandable to any higher level (expecting more detail, more research). Please adapt and modify it to suit your class (a chance here to be creative!).
1) Begin with a Y-shaped road, on its side and pointing towards the right. Standing in the stem of the Y will be a representation of the Syrian people as both protesters/non-protesters (the protesters could be a cluster of stick figures carrying posters with slogans and/or Syrian flags). Send students to look at news media photos to find slogans or other suitable representations.
2) Students may add a text balloon or sidebar with a bullet list of the protesters’ demands. Be sure that they can tell you where their information is coming from.
3) To include those who would probably like to see reforms but are not out on the streets, students might add another group closer of stick figures. Again, they can add a balloon or sidebar to list the reforms that they are advocating, their reasons for staying off the streets, or even their support for boycotts or attempts at dialogue. Make sure that this content is grounded in identifiable sources.
4) Next, students should put a drawing or picture of a lion in one arm of the Y, an alligator in the other. These are the obstacles suggested the difficult choices–with uncertain of outcomes–facing the Syrian people.
5) Students can use the lion’s roar (another balloon) to sum up the Assad regime’s position. Around the lion they may place sidebars with examples of the regime’s tactics during the uprising.
6) The alligator’s gaping mouth can be attached to balloon that sums up the dangers of a civil war, including potential sectarian or ethnic strife or names of opposition organizations (that might emerge as rival political factions).
7) Ask students to think about possible outcomes if Syria manages to get around these obstacles. How could these be represented to the right of the Lion and Alligator? For example, showing Assad the Lion in a plane flying off into exile or in prison behind bars or people casting ballots in a democratic eledction. Perhaps the Alligator can be shown captured in a net or with his mouth tied shut to indicate that the threat of civil war might be neutralized. Again, people could be seated in a constitutional convention or participating in an election. Put BIG question marks beside these possible outcomes.
Recommended Resources
These will change over time and your set of news articles should be updated as needed. You may need to introduce the topic, for example, by drawing items from the BBC’s "Guide: Syria Crisis."
Also, if possible, show recent protest footage. For these check what is available on The Lede (on the New York Times site) and on Al Jazeera English (http://aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/). The intensity of the protests is well-conveyed by the first video of what is now widely-recognized as the uprising’s anthem (see Resources: Recent News)
Among the articles listed above, these would be most useful in addressing the stalemate and its possible resolutions (the two paths forward):
- Marsh, Katherine. "Syria's Silent Majority Will Deterimine Next Step as protests Grow." The Guardian (April 15, 2011).
- "An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by CAmille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011).
- Folkeson, Annika. "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests," BBC News (July 17, 2011).
- Abouzeid, Rania. "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy." TIME (July 19, 2011).
- Ignatius, David. "Plotting a Post-Assad Road Map for Syria." Washington Post (July 20, 2011).
- Shadid, Anthony. "New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria." New York Times (July 24, 2011).
OTHER ACTIVITIES
READ/ANALYZE: In "Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama" Dominic Evans tries to explain why Hama is such a conundrum for the regime. Ask students to re-state the points that Evans is making. Then, based on broader information (including TV coverage), consider the credibility of this explanation.
READ/DISCUSS: Gary Gambil’s essay, "The Hard Man of Damascus," takes a very pessimistic view of the situation. Does Gambill think Assad’s call for a national dialogue is sincere? What motives might Assad have? Who are the soft-liners and hard-lines in Syria? Why does he think a "straight-up transition to democracy" is unlikely in Syria? What does he mean by "a pacted transition"? Why is such a transition also very unlikely in Syria? Think about how other analyists might counter this argument?
WORLD HISTORY: EXPLORE the history of the two pacted transitions that Gambill gives as his examples (South Africa and Chile) and then compare/contrast these cases. Also, think about how they differ from the Syrian uprising.
RESEARCH: Find out more about Michel Kilo, one of the opposition’s most venerable figures. Project a photo of Kilo (captured from the web) as a student presents a short oral report about him.
GENERAL RESOURCES
"Guide: Syria Crisis." BBC News (accessed July 23, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13855203
- Excellent place to start because it provides a concise overview of events since mid-March
- Includes a chart contrasting "What protesters want" with "What Assad has offered"
- Addresses sectarian, regional, and economic aspects of the crisis
- Click on "Protest Footage Mapped" for videos (from June protests; watch for update)
- Scroll down for more features and analysis, plus useful links
- Young activists explain what they are doing and why they are involved in the pro-democracy/anti-Assad movement; they describe the brutality of the security forces; all those featured are men but there are also women in the streets and behind the scenes
- Explain to students that these revolutionaries appear to be middle/upper class and well-educated, mostly involved in organizing demonstrations; grassroots protesters, drawn from a much broader socio-economic spectrum, include many of their less-educated peers
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8626440/Syria-unrest-timeline-of-protests-and-crackdowns.html
- Needs an update but very useful as a overview of events from March 15th to July 8th.
Analysis
Marsh, Katherine. "Syria's Silent Majority Will Deterimine Next Step as protests Grow." The Guardian (April 15, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/syria-protests-silent-majority
- Silent majority is becoming a smaller portion of the population but this article sets out their reasons for holding back, with comments on Assad's strategy at the mid-April point in the uprising.
Evans, Dominic. "Analysis: Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama," Reuters (July 5, 2011): http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/us-syria-hama-idUSTRE7644L020110705
Gambill, Gary. "The Hard Man of Damascus." Foreign Policy (July 6, 2011):
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/06/the_hard_man_of_damascus?page=0,1
Folkeson, Annika. "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests." BBC News (July 17, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14179188
Ignatius, David. "Plotting a Post-Assad Road Map for Syria." Washington Post (July 20, 2011):
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/plotting-a-post-assad-road-map-for-syria/2011/07/20/gIQANBQcQI_story.html
VIDEO: "Would the West Interfere in Syria?" (24:22 mins). Aired on Inside Story (July 22, 2011): http://aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2011/07/201172392452703186.html
- Misleading title (refers to the last third or so of program)
- Episode begins with footage of protests on July 22, noting large protests in Homs and Damacus (where 20 were killed); how crackdown is continuing around the country
- Guests are George Jabbour (president of the Syrian UN Association, former advisor to Hafez al-Assad), Marwa Daoudy (scholar/lecturer at the Middle East Centre, Oxford University), and Radwan Ziadeh (director of the Damascus Centre for Human Rights and currently a visiting scholar in the US)
- Jabbour is hesitant to tell what he knows about what's happening (audio is poor, too); he emphasizes the need for reconciliaton
- Ziadeh speaks with a POV closest to that of the protesters
- Daoudy notes the effects of the regime’s "mixed signals" and thinks that the protests in Damascus on July 22 are a tipping point (but echoes Jabbour on the need for reconciliaton)
RESOURCES: RECENT NEWS (July 19-26)
Ali, Nour and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/syria-troops-homs-security-crackdown
Abouzeid, Rania. "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy." TIME (July 19, 2011): http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,2083769,00.html
Harris, Elizabeth. "Videos Appear to Show Violence in Syria." The Lede: New York Times (July 21, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/videos-appear-to-show-violence-in-syria/
Ali, Nour and Ian Black, "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime Adds to Death Toll." The Guardian (July 22): http://guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/22/mass-syrian-protest-assad-deaths
Weiss, Michael. "Sectarianism, or a Trap by Assad?" The Weekly Standard (July 22, 2011): http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/sectarianism-or-trap-assad_577266.html
Mackey, Robert. "Video of a Syrian Protest Anthem." The Lede: New York Times (July 21): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/video-of-a-syrian-protest-anthem/
- Two videos of protesters performing but the first one has English subtitles and better quality footage
- Preview for suitability (subtitles in first video call Bashar "an ass")
check out Anthony Shadid’s July 22nd article about this anthem
Ali, Nour. "Syrian Troops Attack Village in Northwest, Activists Say." The Guardian (July 24, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/24/syrian-troops-attack-village-activists
Shadid, Anthony. "New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria." New York Times (July 24, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/world/middleeast/25syria.html?scp=2&sq=shadid%20syria%20new%20loyalties&st=cse
Sly, Liz. "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms." Washington Post (July 25, 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syria-permits-opposition-parties-on-restrictive-terms/2011/07/25/gIQAGiWyYI_story.html
RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July)
For an overview of events in early July (as well as more recent coverage) check out posts on the Joshua Landis blog, Syria Comment, especially:
- "News Round Up (5 July 2011)." SyriaComment (July 5, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10573
- "News Round Up (7 July 2011)." SyriaComment (July 8, 2011): http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=10605
Shadid, Anthony. "Coalition of Factions from the Streets Fuels a New Opposition in Syria." New York Times (June 30, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html?scp=5&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse
Shadid, Anthony. "With Police Absent, Protests Surge in Syrian City [Hama]." New York Times (July 1, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/middleeast/02syria.html?scp=4&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse
Daragahi, Borzou and Roula Hajjar. "Syrian Troops Roll into Hama, a Symbol of Antigovernment Activity." Los Angeles Times (July 5, 2011): http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-syria-sweep-20110705,0,3757510.story
"‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Claims in Syria." Al Jazeera (July 6, 2011): http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/07/20117684729673824.html
Chulov, Martin. "Hama Is Beacon of Resistance 30 Years on from Massacre." The Guardian (July 6, 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/06/hama-resistance-30-years-massacre
- For more excellent coverage of Syria and the Middle East by Martin Chulov, go to http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/martin-chulov
"Syrian Protests Hurl Stones at Troops in Key City." AP on NPR (July 7, 2011):
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=134658580
"Opposition Builds in Syria’s Capital, a Key Battleground." Wall Street Journal (July 7, 2011):
2011):http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304793504576431830115150202.html
Nisbet, Robert. "Dozens Arrested Ahead of Syria ‘Reform’ Summit." Sky News (July 7, 2011):
http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16025712
Shadid, Anthony. "Envoys Stay in Syrian City Where Protests Continue." New York Times (July 8, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/world/middleeast/09syria.html
Mackey, Robert. "U.S. Ambassador Greeted with Roses by Syrian Protesters in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (July 8, 2011): http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/u-s-ambassador-greeted-with-roses-by-syrian-protesters
Daragahi, Borzou and Alexandra Sandels. "Thousands Protest in Hama Against Assad." Los Angeles Times (July 9, 2011): http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-syria-violence-20110709,0,347364.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fnews%2Fnationworld%2Fworld+%28L.A.+Times+-+World+News%29
Bakri, Nada. "Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies ..." New York Times (July 11, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/world/middleeast/12syria.html?scp=1&sq=clinton%20syria%20attacks%20embassy&st=cse
Landler, Mark and David E. Sanger. "White House, in Shift, turns Against Syrian Leader." New York Times (July 12, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/middleeast/13policy.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=clinton%20syria%20attacks%20embassy&st=cse
Shadid, Anthony. "Security Forces Open Fire on Syrian Protesters." New York Times (July 15): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/middleeast/16syria.html?scp=6&sq=anthony%20shadid%20syria&st=cse
NOTES
For full citations (with URLs) see RESOURCES.
1) For a sense of this uprising’s "contradictory signs" see Annika Folkeson, "Change of ‘Regime Tactics,’" BBC News (July 17, 2011). Statistics in this paragraph are ballpark figures that vary somewhat from source to source but the number of fatalities increases steadily. Figures provided by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (as reported in the Guardian on July 22): fatalities: 1419 civilians, 352 members of the security forces; more than 1300 arrested [a low figure that probaby does not include those who are no longer being detained]. Liz Sly, in "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms" (Washington Post: July 25, 2011), refers to human rights groups figures of 1600 deaths and 20,000 detentions. The number of refugees in Turkey may be decreasing as it is being reported that some people are returning to their homes in Syria.
2) See articles listed under RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July).
3) The lead-up to this fork began with President Assad’s speech on June 20th (his third attempt to address the crisis in Syria, more serious than those that had preceded it). What he tried to convey was that, finally, he was really "getting it" (that he understood the need for substantive rather than merely cosmetic reforms) and his call for dialogue was perceived by at least some members of the opposition as a positive step. He then allowed a meeting of opposition leaders to take place within Syria. It is also significant that, however unsatisfactory, a dialogue of sorts did occur on July 10.
4) Ambassador Ford, who speaks Arabic, is well-informed about Syria and the region. Press briefings by his staff hint a these back channels. See "Daily Press Briefing--June 28, 2011, " US Department of State (June 28, 2011): http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/06/167237.htm [also the source of the quotation].
5) See RESOURCES: NEWS (Late June and Early July).
6) See Dominic Evans, "Analysis: Syria’s Assad Faces Dilemma in Hama," Reuters (July 5, 2011). Also, "‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Claims in Syria." Al Jazeera (July 6, 2011). Nearly every news article about Hama mentions the 1982 massacre, as do many other reports and discussions of the Syrian uprising, making it clear that its symbolism resonates far beyond Syria. See Martin Chulov and Nidaa Hassan, "Hama Is Beacon of Resistance 30 Years on from Massacre." The Guardian (July 6, 2011):
7) Anthony Shadid, "Envoys Stay in Syrian City Where Protests Continue," New York Times (July 8, 2011); Shadid quotes an activist who states explicitly that they felt protected by the Ambassdor Ford's presence. For footage see Robert Mackey, U.S. Ambassador Greeted with Roses by Syrian Protesters in Hama." The Lede: New York Times (July 8, 2011).
8) Both Kilo and al-Bunni are Christians (at least in a cultural sense) and both were imprisoned during the presidency of Bashar al-Assad. See Ariel Zirulnick, "Syrian Activists Reject Assad's Call for Talks Sunda," Christian Science Monitor (July 7, 2011): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2011/0708/Syrian-activists-reject-Assad-s-call-for-talks-Sunday; "The Consultative Meeting for Syrian National Dialogue," Day Press (July 8, 2011): http://www.dp-news.com/en/print/aspx?articleid=89415. For the Syrian government's view see Mark Memmott, "Syrian Foreign Minister: Opposition Should Join 'Dialogue,'' NPR (July 5, 2011); http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/07/05/137628798/syrian-foreign-minister-opposition-should-join-dialogue
9) Anthony Shadid, "Security Forces Open Fire on Syrian Protesters." New York Times (July 15). For the dissension at this meeting see Rania Abouzeid, "As Assad Hangs Tough, Syria’s Opposition Seeks Unity–and a Viable Strategy," TIME (July 19, 2011).
10) See Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19); and "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime" The Guardian (July 22). For video footage see Elizabeth Harris in The Lede (July 21, 2011). The sectarian aspect in Homs is somewhat disputed (a matter I’ll discuss in my next post) but in the meantime see Michael Weiss, "Sectarianism, or a Trap by Assad?" in The Weekly Standard (July 22, 2011).
11) Nour Ali, Syrian Troops Attack Village in Northwest, Activists Say." The Guardian (July 24, 2011). For the rumor, see Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Mass Syrian Protest Against Assad Regime." The Guardian (July 22).
12) By mid-July there was already a buzz about the regime’s changing tactics; see Annika Folkeson, "Change of ‘Regime Tactics’ Could Reshape Syria Protests," BBC News (July 17, 2011). Andrew Tabler is among those describing the regime as desperate, thus willing to try new "Band-Aids"; see his piece, "Lights Out" in Foreign Policy (July 19, 2011). Also, Liz Sly, "Syria Permits Opposition Parties on Restrictive Terms," Washington Post (July 25).
13) For the state of the economy and how targeted sanctions might push the process along see Andrew Tabler, "Lights Out," Foreign Policy (July 19, 2011). Tabler writes from a well-defined policy perspective. He thinks that Washington should use its tools to push more strenuously towards the goal of ending the regime–in order to prevent the inevitable bloodshed of a prolonged transition. Hussein, as quoted in Nada Bakri, "Draft Reform Law in Syria Fails to Mollify Protesters," New York Times (July 25, 2011).
14) Habash, as quoted in Robert Nisbet, "Dozens Arrested Ahead of Syria ‘Reform’ Summit." Sky News (July 7, 2011).
15) Bashar had not been groomed to "eat’ Syria but was thrust into that role because his brother Basil, the presumptive heir, was killed in a car crash in 1994. Thus, Bashar was weaker politically than he might have been and he had to deal with "old chiefs" of the preceding regime and his more aggressive brother Maher. For this reason it has been somewhat unclear to what extent he exercises power independently. Certainly, he has often been constrained by the regime’s hardlines. This has allowed moderates to cut Assad some slack, but less slack as he has continued to unleash the security forces.
16) Gary Gambill, The Hard Man of Damascus." Foreign Policy (July 6, 2011).
17) See note #16
18) Nada Bakri, "Crowds in Syria Attack U.S. and French Embassies ..." New York Times (July 11, 2011). Landler and David E. Sanger. "White House, in Shift, turns Against Syrian Leader." New York Times (July 12, 2011).
19) This line of questioning was pursued by host of Inside Story episode that aired on July 22, 2011.
20) Anonymous dissident, quoted in Nour Ali and Ian Black, "Syrian Troops Kill 16 People in Homs," The Guardian (July 19). For a human rights activist' perspective see "An Interview with Bassam Alkadi, President of the Syrian Women Observatory," posted by CAmille Otrakji, Syria Comment (July 3, 2011).
