INTRODUCTION
Al Shabaab, the militant Islamists whose grip on central and southern Somalia in now loosening, started out as a cohort of young radicals (shabaab means youth). Several of its founding members were men with experience in Afghanistan–as jihadi fighters or religious scholars. By now those leaders (the survivors) have aged into mid-adulthood–which appears to explain the group’s current preference for its full name, Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen, with the emphasis on Mujahideen (those pursuing jihad). But the Al Shabaab name is sticking–and so is the need to recruit young men to fight in its militias.
First, a rundown of the situation in Somalia since mid-December. As I write it seems that a window is opening in Somalia (as I suggested in "Shoo, Shoo, Al Shabaab"). Once the Shabaab threat is defused, Somalis may see a clearer path towards a more positive political process. On several fronts military units are advancing, with the goal of breaking Al Shabaab’s hold on central and southern Somalia: Kenyan troops (probably the most active); TFG (Transitional Federal Government) troops, often engaging jointly with the Kenyans; Ahlu Sunna militias, and Ethiopian troops. At the same time AMISOM’s peacekeepers (African Union soldiers from Uganda, Burundi, and Djibouti) are deployed in and around Mogadishu to defend the capital from attacks that the Shabaab are still launching against the city from which they retreated in early August. The Kenyan forces are now officially designated part of the AU contingent, which means that the US, but also other Western donors and China, will be picking up most of the tab (1). On January 5th the AU asked the UN to increase the number of AMSOM troops from 12,000 to 17,700, citing "the need to fast track the creation of an administrative unit in the liberated areas" (2).
The Kenyans have concentrated on defeating Al Shabaab in two regions, Gedo and Juba, in southernmost Somalia. By late December Kenyan air strikes against Shabaab training camps (scattered close to the border) were having a tactical impact, but also eliciting criticism from--and on behalf of--civilians, who usually don’t have an opportunity to get out of the way. On December 26th an air strike on a Shabaab-controlled area near Kismayo led to heavy fighting in the village of Burgabo. On January 6th a bombing raid is said to have killed as many as 60 Shabaab fighters (though perhaps as few as 20). Last week the Kenyans chased the Shabaab from two towns in southwestern Somalia, forcing them to retreat to Baardhere, their only remaining stronghold in Gedo region (which butts up against the border with Kenya). There are also rumors that the Kenyans are clearing the road for an advance on the key town of Baidoa.
Al Shabaab is still able to mount serious attacks, however, against Kenyan targets, even cross-border raids. On January 11th more than 100 Shabaab fighters raided the Kenyan town of Gerille, killing six (two police offers and four civilians) and taking three hostages. Two days later the hostages were loaded onto the back of a truck and driven around Baardhere to publicize the successful raid. The raiders also seized weapons, ammunition, and a car–suggesting that this was what they were really after, badly needed supplies. (3)
On December 31st Ethiopian troops captured the strategic town of Beletweyne (less than 20 miles from the Ethiopian border) during an operation that included Somali National Army troops and TFG-allied militias. Beletweyne is the capital of Hiran region in central Somalia and the road running through it links Mogadishu with northern Somalia. Quite understandably, in claiming victory, the TFG has sought to obscure the critical role of the Ethiopians. Most residents were simply relieved to learn that the Shabaab had withdrawn–they’d had enough of Al Shabaab’s cruel punishments, abuse of girls, and strategy of keeping food aid from those who so badly needed it. For the residents of newly liberated Beledweyne, it is "a new world after al-Shabaab left us" because now "there is no longer any oppression and fear" (4). To avoid a recurrence of the nationalist sentiment provoked by Ethiopia’s 2006 incursion, the African Union has decided that Ethiopian troops will move out just as soon as AU peacekeepers can move in to replace them. The TFG Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali visited Beletweyne on January 6th, where he consulted with the Ethiopians about security and joint operations. This visit is being viewed a sign of government confidence and optimism. For Al Shabaab, the loss of Beletweyne, a town that they had held for more than three years, is a major blow and it appears that they are preparing to re-take it. (5)
Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jam’a is a Sufi-led group deeply committed to the goal of "rooting out Al Shabaab fighters from the entire central Somali regions." Ahlu Sunna militias, sometimes in concert with TFG troops, are now on the offensive. On New Year’s Day they launched a "hot" battle in Galgadud region in an attempt to capture the Shabaab stronghold of Elbur. There are also reports that Ahlu Sunna forces may be heading south towards Baardhere in Gedo region (6).
As for Mogadishu itself, Al Shabaab has been resolute in pursuing guerilla tactics against TFG and AMISOM forces. On January 5th fighting broke out north of Mogadishu when the Shabaab attacked AMISOM troops. After coming back for a second inning, the Shabaab were were repulsed, but there were reports of civilian casualties. Two days later the Shabaab attacked again. This time a bomb hit a mosque, killing two clerics and injuring other civilians. Al Shabaab’s leaders claim that AMISOM is responsible--that the mosque was targeted intentionally–and they are stressing this accusation in their propaganda. The AU commander claims that since the bases being defended were two kilometers away from the mosque, it should not have been caught in the crossfire, but he has pledged to do a thorough investigation. On the night of January 9th the Shabaab targeted several AU and TFG bases and, as in previous clashes, both sides used mortars and heavy artillery. Adding to the tension in the capital, unfortunately, is political bickering among TFG members of parliament over the appointment of a new speaker. The UN’s Special Representative for Somalia has expressed concern about the dispute, warning the TFG that it risks losing what has recently been gained–the support and good-will of the international community. (7)
This time it seems that Al Shabaab is really on the run–despite its ability to mount sporadic attacks around Mogadishu. An AU official, assessing the situation in early January, thinks that Al Shabaab’s military capability is being "systematically and steadily destroyed" (8). When speaking to the media, Shabaab commanders are full of bravado (and threats), but it is clear that they are feeling the heat. On the Shabaab radio station they are telling supporters that they "will not give up their fight" (9). Al Shabaab is fighting for its survival and in some quarters (at least) may be desperate for new recruits. So this is an appropriate time to take a closer look at Shabaab recruitment strategies.
Recruiting within Somalia
When the short-lived Islamic Courts Union government collapsed in late 2006, Al Shabaab reached out to the Somali people with a decidedly nationalistic message. As long as Mogadishu and other parts of the country were occupied by Ethiopian troops, Al Shabaab’s nationalistic, anti-foreign, anti-Christian message was a highly effective means of gaining supporters and attracting teenagers and young men eager to carry out its insurgent mission. After the Ethiopians left (early 2009), the rationale for supporting the Shabaab was less clear, but the TFG remained weak and bottled up in a few neighborhoods in Mogadishu. As masters of intimidation, however, Shabaab commanders were able to control most of central and southern Somalia–until very recently. Shabaab administrators imposed a puritanical, often brutal version of Islam that slowly turned many Somalis against Al Shabaab. Most Somalis had been practicing a more moderate, Sufi-infused form of Islam. Taking advantage of Somali nationalist sentiment, local Sufi clerics began to stress the Wahabist (i.e. Saudi) origins Al Shabaab’s Islamist ideology and the obvious presence of foreigners among Shabaab leaders and fighters. Reluctantly, the Sufis formed their own defensive militias, now mostly fighting under the banner of Ahlu Sunna as part of the multi-front effort to get rid of the Shabaab. (10)
Of course, it is true that some of those who joined Al Shabaab were also seeking a spiritual anchor, amid the conflict and chaos of daily life in Somalia (11). After all, young people are often predisposed to be seekers, especially in times and places of upheaval. Al Shabaab’s leaders recognized that Somalia’s fragmented politics were partly (perhaps largely) the result of endless squabbling among clan families, clans, and sub-clans--and believed that they had a remedy–an overarching Islamist ideology that would transcend politics. Indeed, this was what the Islamic Courts Union had been trying to accomplish when Al Shabaab was serving as its youth wing. Still, for young people grounded in Sufi practices, who respected local Sufis clerics, there was an alternative.
Whenever there weren’t enough young men willing to join and fight for Al Shabaab, the group turned to manipulative and coercive tactics (12). Elders were asked to provide young fighters–and subjected to harsh reprisals for failing to do so. Recruiters enticed unemployed, impoverished youths with food, cash, or even mobile phones and preyed upon internally displaced young people in refugee camps. At the peak of the famine they gave cash to hungry families, who would then give up their sons. When recruiters visited Quranic schools, they expected teachers to arm-twist students into joining Al Shabaab. Teachers who would not cooperate might be killed in front of their students (13). Sometimes both teachers and students were abducted from schools. And, despite a rigid adherence to separation of the sexes, girls were recruited or abducted to cook and clean or to transport supplies and weapons. Young women, often teenagers, were singled out and forced to marry Shabaab commanders (14). Over time these tactics helped to further erode the group’s support at the grassroots.
Reports from Somalia indicate that since mid-October these coercive tactics have intensified. In some districts elderly men are bing told that soon they will be sent to Shabaab "boot camps." Anticipating that anti-Shabaab forces would try to capture the towns of Beledweyne, Baidoa, Kismayo, and Marka, Al Shabaab stepped up its recruitment in those areas. Shabaab officials made it clear that young men, even those from "minority" clans (a reference to Somali Bantu clans), would be conscripted. In Kismayo, a port and the largest city controlled by the Shabaab (from which they obtain much cash by taxing imports and exports) they have forcibly recruited more than 70 teachers and students (probably many more by now). They also posted guards at checkpoints to prevent people from fleeing the city. After the Ethiopians expelled the Shabaab from Beledweyne, Shabaab commanders began to prepare for a counterattack, bringing in hundreds of fighters and asking people in nearby rural villages to join their "holy jihad." Many parents feared that this meant the Shabaab would soon conscript their children. In December it was reported that in the area around Baidoa the Shabaab had become so desperate for new "cannon fodder" that they were recruiting young women (mostly teenage girls)–as well as abducting young men. After being trained for combat, assassination, and suicide missions, more than 60 female fighters were about to be deployed locally or, according to intelligence sources, would soon be unleashed against targets in Mogadishu. (15)
There is less information about the extent to which Al Shabaab has been recruiting in Somaliland (autonomous) and Puntland (loosely aligned with the TFG) and what, if anything, may have changed in these northern lands as a result of the conflict in the south. However, a faction calling itself "Awdal State" has accused the Somaliland government of protecting Shabaab fighters who are fleeing to Hargeisa and Buroa and allowing them to recruit in these towns. Given the highly partisan point of view of this source (Awdal State aspires to secede from Somaliland), these claims need corroboration. It seems more likely that the authorities in Somaliland are simply unable to prevent Shabaab agents from living and recruiting covertly in the north. In the past Al Shabaab has perpetrated acts of terrorism in both Somaliland and Puntland. The Puntland government is currently dealing with a local insurgent group that UN monitors have identified as part of Al Shabaab. (16)
Child Soldiers in Somalia
Among those joining Shabaab militias there are significant numbers of minors, including even a few girls. In Somalia, however, the use of child soldiers has not been an exclusively Shabaab practice. Two reports issued in 2011, a UN report in April and an Amnesty International report in July, document the recruitment of children by the TFG and by various local militias. That said, the UN report states unambiguously that such recruitment is "significantly more aggressive on the anti-government elements’ side, especially within Al-Shabaab" and it mentions, specifically, "the extensive forced recruitment of children by Al-Shabaab, especially in the schools" that has often resulted in the closing of schools (17). The plight of these children has been a matter of much concern to UN agencies since the UN is heavily invested in efforts to resolve the situation in Somalia. After prolonged negotiations with UN officials, President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali have agreed to a process that would end the use of child soldiers in the TFG’s armed forces (18). In addition, the TFG has announced that Somalia will now ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. That will leave the United States as the only nation that has signed, but not ratified it.
"In the Line of Fire: Somalia’s Children under Attack" (the Amnesty report) is based on testimony from 200 Somali refugees , including children, in Kenya and Djibouti. It describes, with much detail, the "systematic recruitment of child soldiers under 15 by armed Islamist groups." Its conclusion: Al Shabaab’s use and abuse of children is both "a human rights crisis and a children’s crisis.". And since the evidence was gathered prior to the Al Shabaab’s withdrawal from Mogadishu in early August, it is chilling to learn that the Shabaab were already "using increasingly threatening recruitment methods" (19). (You can download the full report and I urge you to do so.)
While most of the child recruits are ten to seventeen years old, the youngest are only eight. The children’s trivia contest, held last September, is a good example of Al Shabaab’s belief that "children should use one hand for education and the other for a gun to defend Islam" (20). The prizes? The winner and runner-up each received an AK-47 assault rifle, some cash and Shabaab-sanctioned Islamic books (the poor fellow in third place got a couple of grenades). Especially vulnerable are poor and displaced children–those with few resources and those cut off from their kin. Yet nearly all children are at risk since the Shabaab do not hesitate to take children by force–from their families or their schools. Keeping children away from clutches of Al Shabaab is one of the major reason that families have been fleeing from central and southern Somalia–an exodus that pre-dates the famine.
Children who escape from the Shabaab, such as those in a camp for Shabaab defectors in Mogadishu, live in miserable conditions. In November, when Radhika Coomaraswamy (the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict) toured this camp, she found 37 former children soldiers mixed in with older defectors (21). She said that UNICEF’s priority was to assist these children by providing more suitable shelter, putting them back in school or offering other skills training, and reuniting them with their families (a difficult task in Somalia). The TFG is also very concerned about the welfare of Somali children and their vulnerability. Its resources are limited but it would like to build boarding schools for orphans and poor children because they are the most susceptible to recruit by militant or insurgent militias. As the government’s Minister of Education, Ahmed Aideed Ibrahim, puts it so bluntly: "lack of education has led thousands of children to be very vulnerable to warmongers" (22).
In recent weeks, as the conflict has intensified, as the Shabaab have stepped up their "recruiting," the fears of parents have intensified, too. To protect their children from Al Shabaab they are keeping them inside their homes, keeping them out of school and off the streets. Their fears are more than justified. In October Al Shabaab authorities in Gedo region insisted that even young shoe-shiners register, so they could be called up to fight. In Kismayo in early November, when many students refused to go and fight, the local Shabaab authorities arrested more than 100 of them (23).
The good news is that schools are beginning to reopen in Mogadishu, albeit very slowly. And parents are rejoicing. Here’s what Hasna Abdulkader Farah, a mother of five, has to say: "I am praying to Allah to punish al-Shabaab in his hell, because they caused many problems for us. Praise be to Allah now we are safe and my children have returned to school" (24).
Recruiting in Kenya
When it comes to recruiting fighters, it is not surprising that Al Shabaab has looked first and foremost to Somali communities in neighboring countries, especially Kenya and Yemen (25). Large numbers of Somalis have relocated to safer enclaves in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and Yemen. To tap into this diaspora Al Shabaab has developed efficient networks to recruit, train, and transfer recruits.
Last May Kenya’s anti-terrorism unit interrogated a Yemeni suspect who described how Shabaab recruits were smuggled by boat from Yemen to a point on the northern Kenya coast (just south of the border with Somalia), then taken by road to Mombasa and by ferry to Likoni (on the mainland), where they entered a training camp run by "Sheikh Hussein " (26). After training they were sent north in small groups, expecting to cross the border near Kiungu (where they had first landed in Kenya), but the suspect’s group was intercepted by the police on the road that runs straight north from Malindi. (If interested, go to the "Sabaki Bridge" map, listed in RESOURCES, and pan around the region to trace this route.) The original group included six Yemenis, four Somalis (recruited in Yemen?), and a Pakistani. However, the smaller group that got caught included three Kenyans (an adult and two boys), indicating that this route is used to convey Kenyans as well other recruits. It is thought that the operatives involved may have ties to a controversial mosque in Mombasa’s Majengo neighborhood.
Shabaab recruiters have been active in Kenya for several years: infiltrating Somali urban communities (such as Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood); targeting Somali refugees in camps along the border, especially Dadaab (the world’s largest camp); and trying to convince Kenya’s ethnic Somalis to defect to their ‘motherland’ because politically and economically they have been marginalized within Kenya. But recruiters have also sought out non-Somali Muslims and converts to Islam. In October, after Kenyan troops had crossed into Somalia, a non-Somali convert (Elgiva Bwire Oliacha) was involved in planning a grenade attack in Nairobi. He has pleaded guilty and admitted to being a member of Al Shabaab. A cleric in Mombasa told a reporter that recruiting in Kenya has continued despite increased vigilance by the police. Officers of the Kenyan Defence Forces have alleged that some of the militants killed or captured have been Kenyans. (27)
In a truly amazing piece of investigative journalism NTV reporters John-Allen Namu and Harith Salim went undercover to contact the agents of a Shabaab recruiting network. They knew that Al Shabaab had set up camps in Somalia, very close to the Kenyan border, but they wanted to know how were Kenyans reaching these camps. Accompanied by a camera crew that would secretly recorded what transpired, Namu and Salim pretended that they wanted to join the Shabaab. Their first contact led them to a Shabaab recruiter and trainer, who identified himself as a Kenyan army corporal. After interrogating them, he offered to sell them a gun. That’s how they discovered the extent to which Shabaab agents are involved in gun and grenade dealing. While attempting a gun deal, someone noticed that the episode was being recorded–so they left in a hurry. To assess their information they compared it with what they had already learned from talking to Kenyan intelligence officers. (28).
What motivated these reporters was the grief of parents whose sons had run off to join Al Shabaab. Watch Peter Greste’s video on Al Jazeera English (see RESOURCES) and you'll understand just how powerless these parents feel. (Let me confess that I've brought my point of view as a parent/grandparent to bear on this post, yet I’ve tried to remain as objective as I can--to respond with my head as well as my heart.)
Since Kenya’s mid-October incursion of Somalia, for which the Kenyans have incurred the wrath of Al Shabaab, Kenya authorities have re-doubled (many times over) their internal security and counter-terrorism measures–knowing all too well that there are plenty of Shabaab operatives roaming in Kenya (in the northeastern districts, in the slums of Nairobi and Mombasa). Quite understandably this has made life difficult for Somali residents of Kenya– for traders and clerics as well as refugees, and for Kenya’s ethnic Somalis. Last week Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting serious abuses by the Kenyan police and military. At the hands of the security forces civilians have been subjected to "rape, beatings, looting, and arbitrary arrests."
On January 11th a Human Rights Watch worker in Gariss witnesssed a mass beating of the town's residents. According to Daniel Bekele (HRW’s Africa director), this incident shows that "it’s clear tht impunity has become the norm." That the "worst abuses took place at Dadaab" (the huge camp for Somali refugees) is appalling. Kenya is tense, people are fearful, and so aggressive tactics might be expected–but human rights violations must always be condemned and the perpetrators held responsible. (29)
Shabaab spokesmen keep bragging about how they will retaliate by hitting targets in Kenya and in a recent video they have formally declared a jihad on Kenya (30). So far, the Kenyans have thwarted some, but not all attacks–and they are waiting for "the big one." To gather more intelligence they have offered amnesty, in certain case, to those willing to cooperate. For two weeks the whole country has been on high alert, worried about Shabaab operatives already in the country and those who may enter for the purpose of carrying out a terrorist attack (31).
One of the saddest stories I’ve read is that of a Abdi, a Somali refugee and orphan, whose parents had been killed in a rocket attack. Abdi told his story to Robyn Dixon, a Los Angeles Times reporter on assignment in Nairobi (32). Thirteen years old, homeless, and missing his parents, Abdi needed a friend. Then along came, Abdufazil, a Shabaab commander, who fed him, befriended him, convinced him that it was the Christians who had killed his parents, and lured him into Al Shabaab’s net. His friend passed Abdi on to a camp back in Somalia, where the Shabaab began training to become a suicide bomber. Afraid to die, Abdi was not ready for such a mission. With four other boys he escaped from the camp and returned to Nairobi. Now, at age 14, he lives in poverty in Eastleigh (Nairobi’s "Little Mogadishu"), like so many other uprooted Somali boys. Illiterate, with no skills, unable to speak Swahili, Abdi is adrift in Nairobi once again and facing a very uncertain future.
After reading about Abdi’s experience, I thought about those young Somali Americans who have also "escaped"–by running away from their homes in America, right into the arms of Al Shabaab. Would they have run off to Somalia if they had known what happened to Abdi?
Recruiting in the Diaspora
For twenty years Somalia has been churning–and this churning has resulted in a flow of Somalis to havens in a far-flung diaspora beyond the Horn of Africa. Recruiters acting on behalf of Al Shabaab often target the youth of "Little Mogadishu" neighborhoods in North America, Europe, and Australia. While young men recruited from the diaspora may need a longer "seasoning" period (while adapting to the culture and environment and learning basic combat skills), they often have computer and social media skills that--if combined with fluency in English and an ability to travel using American, European or other Western passports–make them highly desirable assets. Their talents have been used to create and disseminate radical, jihadi ideology on websites designed to attract others to the jihadi cause. In fact, the visibility of recruits from the US is increasing--in roles "shrewdly calculated to raise al-Shabab’s international profile"–and as a result their influence is also increasing. (33)
Recruiting that targets young Somalis living in the US are of great concern to those expected to keep Americans safe from terrorist attacks. At least forty Somali Americans or Somalis resident in the US have left to join Al Shabaab–though perhaps only twenty or so are still alive in Somalia (34). While it is true that Al Shabaab’s priority is creating an Islamic state in Somalia, its leaders have expressed their commitment to global jihad. To punish Somalia’s "meddling" neighbors, Shabaab operatives have carried out acts of terrorism in the region, most infamously the 2010 bombings in Kampala. Studying with Shabaab clerics (religious indoctrination is part of camp life) and training and fighting with the Shabaab is for most recruits a radicalizing experience, taking them further along the jihadi path (35). Thus, it is conceivable that a cell of Shabaab returnees or even a "lone wolf" could carry out an act of terrorism on American soil. But let me also state very emphatically that this is no excuse for stigmatizing Somali Americans or for inappropriate surveillance of individuals or their communities.
The fact that agents of Al Shabaab or other radical groups have managed to recruit Somali American youth scares the daylight out of US anti-terrorism experts. In addition to Shirwa Ahmed, two other Somali Americans have carried out suicide bombings for Al Shabaab and seven US citizens (of various backgrounds) have died fighting for them (36). In 2009, as a media response to the suicide bombing carried out by Shirwa Ahmed, a young Somali American from Minneapolis (the Somali ‘capital’ of America), the New York Times put together an excellent set of materials that provide an overview of Shabaab recruiting tactics and the individuals recruited during the period from 2007 to 2009. These were re-published last October and are still very useful (see RESOURCES). Though a few of those recruited have returned to the US, none of them have committed acts of terrorism but the possibility is indeed worrisome. So far, apparently, counterterrorism measures, including the arrest of several recruiters, have disrupted Shabaab-related activities in the US. In 2011, however, AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) began urging Al Shabaab to plan act of terrorism against targets beyond Africa, more specifically the US and its allies What the experts fear is "conflation of jihadi zones" as militants in Somalia and Yemen cement their operational ties and move closer to each other ideologically (37).
Craig Baxam
The case of Craig Baxam, age 24, an Iraqi war veteran, should give pause to those who argue that young men who run off to join Al Shabaab or other militant groups pose no real threat to US interests or security (38). Since he had US army training in cryptology and intelligence, Al Shabaab (or any terrorist group) would have considered him an amazing asset. He is not a Somali American (though he may have changed the spelling of his name so it would look Somali). After imbibing the contents of an Islamist website, he converted to Islam and eventually decided he could live a righteous life only in a place governed by a very strict from of sharia. Baxam didn’t have much of plan when he arrived in Kenya on December 20th, which suggests that he hadn’t done enough homework (he had no one lined up to meet and assist him). In Malindi he got on a bus for Garissa, a town near the border with Somalia, but was so conspicuous that the Kenyan authorities soon figured out what he was up to and arrested him. He was sent back to the US and charged in a court in Maryland on January 9th. (39)
Shabaab Networks
If Baxam had sought out the right contacts, he might have reached Somalia using the same clandestine means as funneling those recruited in Kenya (40). For young Somali Americans seeking to join Al Shabaab there are networks (though somewhat disrupted) that will help with funding and travel arrangements. They are escorted to safe houses in Kenya or elsewhere in the region, where Shabaab operatives take over and send them on to Somalia. What might be called the "Minnesota pipeline" surely existed at one time–and perhaps still exists or it could be re-activated. Court documents unsealed in late 2009 have revealed that in the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul) both peers and elders were involved in attracting young recruits--"exhorting them to fight for their homeland" or "to fight for jihad, or holy war, against the West and what they described as its puppet government in Mogadishu." Omer Abdi Mohamed was one of the ringleaders of such a network, targeting young Somali Americans in Minnesota as early as September 2007. He raised money in the community from people who had no idea what he was up to. His trial brief mentions a Shabaab recruiting video, filmed in Somalia, that shows former Minneapolis residents, making appeals in English to potential new recruits back home or elsewhere in the English-speaking diaspora. Federal investigations have turned up cells linked to this network in Boston, San Diego, and Columbus (Ohio) and there is also evidence of Shabaab recruiting in Seattle, Washington, DC, and Lewiston (Maine). (41)
Dynamics of Recruitment
Why are young Muslims, and Somalis in particular, lured into Al Shabaab’s net? There isn’t any simple answer because so many factors are at play in diaspora communities (42). Young people from traditional, religiously conservative families may have difficulties "fitting in," yet interviews with the friends of those recruited suggest that in many ways they had been fairly typical teenagers–until they were exposed to Islamist or jihadi ideas online or by adults in their communities. Other recruits grew up in more (rather than less) assimilated families, yet they became ambivalent or confused about their place in American society and began looking for their religious and ethnic roots. Somali nationalist or sub-nationalist (clan-based) diaspora politics is a factor, too, since Al Shabaab continues to play the nationalist card–more persuasively now that Kenyan and Ethiopian troops are occupying parts of Somalia. Young people sorting out their multiple identities may simply want to reconnect with the country that their parents left behind, but may not have a realistic picture of what it would be like to live there. Recruiters tell them that "traveling to Somalia to fight jihad will be fun" (43). Those seeking an Islamic anchor may find real spiritual mentors at the local mosque–though a few will follow a path from piety to extremism. What clearly-articulated, fundamentalist beliefs of any sort (including secular ideologies) can offer an alienated young person--for whom life seems to have little meaning–is a cause to rally around, to live for, and sometimes to die for. For the true believer, no more days of aimless drifting, life has a purpose.
Of course, only a few of the confused, alienated, or rebellious teens in the Somali diaspora will actually turn to radical forms of Islam--and an even smaller subset will leave to join Al Shabaab. So why do some decide to go, while others stay home? In many instances, perhaps only the an individual’s life history can help us understand what happened . Or maybe not–since Shirwa Ahmed’s friends can’t figure it out, according to the what they shared with Star Tribune reporters Richard Meryhew, Allie Shah, and James Walsh (see RESOURCES).
In a provocative essay Alia Malek argues that what’s missing from most of our discussions are "the more salient factors: gender and an American acceptance of violence." She cites the work of Dr. Rhea Almeida, who thinks that "radicalization is rooted in the same sorts of dynamics that can lead boys to other kinds of violence from gangs to school shootings." Dr. Almeida may be on to something: notions of masculinity, marginalization, mental health and family issues are all factors worth taking into account. She also points out that disaffected youth have few if any "safe" places to talk about their frustration or vent their anger, so they turn to social media on the Internet. But these "underground" conversations are usually "controlled, one-dimensional, and unchallenged." In real (rather than virtual setting young people’s ideas would be challenged by family members or community elders or even their own peers. Farah Mohamed Beledi, "a Minnesota kid with American problems," fits this model. His father died in Somalia’s civil war of the early 1990s. He arrived in the US in 1996, at age 12, with his mother says he was a "good boy" until he turned into a "troublemaker." He played hooky, joined a gang, and ended up in prison for stabbed someone. His radicalization occurred in prison, not in a local mosque, but when he got out he found other radicals who liked to talk about jihad and he became a member of Abubakar as-Saddique Mosque. He left for Somalia, where he became a suicide bomber. (44)
In the America’s "Little Mogadishus" poverty is certainly a factor, making life difficult for breadwinners and boring for unemployed youth (just as poverty is a major factor in Kenya’s urban slums and refugee camps). In Minneapolis, the Little Mogadishu neighborhood has a 70% poverty rate: almost 25% of adults are unemployed and more than 50% of household heads are single mothers (often widows). Some authorities claim that "Somali youth in the united States are more easily radicalized than other young Muslims because they are often extremely poor and more isolated from society as a whole" (45). Children whose parents are busy trying to make ends meet may feel disconnected from them and neglected. Parents worried about their children (for example, if gangs are trying to recruit them) may feel relieved when their teenagers become active in a local mosque, start praying regularly, and take an interest in studying the Quran. But a radical speaker at a mosque may prompt a curious teenager to go search, where he can find plenty of extremist views, including Shabaab propaganda videos. In Minneapolis, suspicion has centered on Abubakar as-Saddique Mosque, with some justification. This mosque is now under new leadership and pursuing anti-extremism agenda, with a special focus on its youth. (46).
Imagine what it’s like to be the parent of a Somali American teenager. You’ve been struggling to find your way in a new land–to find a job, learn a new language, put food on the table, provide a home for your family, and keep your kids on a straight path–in school and out of trouble. You don’t know what to think when you hear about teenagers and young men suddenly disappearing, running off to Somalia to join Al Shabaab and right back to the violence from which you had escaped--from which you had wanted to protect them. You may have notice that your child is changing, but you don’t suspect that he is using his brand-new laptop (you cut lots of corners so you could buy it for him) to access radical content, including Shabaab propaganda videos. Then one day he disappears. This is the reality for many parents in the Minnesota’s Twin Cities.
Community-Based Programs
In a disturbing feature article in the Washington Post, Eli Saslow tells the story of Abdirizak Bihi and his one-man "community-based counterterrorism program" in Minneapolis (47). Bihi had left Somalia for the US in the late 1980s. He got a green card and in 1995 he went to Kenya to rescue his sister and her young son from a refugee camp. He brought them to the US where his sister found had some difficulties, but his nephew Burhan Hassan seemed to be doing fine--a good student, a fan of NFL football, and a member of a Muslim youth group. Bihi was pleased to see Burhan taking his religion more seriously (a sign that he was growing up)–until that day in 2008 when he got a call from Burhan’s high school. Concerned that his nephew was truant, he went to investigate, only to discover that Burhan and his passport were missing. And what did Bihi find on Burhan’s abandoned computer? It was full of the videos of the late Anwar al-Awlaki’s sermons. And where was Burhan? With six of his friends he had run off to Somalia to join Al Shabaab–and four months later he was killed in combat. Like several of those charged with recruiting in the Twin Cities, Burhan had frequented Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center.
The fate of his nephew lit a fire in Abdirizak Bihi: he was determined to do whatever he could to reach out to young Somalis, to help them make better choices. He spent a lot of money (donations and all of his savings) organizing community forums, youth activities, and media coverage of recruiting tactics. This work became an obsession and Bihi’s marriage and family finances suffered a great deal as a result. But sure enough, his efforts to build an antiterrorism infrastructure (including a city-sponsored soccer field) drew the attention of Congressional counterterrorism mavens and last March he was invited to speak at a hearing in Washington, DC. After three years of intensive efforts Bihi is now very discouraged: his youth activities depend on shoe-string budgets, but Congress is unwilling to fund these sorts of grassroots projects (no walk the walk, just talk the talk). He’s got no money left, but Shabaab recruiters (according to FBI evidence) are handing out meals and cellphones as enticements--and to those recruited, East Africa-bound plane tickets.
As Saslow points out, a few other outreach programs do exist (in Dallas, Texas, Dearborn Michigan, and Hollywood, California). For the Twin Cities area, however, it is encouraging to read what Thomas E. Smith, the police chief of St. Paul has to say about his department’s efforts to combat radicalization and recruitment (48). He is convince that positive messages about "strong families, legitimate social organizations and constructive religious messages" can drown out Al Shabaab’s "destructive messages." Working with federal and local government partners (the FBI field office, the U.S. Attorney’s office, and the Ramsey County Sheriff’s department) and non-governmental organizations (the Muslim American Society and the YMCA), Chief Smith and his officers have organized activities for Somali American young people, such as after school study sessions, art programs, and camping trips. More than 300 Somali American kids take part in programs staffed by the Police Athletic League (officers coach soccer as well as flag football). Police women are now leading outreach programs for young women and girls. These programs have built trust among police mentors and youth in the community. Perhaps Bihi and other frustrated activists should get involved in strategies to set up, improve, or increase the number of youth programs sponsored by their local governments. The success of St. Paul’s police officers, who meet regularly with the Somali Advisory Council, suggests that such cooperation would not impair their standing in the local community (but might enhance it).
Last summer I read a great deal in the New York Times about a hearing in the US House of Representatives, chaired by Representative Peter King (Republican, New York), that was concerned with the radicalization of Muslims in the US, who run the gamut from refugees, immigrants, and foreign students to naturalized and native-born citizens (49). The larger context of this event was the paranoia in certain branches of conservatism--among those who imagine that any day now sharia (Islamic law) will be imposed in the US. That’s truly preposterous. More credible is the view of Mohamed Elibiary, a Muslim adviser to the Department of Homeland Security and, by the way, a self-identified conservative Republican. Elibiary thinks that this anti-sharia talk provides "propaganda for jihadists," who can use it to convince Muslims that they’d better get on the right side of "a titanic clash of faiths " (50). In other words, the anti-sharia campaign plays right into the hands of those who would radicalize young Muslims as a first step towards recruiting them for Al Shabaab or Al Qaeda.
Al-Amriki
An American-born Islamist, married to a Somali Canadian woman, Abu Mansour al-Amriki is "the most high profile American member of Al Shabaab" (51). Born Omar Hammami, the son of a Muslim immigrant from Syria, married to a Southern Baptist American woman, he grew up in a middle class family in a small town in Alabama. By the time he was in college, he had adopted the Salafi version of Islam. Arriving in Somalia shortly before the Ethiopian invasion (December 2006), he joined Al Shabaab at what was a critical moment and eventually became one of its senior commanders. As a Salafist, he was drawn to Shabaab’s goals of ridding the country of foreign occupiers, killing apostates, and establishing an Islamic caliphate. Indicted in the US for violating terrorism laws–for traveling to Somalia to join Al Shabaab providing material support) and for taking on "an operational role in that organization" (quotes Holder), a warrant has been issued for his arrest. In March it was reported, incorrectly, that he had been killed during a gun fight in Mogadishu. While is possible that he was killed in July in a US drone attack, this has not been unconfirmed.
With excellent English-language skills and knowledge of pop culture Al-Amriki’s ability to recruit from the American and English-speaking diaspora was a real boon to Al Shabaab. He appears in a number of online videos, affirming Al Shabaab’s allegiance to Al Qaeda and pleading with parents to encourage their children to join Shabaab’s jihad. In 2009 several Somali-American members of Al Shabaab appeared with Al-Amiriki in one of these videos. Al-Amriki even performs rap songs. By putting the label nasheed (Islamic song) on his raps, he gets around the Shabaab prohibition on on singing. In 2011, to proclaim that he was very much alive (though still very much desiring martyrdom) he recorded two songs: "Send Me a Cruise" (a cruise-missile) and "Make Jihad with Me." For the lyrics of "Send Me a Cruise" go to the Long War Journal site, where you can also listen to it (52).
Anxiety in America: The Remittance Issue
In October two Somali women from Minnesota were convicted of sending money to Al Shabaab, using the hawala method (53). (A hawala is a money transfer business that uses ordinary banks to send funds to another firm, especially useful when, as in the case of Somalia, there is no banking system.) Supporters say the amount involved--a little more than $8,000, raised over several years--did not justify what the federal government had spent prosecuting them. And in any case they were simply raising funds for charities to help poor Somalis. This conviction struck fear into Somalis who had been sending money back to relatives trying to survive in Somalia–and perhaps even more fear into the banks that had been processing these remittances. The amount remitted from the US is thought to be around $100 million per year, surely not a drop in the bucket!
A major player in the transfer of funds, Sunrise Community Banks of Minnesota, decided it could no longer risk getting prosecuted under US anti-terrorism laws. After failing to obtain a federal waiver that would remove this risk, Sunrise officials stopped remitting funds to Somalia on December 30th. They have continued working with US government agencies to find a solution because, as Sunrise CEO David Reiling puts it, "The humanitarian consequences of this decision weigh heavily on us" (54).
It is impossible to underestimate the importance of these remittances from Somalis in the US to their relatives and friends in Somalia or in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. In Somalia the last six months have been desperate times–with up to four million people facing starvation at the peak of the famine and more than 250,000 still at risk, needing food and medicine. Now they are caught in the crossfire of a concerted effort to rid the country of Shabaab militants. Even in those areas from which Al Shabaab has retreated, there is a lagging humanitarian response because aid organizations sense it is still too dangerous as Al Shabaab might return, seeking vengeance (attacking personnel, destroying equipment, looting supplies–as occurred after Shabaab banned 16 agencies late last year). So a vital lifeline is being jerked away from many innocent people who have been depending on it. In the meantime, one of Minnesota’s money transfer businesses has offered to accept up to $500 in cases of emergency, which it will send using banks in other states. The US government claims that Somalis have other ways to send out money legally, but most Somalis in America say these options are impractical. Moreover, underground methods might increase the likelihood that funds would end up in the wrong hands. (55)
When hundreds of Somalis protested in Minneapolis on December 30th, they carried signs showing hungry children to express their frustration with the banks and with a government that isn’t responding to their predicament. For the record, both of Minnesota’s senators (Amy Klobuchar and Al Franken) and US Representative Keith Ellison are in their corner but haven’t made any substantial progress in resolving the problem. As Sen. Franken has pointed out, Al Shabaab could use this freeze as propaganda–as an example of how the US was preventing funds from reaching poor Somalis. A second protest on January 6th was attended by Rep. Ellison and two state representatives. Abdulwalid Qainle, a Somali-American on the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School, speaking at the rally, defined the issue as one of morality and civil rights: "We are here to defend the rights of American citizens to be able to sustain their loved ones in the Horn of Africa." (56)
What will Somali Americans and Somali refugees in America do if they cannot transfer funds safely and legally? If I were in their shoes, I’d be more than distraught, I’d be angry. In the words of a Star Tribune editorial, "it isn’t right for innocent people to lose their ability to fight famine and poverty in their homeland" (57).
What I worries me is that frustration over this issue, if left unresolved, could turn into a festering resentment, especially among young Somalis (who might be less patient than their elders). This could send more young, disgruntled Somalis into the arms of Al Shabaab or other militant groups (such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). That’s another reason to hope that Al Shabaab’s days are numbered in the single or low-double digits. If the Shabaab threat is neutralized, the US government maybe more inclined to deal with the remittance issue by agreeing to waivers or devising less stringent regulations.
Shooing Al Shabaab from southern Somalia would greatly reduce the flow of recruits from the diaspora’s "Little Mogadishus" to radical groups in the Horn of Africa. This would be a positive outcome from the point of view of the US government and that of many Somalis and Somali-American parents residing in the US and elsewhere, whose greatest fear has been loosing their children to Al Shabaab. So, shoo, shoo, Al Shabaab. Good riddance!
ACTIVITIES
These activities are highly suitable for sociology and global studies classes and for anyone trying to engage young people with issues related to immigration and assimilation, poverty , generation gaps, peer pressure, social persuasion, gangs, and human trafficking. The first two activities are especially suited to middle school students (brief readings, points of contact with their own lives). For more background consult, "Shoo, Shoo, Al Shabaab."
READ/DISCUSS: In a reading or social studies class ,assign or read in class Jeffery Gettleman’s short article, "First Prize for a Child in Somalia: An AK-47." ASK: What does Al Shabaab want children to know how to do? Will the children who participated in this contest be more or less likely to join Al-Shabaab?
READ/ANALYZE: In a reading, language arts or global studies class ask students to read Abdi’s story, as told by Robyn Dixon in the Los Angeles Times. ASK these questions: Why did Abdi need a friend? Was Abdufazil a good friend? How did Abdufazil convince him to join Al Shabaab? Why did Abdi decide to run away? Why is his life so difficult in Nairobi? What do you think will happen to him in the future? If time permits, students might demonstrate their understanding of the recruitment process by ROLE-PLAYING conversations between Abdi and Abdufazil. This could be very effective in a theater, sociology, or health class (any setting where students are learning how to resist adults or peers trying to entice them to "the dark side"). DISCUSS: Which is harder to resist, adult persuasion or peer pressure?
READ/COMPARE: In another article Robyn Dixon tells the story of Maulid Warfa, now age 43, whose life was twice interrupted history by conflict in the Horn of Africa. Warfa, a Somali from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, was only nine-years old when his family fled the ogaden during the 1977 war between Ethiopia and Somalia. Life was tough growing up in a refugee camp in southern Somalia, but he got an education. Now he works for UNICEF as a emergency specialist in Galkayo (a town in semi-autonomous Puntland). Ask students to compare Maulid’s experiences as a boy with those of Abdi. What advantages and opportunities did he have that Abdi probably won’t have?
LANGUAGE ARTS OR JOURNALISM CLASS: As preparation, hand out background reading on Al Shabaab (selecting recent items from online news sources and/or my previous post) and show one or two video clips, for example, Peter Greste, "Al-Shabab Recruiting Kenyan Youths to Fight" or Simon Kigamba, "Is Majengo a Fertile Al-Shabaab Breeding Ground? (Both listed in RESOURCES). Briefly discuss these to make sure everyone understands what Al Shabaab is and why it is recruiting young people to join its cause. Then ask students how they would go about investigating Al Shabaab–if they were journalists in Somalia, Kenya, or Minnesota. Follow-up with in-class reading and of "How Al Shabaab Recruitment Agents Lure Kenyans to Somalia." (or assign it as homework for discussion the next day). This lesson should help students better understanding of the hazards dangers journalists face when going undercover.
READ/DISCUSS: Have students READ Josh Meyer’s article, "U.S. Says 8 Lured Somali Terror Recruits" (2009) as a prelude to a discussing of Abdirazk Bihi efforts to prevent young Somali Americans from leaving their homes to join Al Shabaab. What personal experience prompted Bihi’s efforts? Why does he think the youth in his community are susceptible to Shabaab recruiting? What is he doing about this problem? Why isn’t Congress willing to fund such grassroots efforts? What advice would you give Bihi?
First READ/DISCUSS what the friends of suicide bomber Shirwa Ahmed had to say about what kind of person he was (as reported by Richard Meryhew, Allie Shah, and James Walsh in "The Making of a Minnesota Suicide Bomber"). Then ask students to WRITE a follow-up essay: What would you say to a friend who wanted to join Al Shabaab or a jihadi group abroad? What might persuade your friend to make a different decision? Are there mentors in the community that your friend could talk to?
READ/ANALYZE: Prepare students by showing these videos: "Recruiting Americans for Jihad" (New York Times, 2009) and "Mohamed Elibiary on CNN's Anderson Cooper 360 Discussing Homegrown Youth" (see RESOURCES). Then assign resources for analysis of the dynamics of recruiting in the US. These are highly recommended: the articles by Ayante, Meyer, Saslow, Malek; and the report (based on interviews) by Meryhew, Shah, and Walsh. To cover more ground is less time you could divide the class into groups and assigning each group a different article. Students could use a GRAPHIC ORGANIZER, such as a chart showing links among factors and feedback loops, to help them analyze the material. The goal of a class discussion be drawing up a revised and more inclusive version of their organizers. Encourage students to consider the relative importance of different factors and how these might come together to influence an individual’s behavior and decision-making.
WATCH/READ/COMPARE: As a follow-up to the preceding (US-focused) activity, show videos about Shabaab’s efforts to recruit young people in Kenya (see RESOUrCES). Then ask them to READ Koert Lindijer, "Al-Shabaab Recruits in Nairobi’s Slums." Assign a chart or essay comparing these two settings: What do these urban communities have in common? What’s different? Do recruiters use similar or different tactics? Are young people vulnerable for similar or different reasons? What can we learn from comparing these two cases–that we would probably not discover if we examined only one of them?
RESEARCH/DEBATE: Find out more about the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Why has the US failed to ratify it? What arguments do the supporters and opponents of ratification put forward? Who makes the better argument? Debate the issue in class or ask students to write persuasive essays.
RESOURCES: REFERENCE AND RECENT NEWS
TIMELINE: "Somalia Profile: A Chronology of Key Events." BBC News (20 December 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632
MAP: "Somalia: A Country Broken into Pieces." New York Times (9 September 2011):
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/10/world/africa/20110910-somalia-a-country-broken-into-pieces.html?ref=somalia
MAP: "Sabaki Bridge, Kenya." iTouchMap:
http://itouchmap.com/?c=ke&UF=-2261922&UN=-3121797&DG=BDG
News
Abokar, Shafi’i Mohyaddin. "Somalia: Taking Back Schools from Islamic Militants." The Guardian (28 December 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/dec/28/somalia-schools-opening-mogadishu
"Silence, Militants at Root of Rapes in Somalia." NPR (3 January 2012):
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/03/144621361/silence-militants-at-root-of-rapes-in-somalia
Baldauf, Scott. "Somalia’s Al Shabab Islamists Are on the Run." Christian Science Monitor (5 January 2012): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0105/Somalia-s-Al-Shabab-Islamists-are-on-the-run?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%20Custom%202%20(01052012)&cmpid=ema:nws:NzQ4MDUyMjgzNwS2
Davison, William. "Ethiopia Enters Somalia, but Avoids African Union Joint Operation." Christian Science Monitor (6 January 2012): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2012/0106/Ethiopia-enters-Somalia-but-avoids-African-Union-joint-operation
"Somalia: UN Envoy Voices Concern about Parliamentary Infighting." UN News Centre (6 January 2012): http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40895&Cr=&Cr1=
"Kenya on Edge as Terror Attack Threat Looms." New York Times/AP (10 January 2012):
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2012/01/10/world/africa/AP-AF-Kenya-Terror-Threat.html?ref=global-home
"Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border." Human Rights Watch (12 January 20120: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/12/kenya-security-forces-abusing-civilians-near-somalia-border
"Somali Islamists Parade Kenyan Hostages." Capital FM News/AFP (13 January 2012): http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/01/somali-islamists-parade-kenyan-hostages/
"Kenya-Somalia: Paying High Price for Military Incursion." IRIN (13 January 2012):
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94641
Houreld, Katharine. "Kenya Islamic Group Claims Ties to Al-Shabab." Boston.com/AP (15 January 2012): http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2012/01/15/kenya_islamic_group_claims_ties_to_al_shabab
Omar Feisal and Omar Faruk. "Kenyan Jets Bomb Somali Rebel Base, Kill 14." Reuters (15 January 2012): http://af.reuters.com/article/kenyaNews/idAFL6E8CF0BR20120115
RESOURCES: AL SHABAAB RECRUITMENT
"Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)." UN (18 July 2011): http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433
Recruiting in Somalia (including Child Soldiers)
"Developments in Somalia." Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (based on 23 April 2011 report to the Security Council). UN: http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/somalia.html
"UN Envoy Welcomes Somali and Central African Progress on Child Soldiers." UN News (28 November 2011): http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsID=40545&Cr=child+soldiers&Cr1=
"Children in Somalia Facing War Crimes." Amnesty International (20 July 2011): http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/children-somalia-facing-war-crimes-2011-07-20 (article available also in Arabic, French, Spanish)
- For link to full report, "In the Line of Fire: Somalia’s Children under Attack" (also in Arabic); based on testimony from 200 Somali refugees in Kenya and Djibouti
Gettleman, Jeffrey. "First Prize for a Child in Somalia: An AK-47." New York Times (20 September 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/world/africa/shabab-gives-unusual-prizes-for-somali-children-in-contest.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=somalia&st=nyt
Dixon, Robyn. "A Young Somali Lured into a Life of Death." Los Angeles Times (11 November 2011): http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/11/world/la-fg-somalia-bomber-20111112
DeCapua, Joe. "Ending Use of Child Soldiers in Somalia." VOA News (25 November 2011): http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/decapua-child-soldiers_un_25nov11-134495963.html
"Militants Recruiting Child Soldiers as ‘Warriors of Shabab.’" Shabelle Media Network (26 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112271771.html
Abokar, Shafi’i Mohyaddin. "Somalia: Taking Back Schools from Islamic Militants." The Guardian (28 December 2011): http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/dec/28/somalia-schools-opening-mogadishu
"Al-Shabaab Compels Elderly Men to Join Its Militias in Bay." Sunatimes (28 December 2011): http://sunatimes.com/view.php?id=1599
"Silence, Militants at Root of Rapes in Somalia." NPR (3 January 2012):
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/03/144621361/silence-militants-at-root-of-rapes-in-somalia
Recruiting in Kenya
"Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010)." UN (18 July 2011):http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433
"How Al Shabaab Recruitment Agents Lure Kenyans to Somalia." Daily Nation [Nairobi]
(4 June 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201106040055.html
- Based on the amazing investigative journalism by NTV reporters John-Allan Namu and Harith Salim
Greste, Peter. "Al-Shabab Recruiting Kenyan Youths to Fight." Al Jazeera (15 November 2011): http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/2011111514535374673.html
- Includes VIDEO (2:24 mins): Short interviews with two parents, whose sons were recruited in Nairobi
VIDEO: "Is Majengo a Fertile Al-Shabaab Breeding Ground?" 2:08 mins. Report by Simon Kigamba. Uploaded by NTVKenya (1 January 2012): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqBb5iuhgfk&feature=plcp&context=C31524c4UDOEgsToPDskL9Xazj993YAU34_wrtAs9H
- "Majengo estate in Nairobi has earned the rather dubious reputation of being the most lucrative hunting ground for Al-Shabaab recruitments. Out of the fifteen photographs of Al-Shabaab recruits released by police on Friday, eight were believed to have come from this slum estate. Why is Majengo so inviting for those seeking recruits to carry out terrorism activities?"
Lindijer, Koert. "Al-Shabaab Recruits in Nairobi’s Slums." Radio Netherlands Worldwide (3 November 2011): http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/al-shabaab-recruits-nairobi%E2%80%99s-slums
Nunga, Kimani. "Kenya: Why Al-Shabaab Is Recruiting Our Youth." Daily Nation (13 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111140777.html
Recruiting in the Diaspora and the US
Anzalone, Christopher. "Globalizing Insurgency in Somalia." YaleGlobal Online (23 August 2011): http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/globalizing-insurgency-somalia
- Author is a PhD student at McGill University in Canada.
- World History and Global Studies teachers take note: this article was reposted in Daily Star [Lebanon] (6 September 2011).
DOC: "Hearing on Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland." US House of Representatives: Committee on Homeland Security (27 July 2011): http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/al-shabaab-recruitment-and-radicalization-within-muslim-american-community-and-threat
- VIDEO of Rep. Peter King’s opening remarks; links to PDF of full text of testimony of four witnesses, including Thomas E. Smith (Chief of Police, St. Paul, Minnesota) [URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683018]
- Summary of the findings and conclusions of the July hearing
VIDEO "Mohamed Elibiary on CNN's Anderson Cooper 360 Discussing Homegrown Youth," CNN (9 December 2009): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mHOskTF11w
Aynte, Abdi. "Are Jihadist Groups Luring Minnesota Somalis Back to Fight?" Minnesota Independent (23 December 2008): http://minnesotaindependent.com/21144/did-jihadist-recruiters-lure-local-men-home-to-fight
- Somali American journalist reports on how the Minnesota community responded in 2008 to news about its "missing boys" and what they thought at the time about why they left. The article mentions Shirwa Ahmed and indicates that fingers were already being pointed at Abubakar as-Saddique mosque.
Meryhew, Richard, Allie Shah, and James Walsh. "The Making of a Minnesota Suicide Bomber." StarTribune [Minneapolis] (3 May 2009): http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=44231707
"Joining the Fight in Somalia." New York times (12 July 2009; repost on 30 October 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/12/us/20090712-somalia-timeline.html
- Link to VIDEO (8:55 mins): "Recruiting Americans for Jihad" (12 July 2009): http://video.nytimes.com/video/2009/07/11/us/1194841468554/recruiting-americans-for-jihad.html
Elliott, Andrea. "The Jihadist Next Door." New York Times Magazine (31 January 2010):
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html
Stack, Liam. "New Jersey Men Arrested at JFK on Way to Join Al Shabab in Somalia." Christian Science Monitor (7 June 2011): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0607/New-Jersey-men-arrested-at-JFK-on-way-to-join-Al-Shabab-in-Somalia
- Both were citizens: one born in US, of Palestinian descent; other naturalized, born in Dominican Republic
Saslow, Eli. "Muslim Activist in Minnesota Struggles as One-man Counter Against Lure of Terrorism." Washington Post (9 July 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/muslim-activist-in-minnesota-struggles-as-one-man-counter-against-lure-of-terrorism/2011/07/04/gIQAwNH53H_story.html
Berger, J. M. "Al Shabab’s Recruiting Pipeline from Minnesota to Somalia Detailed in New Filing." Intel Wire (16 July 2011): http://news.intelwire.com/2011/07/al-shababs-recruiting-pipeline-from.html
- A highly condensed version of trial brief, filed for the case of Amer Abdi Mohamed–with a link to full document.
Lyden, Tom. "Ex-Recruit Speaks Out on Al Shabaab Experience, Methods." Fox 9 News [Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota] (27 July 2011): http://www.myfoxtwincities.com/dpp/news/minnesota/ex-recruit-speaks-out-on-al-shabaab-experience-methods-jul-27-2011
- Includes VIDEO (9:10 mins): article reads like transcript
Meyer, Josh. "U.S. Says 8 Lured Somali Terror Recruits." Los Angeles Times (24 November 2011): http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/24/nation/la-na-somali-terror24-2009nov24
Drogin, Bob. "Terrorism Probe Casts Scrutiny on Minneapolis’ Somali Immigrant Enclave." Los Angeles Times (25 November 2009): http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/25/nation/la-na-little-mogadishu25-2009nov25
Roggio, Bill. "American Shabaab Commander Omar Hammami Releases Tape That Mocks Reports of His Death." Long War Journal (10 April 2011): http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/04/american_shabaab_com.php
Kron, Josh. "American Identified as Bomber in Attack on African Union in Somalia." New York Times (30 October 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/africa/shabab-identify-american-as-bomber-in-somalia-attack.html?ref=alshabab
Emerson, Steven and the Investigative Project on Terrorism. "Prosecutor Warns Not to Ignore al-Shabaab Threat." Global Security News (17 December 2011): http://global-security-news.com/2011/12/17/prosecutor-warns-not-to-ignore-al-shabaab-threat/
"Former US Soldier Craig Baxam ‘Helped al-Shabab.’" BBC News (9 January 2012): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16478853
- Includes link to document indicting Baxam (a primary source)
Tucker, Eric. "Ex-Soldier Ordered Held in Case Related to Terrorism." Star Democrat/AP (13 January 2012): http://www.stardem.com/news/state_news/article_a6d0fd9e-208b-53f6-b7eb-743c0c37232c.html
- Baxam was denied bail; see this article for his public defender’s statements
"Americans Rise in Ranks within Somalia Jihadi Militant Group Linked to al-Qaida." Washington Post/AP (14 January 2012): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/americans-rise-in-rank-within-somalia-jihadi-militant-group-linked-to-al-qaida/2012/01/14/gIQAUh0ayP_story.html
Remittance Issue
These resources could be used in a classroom debate: Should the US government regulate the flow of remittances to Somalia? If yes, what regulations are appropriate–or not appropriate?
"Minnesota: 2 Women Guilty of Aiding Terrorist Group." New York Times/AP (20 October 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/in-minnesota-two-women-guilty-of-aiding-terrorist-group.html
Hussein, Mohamed. "Money Must Continue to Flow to Somalia." StarTribune [Minneapolis, Minnesota] (3 January 2012): http://www.startribune.com/opinion/otherviews/136625453.html
Samatar, Hussein. "Minnesota Must Battle Against Anti-Somali Bigotry." StarTribune [Minneapolis, Minnesota] (3 January 2012): http://www.startribune.com/opinion/otherviews/136625478.html
- Somali Minnesotan’s perspective on his community and the remittance issue; Samatar is a former commercial banker, member of the Minneapolis School Board, and founder and executive director of the African Development Center of Minnesota
"Peace and Justice Groups Say, ‘Stop the Witch Hunt of the Somali Community,’" Fight Back News (4 December 2011): http://www.fightbacknews.org/2011/12/4/peace-and-justice-groups-say-stop-witch-hunt-somali-community
- Report about a "Speak Out in Support of the Somali Community" event where supporters claimed that the women convicted of "material support to foreign terrorist organizations" were raising money for charities. Its sponsors were Minnesota Peace Action and other local groups. Speakers included the husband of one of the women, the Director and Imam of the Minnesota Dawa Institute. The article describes Al Shabaab as "an Islamist organization that fights to free Somalia from foreign domination."
Tran, Mark. "Aid Groups Lobby US Not to Shut Off Remittances to Somalia." The Guardian: GlobalDevelopment (4 January 2012): http://guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/jan/04/aid-us-remittance-money-somalia?newsfeed=true
"Editorial: Money-Wire Freeze Penalizes Somalis." StarTribune [Minneapolis, Minnesota] (6 January 2012): http://www.startribune.com/opinion/editorials/136844773.html
"Hawala Will Still Allow Cash Transfers to Somalia." St. Cloud Times [St. Cloud, Minnesota] (7 January 2012): http://www.sctimes.com/article/20120107/NEWS01/101070016/Hawala-will-still-allow-cash-transfers-Somalia
Especially for Wisconsin Students and Teachers
"Somalis Seek Refuge in Brown County." Gubta News Network (8 August 2011): http://www.gubta.com/2011/08/08/somalis-seek-refuge-in-brown-county/
NOTES
1) Reported in "Islamic Terrorists Feel Oppressed," Strategy Page (10 January 2012): http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/somalia/articles/20120110.aspx. This site provides a detailed summary of important developments. Note that media reports often refer to AMISOM troops as AU troops. Consider also the somewhat optimistic overview in Scott Baldauf, "Somalia’s Al Shabab Islamists Are on the Run," Christian Science Monitor (5 January 2012): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2012/0105/Somalia-s-Al-Shabab-Islamists-are-on-the-run?cmpid=ema:nws:Daily%20Custom%202%20(01052012)&cmpid=ema:nws:NzQ4MDUyMjgzNwS2.
2) "African Union Asks UN to Raise Peacekeeping Force to 17,700," Radio Netherlands Worldwide (5 January 2012): http://allafrica.com/stories/201201060008.html
3) "Elders Denounce Kenyan Fighter Jet Attacks," Shabelle Media Network (26 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112271795.html; "Officials-Militants Killed in Southern Region Fighting," Shabelle Media Network (28 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112280183.html (resulting from a Shabaab offensive against TFG and KDF bases near Burgabo village); "Kenyan Fighter Planes Strike in Southern Region," Shabelle Media Network (28 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112280719.html (allegedly striking "a known rebel haunt"); "Kenya Says Kills 50 Shabaab Fighters in Airstrikes," Horsheed Media/Reuters (6 January 2012): http://horseedmedia.net/2012/01/06/somalia-kenya-says-kills-50-shabaab-fighters-in-airstrikes/; "Kenya Push al-Shabaab from Two Towns," News24 (6 January 2012):
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Kenya-push-al-Shabaab-from-two-towns-20120106 "Shabaab Kill Six, Abduct Four in Daring Raid on AP Camp." Daily Nation (12 January 2012): http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Shabaab+kill+six+abduct+four+in+daring+raid+on+AP+camp+/-/1056/1304776/-/4xegerz/-/ (one of presumed abductees reappeared); "Somali Islamists Parade Kenyan Hostages." Capital FM News/AFP (13 January 2012): http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/01/somali-islamists-parade-kenyan-hostages/
4) "Shabaab Gather, Recruit at Border Town." News24 (3 January 2011): http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Shabaab-gather-recruit-at-border-town-20120102
5) Mohamed Ibrahim and Jeffrey Gettleman, "Strategic Somali Town Is Seized by Ethiopians," New York Times (31 December 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/world/africa/ethiopian-forces-seize-strategic-somali-town-from-shabab.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=gettleman%20strategic%20somali%20town&st=cse; William Davison, "Ethiopia Enters Somalia, but Avoids African Union Joint Operation," Christian Science Monitor (6 January 2012): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2012/0106/Ethiopia-enters-Somalia-but-avoids-African-Union-joint-operation; "PM Visits Beletweyn, Meets Ethiopian Officials." RBC Radio (6 January 2012):
http://www.raxanreeb.com/?p=126131; "Somalia: Ethiopian Troops ‘to Hand over to AU Force.’" BBC News (6 January 2012): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16441240; "Shabaab Gather, Recruit at Border Town" (see note 3).
6) Sufi animosity towards Al Shabaab was discussed in "Shoo, Shoo, Al Shabaab." "Ahlu Sunna Threatens Al-Shabab Militants," Shabelle Media Network (15 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112160803.html. "Ahlu Sunnah and TFG Troops En Route to Al Shabaab Controlled City." Garowe Online (27 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112271951.html; "Fresh Fighting Flares up in Central City Elbur." Mareeg Online (1 January 2012): http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=22422&tirsan=3
7)"Al Shabaab Militants Attack AMISOM," Garowe Online (29 December 2011):
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Al_Shabaab_militants_attack_AMISOM.shtml; "Al Shabaab Insurgents Continue Guerilla War in Mogadishu," Garowe Online (5 January 2012): http://allafrica.com/stories/201201051211.html.
"AU Forces to Investigate Mosque Attack," Radio Netherlands Worldwide (9 January 2012): http://allafrica.com/stories/201201091000.html; "Two Killed, Three Wounded in a Heavy Fighting in Mogadishu," Shabelle Media Network (10 January 2012): http://allafrica.com/stories/201201101157.html. "UN Envoy Voices Concern about Parliamentary Infighting," UN News Centre (6 January 2012): http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40895&Cr=&Cr1=
8) Scott Baldauf, "Somalia’s Al Shabab Islamists Are on the Run," Christian Science Monitor (5 January 2012).
9) Reported in "Ahlu Sunnah and TFG Troops En Route to Al Shabaab Controlled City," Garowe Online (27 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112271951.html
10) For more discussion see "Shoo, Shoo, Al Shabaab." For Shabaab brutality see "Silence," and Amnesty report (brutality unleashed on children and witnesses by them in brief news, dts in full report]. Progress along the "roadmap" has been slow but steady during UN-sponsored meetings held in September and December 2011. This process and the involvement of regional and international stakeholders will be the topic of another post.
11) Al Shabaab’s leadership includes a few highly trained clerics, usually identified in the media as "sheikh so-and-so" (see PDF of Christopher Harnisch, "The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab," Critical Threats [12 February 2011]: http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf). For a remarkable account see Tom Lyden, "Ex-Recruit Speaks Out on Al Shabaab Experience, Methods," Fox 9 News [Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota] (27 July 2011).
12) Stephanie Hanson, "Al-Shabaab," Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011): http://ww.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650; "Al-Shabaab Embark on Forced Recruitment in Mogadishu," Africa Review (25 February 2011):
http://www.africareview.com/News/Al+Shabaab+embark+on+forced+recruitment/-/979180/1115004/-/5374cwz/-/index.html. See also sources in note 5.
13) "Children in Somalia Facing War Crimes." Amnesty International (20 July 2011); see article for link to PDF of full report.
14) "Silence, Militants at Root of Rapes in Somalia." NPR (3 January 2012).
15) Abdi Mohamed Maddaale, "Al-Shabaab Recruits New Fighters in Hiran," SomaliaReport (29 October 2011): http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1896; Abdikafar Hosh Ismail Hassan, "Al-Shabaab Recruiting Heavily in Kismayo," SomaliaReport (4 November 2011): http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1949/Al-Shabaab_Recruiting_Heavily_in_Kismayo; "Al-Shabaab Continues Forced Recruitment," SomaliaReport (24 November 2011): http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2117/Al-Shabaab_Continues_Forced_Recruitment; "Al-Shabaab Compels Elderly Men to Join Its Militias in Bay," Sunatimes (28 December 2011): http://sunatimes.com/view.php?id=1599; "Shabaab Gather, Recruit at Border Town [Beledweyne]." News24 (3 January 2011): http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Shabaab-gather-recruit-at-border-town-20120102. Maddaale mentions recruitment of women, but see esp. "Somalia’s Al Shabaab Recruits Women to Fight Off Onslaught." Hiiraan Net (10 December 2011): http://www.hiiraannet.com/?p=10847 (source of this information is China’s Xinhua news agency).
16) Mohamed Douksieh (Press secretary of Awdal State), "Somalia: Awdal State Will Never Be Deterred by Bullying." Sunatimes (5 January 2012):
http://sunatimes.com/view.php?id=1616.
17) "Developments in Somalia," Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, based on 23 April 2011 report to the Security Council (see RESOURCES). For link to the Amnesty report go to "Children in Somalia Facing War Crimes." Amnesty International (20 July 2011).
18) "UN Envoy Welcomes Somali and Central African Progress on Child Soldiers." UN News (28 November 2011).
19) News article about the report: "Children in Somalia Facing War Crimes." Amnesty International (20 July 2011).
20) Jeffrey Gettleman, "First Prize for a Child in Somalia: An AK-47." New York Times
(20 September 2011).
21) "UN Envoy Welcomes Somali and Central African Progress on Child Soldiers." UN News (28 November 2011).
22) "Developments in Somalia," (see note 17). Abokar, Shafi’i Mohyaddin, "Somalia: Taking Back Schools from Islamic Militants," The Guardian (28 December 2011).
23) "Al-Shabaab Compels Elderly Men to Join Its Militias in Bay." Sunatimes (28 December 2011): http://sunatimes.com/view.php?id=1599. Abdikafar Hosh Ismail. "Al-Shabaab Recruiting Heavily in Kismayo." SomaliaReport (4 November 2011): http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1949/Al-Shabaab_Recruiting_Heavily_in_Kismayo
24) As quoted in Abokar, Shafi’i Mohyaddin, "Somalia: Taking Back Schools from Islamic Militants," The Guardian (28 December 2011).
25) For an overview see Christopher Anzalone, "Globalizing Insurgency in Somalia," YaleGlobal Online (23 August 2011); the author is a PhD student at McGill University. For more detail see "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea," UN (18 July 2011), pp. 24-27.
26) Dominic Wabala, "Kenya: Shabaab Recruits Train in Mombasa." Nairobi Star (17 September 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201109170183.html. For smuggling routes used by another network, which includes Uganda, see "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea," UN (18 July 2011), pp. 25-26.
27) "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea," UN (18 July 2011), pp. 24-27; and the documentary evidence for the Muslim Youth Centre case study, pp. 140-78. "Kenyan Grenade Suspect Tells Court He Was a Member of Somali Militant group Al-Shabab," Washington Post (25 October 2011). Sara Bakata, "How Many Oliachas Are Among Us?" Daily Nation (29 October 2011):
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion. Kimani Njunga’s opinion piece mentions the recruitment of young Kikiyu and Kamba and the targeting of youth in slums; see "Kenya: Why Al-Shabaab Is Recruiting Our Youth," Daily Nation (13 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111140777.html. Koert Lindijer, "Al-Shabaab Recruits in Nairobi’s Slums," Radio Netherlands Worldwide (3 November 2011):
http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/al-shabaab-recruits-nairobi%E2%80%99s-slum
28) "How Al Shabaab Recruitment Agents Lure Kenyans to Somalia," Daily Nation [Nairobi] (4 June 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201106040055.html. This is an edited excerpt (from the text of a longer TV segment). NTV (http://www.ntv.co.ke/) is part of the National Media Group, which includes the Daily Nation, Business Daily, and East African Standard. For TV news clips go to NTV’s channel on YouTube and search, for example "shabaab": http://www.youtube.com/user/NTVKenya/search?query=shabaab.
29) "Kenya: Security Forces Abusing Civilians Near Somalia Border." Human Rights Watch (12 January 20120); quotes from this source. See also "UN Agency Worried about Insecurity at Refugee Camps in Horn of Africa." UN News Service (13 January 2012):
http://allafrica.com/stories/201201131482.html
30) Patrick Mayoyo, "Kenya: Al-Shabaab Video Declares Holy War Against Country," The Monitor (11 January 2012): http://allafrica.com/stories/201201110503.html
31) Steve Mkawale, "30 Al Shabaab Recruits Surrender," The Standard (11 November 2011): http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000046591&cid=4&. "Kenya on Edge as Terror Attack Threat Looms." New York Times/AP (10 January 2012).
32) Robyn Dixon, "A Young Somali Lured into a Life of Death." Los Angeles Times (11 November 2011).
33) In this post my focus is on recruiting in the US to introduce the readings featured in the ACTIVITIES section. However, this is a much broader phenomena. For example, in August 2009 the Australian police arrested four men suspected of having links to Al-Shabaab and later charged with conspiring to attack a military barracks near Sydney (reported in TIME). For Shabaab members from UK (who may or may not be Somalis): "Scotland Yard to Aid Kenya Terror Investigation After Briton Arrested," Shabelle Media Network (28 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112290309.html. Abdi Aynte noted, early on, that Al Shabaab members had "intensified their cyber activities" (as reported by the UN Minitoring Group); see "Are Jihadist Groups Luring Minnesota Somalis Back to Fight?" Minnesota Independent (23 December 2008). Quote from "Americans Rise in Ranks within Somalia Jihadi Militant Group Linked to al-Qaida," Washington Post/AP (14 January 2012).
34) "Americans Rise in Ranks within Somalia Jihadi Militant Group Linked to al-Qaida," Washington Post/AP (14 January 2012). For statistics, see the summary of a hearing held last July, "Majority Investigative Report: Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland," US House of Representatives: Committee on Homeland Security (27 July 2011): http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf. For a roster and details about early recruits see "Joining the Fight in Somalia," New York Times (12 July 2009).
35) Article and VIDEO: Tom Lyden, "Ex-Recruit Speaks Out on Al Shabaab Experience, Methods," Fox 9 News [Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota] (27 July 2011).
36) Richard Meryhew, Allie Shah, and James Walsh, "The Making of a Minnesota Suicide Bomber." StarTribune [Minneapolis] (3 May 2009).
37) Steven Emerson, "Prosecutor Warns Not to Ignore al-Shabaab Threat," Global Security News (17 December 2011). Ben Bennett, "Al Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, U.S. Says," Los Angeles Times (18 July 2011): http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-20110718 (based on US intelligence sources, including Ahmed Warsame [Al Shabaab leader intercepted en route from Yemen to Somalia, interrogated on a US warship, sent to New York to face terrorism charges] and messages on flash drives found in Osama bin Laden’s compound. About the fear of conflation: Bennett is quoting Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University.
38) For example, the views of Rep. Bennie Thompson (Democrat, Mississippi), as reported by Penny Starr, "Democrat: Terror Group That’s Recruiting Americans Doesn’t ‘Present Any Danger to This Homeland,’" CNS News (28 July 2011): http://cnsnews.com/print/105519. In fairness to Rep. Thompson, it should be noted that he was reacting to the views of Rep. Peter King the day after the release of a report about Al Shabaab and to King and certain other Republicans to exaggerate the threat. On the other hand, he asserts that Al Shabaab has only 3,000 members (when estimates range as high as 14,000–though this is probably too high) and ignores the distress of the families of those recruited by Al Shabaab.
39) Matt Zapotosky, "Craig Baxam, Ex-U.S. Soldier, Charged with Trying to Aid Terror Group al-Shabab," Washington Post (9 January 2012): http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/craig-baxam-ex-us-soldier-charged-with-trying-to-aid-terror-group-al-shabab/2012/01/09/gIQAJvMbmP_story.html?tid=pm_local_pop; for a link to the indictment go to "Former US Soldier Craig Baxam ‘Helped al-Shabab.’" BBC News (9 January 2012): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16478853.
40) Baxam could have made contacts fairly easily in Nairobi (as we know from the NTV investigation), but he seems not to have known how to make them (or, he could be withholding information to protect contacts–but I don’t think a Shabaab agent would have put him on a bus--given the Kenyan authorities’ tight security since the Kenyan incursion).
41) Christopher Anzalone, "Globalizing Insurgency in Somalia," YaleGlobal Online (23 August 2011). J. M. Berger, "Al Shabab’s Recruiting Pipeline from Minnesota to Somalia Detailed in New Filing," Intel Wire (16 July 2011), a condensed version of the brief filed for the trial of Omer Abdi Mohamed. See also Josh Meyer, "U.S. Says 8 Lured Somali Terror Recruits," Los Angeles Times (24 November 2011); Meyer describes the contents of the court documents, which provide details about Shabaab safe houses and camps. Alana Goodman, "How Al Shabaab Recruited 40 Americans Since 2007," Commentary (27 July 2011):
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/07/27/how-al-shabaab-recruited-40-americans-since-2007/
42) Bob Drogin, "Terrorism Probe Casts Scrutiny on Minneapolis’ Somali Immigrant Enclave," Los Angeles Times (25 November 2009); Josh Meyer, "U.S. Says 8 Lured Somali Terror Recruits." Los Angeles Times (24 November 2011): See also Eli Saslow, "Muslim Activist in Minnesota Struggles as One-man Counter Against Lure of Terrorism," Washington Post (9 July 2011). Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (Harper & Row, 1951; Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2002) is still very useful for the dynamics (push/pull factors) that draw people to a diverse array of social and political movements.
43) As quoted in Josh Meyer, "U.S. Says 8 Lured Somali Terror Recruits." Los Angeles Times (24 November 2011).
44) As quoted in Josh Meyer (see note 43). Eli Saslow talked to Beledi’s mother (see "Muslim Activist in Minnesota Struggles," (note 42).
45) Statistics cited in Eli Saslow (see note 42). Quote from Josh Meyer, "U.S. Says 8 Lured Somali Terror Recruits," Los Angeles Times (24 November 2011).
46) St. Paul Police Chief Thomas E. Smith points out that members of Somali gangs in the Twin Cities have been indicted for the sexual trafficking of Somali girls that was part of a criminal enterprise operating in Minnesota and Tennesee (see note 48). Laura Yuen, "Mpls. Mosque Assault Points to s Fringe Element." Minneapoli Public Radio (21 July 2011): http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/07/21/minneapolis-somali-mosque-punch-fringe-element
47) Eli Saslow, "Muslim Activist in Minnesota Struggles," (see note 42). Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical Yemeni American cleric, was killed this year in a drone attack.
48) "Testimony of Thomas E. Smith, Chief of Police, Saint Paul Police Department, Saint Paul, Minnesota." House Committee on Homeland Security (27 July 2011). Link to full testimony at to "Hearing on Al Shabaab, "US House of Representatives: Committee on Homeland Security (27 July 2011):
http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/al-shabaab-recruitment-and-radicalization-within-muslim-american-community-and-threat OR directly to PDF at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683018.
St. Paul’s programs are considered a model and their methods have attracted the interest of agencies working on similar issues in Denmark and Britain. For highlights of the hearing see "Majority Investigative Report: Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland," US House of Representatives: Committee on Homeland Security (27 July 2011):
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf.
49) Under the chairmanship of Rep. King there have been four of these hearings (the first was in March). They have stirred up controversy among Muslim Americans because of the harshness of Rep. King’s comments about Muslims and mosques. As Washington Post reporters David a. Fahrenhold and Michelle Boorstein point out King’s commentary set a tone in Congress and in the country quite different from that of earlier hearings chaired by Sen. Joseph Lieberman (Independent, Connecticut) and Rep. Jane Harman (Democrat, California); see "Rep. Peter King’s Muslim Hearings," Washington Post (9 March 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030902061.html. For the topic of Al Shabaab recruiting, however, the July hearing elicited useful information, in particular the testimony of Thomas E. Smith (see note 48).
50) Scott Shane, "In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S," New York Times (22 December 2012): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/us/politics/in-shariah-gingrich-sees-mortal-threat-to-us.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=scott%20shane%20islamic%20law%20gingrich&st=cse. In Saslow’s article (see note 42), Elbiary is credited with helping law enforcement "deradicalize known extremists." His sense of why some youth attracted to extremist ideas is clearly expressed in the VIDEO "Mohamed Elibiary on CNN's Anderson Cooper 360 Discussing Homegrown Youth," CNN (9 December 2009): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mHOskTF11w
51) Andrea Elliott’s in-depth article in the New York Times Magazine ("The Jihadist Next Door") is an excellent resource. The back story of another American, Jehad Mostafa, is somewhat parallel to that of Hammami; for an article comparing them see "Americans Rise in Ranks within Somalia Jihadi Militant Group Linked to al-Qaida," Washington Post/AP (14 January 2012). An Al Qaeda video released in October shows Mostafa handing out food to famine victims in Somalia.
52) See Bill Roggio, "American Shabaab Commander Omar Hammami Releases Tape That Mocks Reports of His Death," Long War Journal (10 April 2011).
53) "Minnesota: 2 Women Guilty of Aiding Terrorist Group." New York Times/AP (20 October 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/in-minnesota-two-women-guilty-of-aiding-terrorist-group.html. For a response by their supporters see "Peace and Justice Groups Say, ‘Stop the Witch Hunt of the Somali Community,’" Fight Back News (4 December 2011).
54) Mark Tran, "Aid Groups Lobby US Not to Shut Off Remittances to Somalia," The Guardian: GlobalDevelopment (4 January 2012). Letter to editor: David Reiling, "Somali Bank Transfers," StarTribune [Minneapolis, Minnesota] (6 January 2012): http://www.startribune.com/opinion/letters/1367775968.html
55) "Editorial: Money-Wire Freeze Penalizes Somalis," StarTribune [Minneapolis, Minnesota] (6 January 2012). For two Somali-Minnesotan views see items by Mohamed Hussein and Hussein Samatar (in RESOURCES). "Hawala Will Still Allow Cash Transfers to Somalia," St. Cloud Times [St. Cloud, Minnesota] (7 January 2012).
56) "Editorial: Shortchanging Somalia," Los Angeles Times (16 December 2011):
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-somalia-20111216,0,162240,print.story; Allie Shah, "Protest Today Over Closing of Somali Money Wire Accounts," StarTribune [Minneapolis]
(30 December 2011): http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/136433353.html; and "Somalis Again Protest Closing of Money-Transfer Accounts," StarTribune (6 January 2012):
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/136858023.html.
57) Star Tribune (6 Janaury 2012), see note 55.
