Shoo, Shoo, Al Shabaab!

(This post provides a way to bring current events in Somalia and the Horn of Africa into the classroom. At the very moment when the decades-long conflict in Somalia is intensifying, other international stories–European debt, elections and protests in Egypt and Russia, impending civil war in Syria–have pushed this conflict to the margins of US media markets. While the media did report the recent Kenyan and Ethiopian incursions into Somalia, its attention is now mostly focused elsewhere--despite the Horn’s being a hotspot in the US counterterrorism "playbook." You can stir up interest in this strategic region by playing up the youth angle of Al Shabaab and asking to students to imagine what their lives would be like if they suddenly had to comply with the kinds of strict rules that imposed in Shabaab-controlled parts of Somalia.)


INTRODUCTION

Al Shabaab is a radical Islamist group that, beginning in 2007, extended its authority over much of central and southern Somalia, including neighborhoods and markets in Mogadishu, the capital and headquarters of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). "Shabaab" means "youth" and its militias are filled with young recruits, some of them recruited from Somali communities in the diaspora. Wherever possible Shabaab leaders have imposed a strict, often cruel, version of sharia (Islamic law). (1)

But what has especially earned Al Shabaab the opprobrium of international opinion–and further eroded its local support–has been its policy of interfering with international famine and medical relief efforts. During the worst famine in more than 60 years many Somalis have died because Al Shabaab radicals prevented food and medicine from reaching them. In areas controlled by Al Shabaab large numbers of starving people set out on foot for refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. This angered the Shabaab, who then attacked those who were trying to escape (2). Given the severity of the famine, Al Shabaab’s response has contributed to a growing sense inside and outside of Somalia that it is time to get rid of Al Shabaab. Enough is enough. This may be Al Shabaab’s "shoo-shoo" moment.

(Does the word "shoo" seems a bit light-hearted when so many people are suffering from hunger and violence in Somalia? I don’t want to trivialize the situation but the sound-play may help students to remember the unfamiliar sounding Shabaab and Mogadishu.)

In early August the forces of AMISOM (UN mandated peacekeepers, mostly from Uganda and Burundi) put so much pressure on Shabaab militias in Mogadishu that they retreated from the city. Their leaders tried to save face by telling the world that this was merely a tactical decision (which, in a sense, it was). Although AMISOM has "shooed" Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, its fighters are still giving and receiving heat in and around Mogadishu. But for an interlude the city was more at peace than it has been in a long time. Most Shabaab fighters retreated to strongholds and training camps in central and southern Somalia, arriving just as the severity of the famine was reaching its peak–and helping to make a bad situation much worse. While the famine has eased in parts of the country, many people are still experiencing "emergency" conditions, according to recent UN assessments. (3)

Incidents of kidnapping, murder and hostage-taking that occurred in Kenya in September and October. These were attributed in the press to Somali gunmen, who may have been Shabaab or Islamist militants–or could be members of criminal gangs or pirates. The targets were Western tourists and aid workers: a British couple, attacked in a seaside bungalow on Lamu (Kenya’s island paradise)--after he was killed, his wife was taken hostage; a sick, severely disabled French woman, kidnapped on the island of Manda, who later died from lack of medicine; and two Spanish women, working for Medecins Sans Frontiers, abducted from the large refugee camp at Dadaab (4). The Kenyan government quickly assumed that all of the perpetrators belonged to Al Shabaab. Other observers were more reluctant to blame Al Shabaab since its leaders had not taken credit for these incidents (asuming that if these were the deeds of Shabaab militants, the group would not have denied it). Still, in areas under its control Al Shabaab bears some responsibility for conditions that are conducive to such activities. In any case, this is part of the context in which neighboring countries and other stakeholders (the African Union, the United Nations, the United States) seem determined to eliminate the Shabaab menace, to shoo the Shabaab, once and for all.

On October 16th Kenyan troops crossed the border into Somali, pursuing the Shabaab and hoping to take the coastal town of Kismayo. Kenya says it was provoked by kidnappings and by cross-border attacks, all of which were taking a toll on its tourism industry. With some assistance from Transitional Federal Government forces, the Kenyan army has ousted the Shabaab from a number of small towns–despite the muddy mire due to the onset of heavy rains. Then, on November 19th, Ethiopia troops advanced into central Somalia (though the Ethiopians at first denied these reports). In the past eight weeks Kenya has also used diplomacy to assemble international support for what is now emerging as a major effort to eradicate al Shabaab’s militias. (5)

If, eventually, Al Shabaab is gone (or neutralized), local clan elders might take charge of their communities–though they could find themselves--once again--under the thrall of various warlords (who would be eager to to fill any vacuum). So, while it is possible to imagine that shooing the Shabaab might have an overall positive effect, this is by no means inevitable. In the meantime, the conflict is intensifying and civilians are being caught in the cross-fire,. This is raising humanitarian concerns about how a surge of refugees might affect famine relief efforts (6). Humanitarian aid has not arrived as expected in areas "liberated" by Kenyan Defense Forces though the Kenyans have supplied limited amounts.

Who are the Shabaab? How did they manage to insert themselves into the political landscape--and why have they now lost their footing? Will efforts to dislodge them succeed? And if they do, will this bring greater stability to Somalia? These are important questions–which I’ll only begin to tackle here as I try to provide background information for a theme of more general concern and relevance in the classroom. This theme is the strategies that radical Islamists use to recruit young men to fight and carry out acts of terrorism. In the classroom talking about Al Shabaab’s recruitment strategies can be as starting point for trying to understand the carrots and sticks that lure young people into all sorts of nefarious enterprises--gangs and cults as well as terrorist organizations.

Al Shabaab and Somali Nationalism

Al Shabaab’s emergence as a political force was in many respects a response to outsiders’ efforts to stabilize Somalia, largely through the creation of a series of transitional governments (7). It was founded in 2004 and joined the Islamic Courts Union, which came to power in Mogadishu in 2006, but it did not dominate the ICU. Although the ICU espoused strict Islamist practices, its was composed of groups that ranged from moderate to radical. Its moderate leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, is now the president of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). But Al Shabaab represented the radicals on the periphery of the ICU umbrella.

To understand how Al Shabaab came to dominate southern Somalia we need to back up to Ethiopia’s December 2006 invasion of Somalia. The Ethiopians threw out the Islamic Courts Union government, which had brought a fair amount of order to a very chaotic state of affairs. What replaced the ICU was the much weaker TFG. Though founded in 2004, the TFG was only installed in Mogadishu after Ethiopian forces had cleared a path for it–and it lost ground rapidly when the Ethiopians pulled out in January, 2009. (8)

After the ICU government was ousted, the ICU umbrella collapsed. Soon differences in religious outlook and aspirations became more pronounced and the Islamists splintered. Two of the most radical factions, Al Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam, joined forces and rallied people to their cause, which became a fervid insurgency against the US and Ethiopian-backed TFG. Al Shabaab organized militias and recruited young men, who were quite willing to take part in a war against foreign invaders. (9)

To make a convoluted story rather simple, the Ethiopian strategy backfired–very badly. Radical Islamists used the invasion by "Christian Ethiopia" to garner support among people whose version of Islam was quite different from that of Al Shabaab’s hard-core (10). Many young people who joined Al Shabaab did so out of nationalist sentiment though some were opportunists. The Ethiopian occupation became a perfect pretext for Shabaab propaganda. By the time the Ethiopians left there wasn’t much support among ordinary Somalis for the TFG, a ‘national’ government that was confined to Mogadishu, where it was pushed into ever more restricted enclaves.

From early 2009 until mid-2011 Al Shabaab was the dominant element in about one-third of the country (see MAP). With up to 14,000 fighters in the field, Shabaab militias needed weapons and ammunition, plus food and other supplies. In addition to funding from individuals and remittances from sympathizers living abroad, Al Shabaab taxed fishermen and smugglers and sometimes resorted to kidnapping for ransom. When they gained control of port of Kismayo, it became their cash cow–providing up to $50 million in duties from imports and exports. Al Shabaab was "flush" while the TFG was "broke" and thus it could entice poorly paid (often unpaid) TFG soldiers to defect and join its ranks. (11)

I’ve concluded that many Somalis who supported Al Shabaab initially did so out of a need to reaffirm a sense of national identity at a very dark time–when Somali sovereignty had been assaulted by an occupying force. Al Shabaab was prepared to organize militias to expel the invaders. That is why the presence, once again, of Ethiopian forces in Somalia makes a lot of people nervous–analysts, diplomats, and especially Somalis--both in Somalia and in the far-flung Somali diaspora. It seems, however, that the Ethiopians and their US-backers may have learned a few lessons from their ill-fated 2006 invasion and decision to push on to Mogadishu (12). There can be little doubt that in 2006 the presence of Ethiopian troops in the capital and in many parts of central and southern Somalia was more than an affront to Somali sovereignty–it was an assault on Somali dignity (13). So this time the Ethiopian role will probably be more limited. It has been reported, however, that the Ethiopians have already returned to some of their old bases and there is speculation that they might go as far as Baidoa (more than 150 miles from Mogadishu) (14).

We must remember that 2011 is not 2006. This time Somali reactions are part of a milieu in which the ideological extremism of the Shabaab has turned local clan elders and religious leaders against them. Of course, there is much ambivalence about Kenyan and Ethiopian boots on the ground, but the TFG and many Somalis now seem willing to tolerate their presence–as an interim strategy to get rid of Al Shabaab. The TFG is still weak, even in Mogadishu, where its ability to hold onto its recent gains is dependent on AMISOM’s Ugandan and Burundian troops, and the extent to which its own forces are fighting alongside the Kenyan army is probably very limited. That is why it has welcomed Djibouti’s commitment to sending 850 additional peacekeepers by the end of this year (15). Initially, President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed voiced his disapproval of Kenya’s "inappropriate" infringement on Somali sovereignty (16). He seems to have changed his mind, perhaps partly as a result of conversations with various stakeholders, on whom his fragile government is so reliant.

IGA (the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) is a regional organization, comprised of eight member nations: Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea (17). These countries are the major African stakeholders in Somalia’s future. On November 25th, during a summit meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, IGAD gave its full support to ongoing Kenya/TFG military operations. At the top on the agenda was how to support this campaign to oust Al Shabaab in ways that would bring about greater stability in central and southern Somalia. The TFG government voiced support for an Ethiopian force–if it had an official mandate (a reference to the UN mandate under which AMISOM is operating). To reassure the TFG that Ethiopia would act with restraint, Prime Minister ... stressed that Ethiopia would act only in concert with IGAD and the African Union (18). There was also broad agreement that that, if possible, Kenyan troops should be integrated into AMISOM (more recent developments suggest that this will soon be happening). Obviously, in these IGAD deliberations there were diplomatic efforts to defuse a Somali nationalist backlash--although that risk is still very real.

On November 29th, at the end of a three-day meeting in Mogadishu, chaired by the UN Special Representative for Somalia, President Ahmed sounded very resolute. He confirmed his support for IGAD’s decision to "destroy Islamist militants of Al-Shabab and root out their strong hold regions in Somalia with the help of African union peace keeping troops" and then asked the broader international community to help the TFG win the war against Al Shabaab (19). Apparently, he would accept Ethiopian troops if they were officially designated AU reinforcements–and in the meantime he will just avoid acknowledging the facts on the ground–that the Ethiopians are already there. This tactic will not go unchallenged. His position was criticized at another meeting in Mogadishu, convened it seems for that purpose, and attended by clan elders and a few TFG members of parliament. The attendees issued a statement rejecting what had been proposed at the UN-chaired meeting. Later, in a barb no doubt directed at President Ahmed, the MPs denounced the government for accepting the presence of Ethiopian troops "in the pretext of the fight against al-Shabab fighters." They alleged that what had transpired was "a national deception" (20).

Animosity between the Ethiopian state and ethnic Somalis is well-attested over the centuries, an enduring feature of the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. Yet the reality has always been more complicated. Dissident Somali factions have often looked to Ethiopia for support and since the early 1980s Ethiopia has backed a great variety of Somali political parties, rebel movements, and warlords. There are close ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti (a former French colony, independent since 1977, which has a Somali ethnic majority) and between Ethiopia and Somaliland (a fully autonomous state in northern Somalia). Apparently, Ethiopia now sees its interests as being served by a stable but territorially limited TFG, by greater security in Puntland and Galmudug (both semi-autonomous regions of central Somalia, aligned with the TFG), and by the emergence of a cooperative (probably "Kenyan-sponsored") buffer polity in the southwest. So, the Ethiopian invasions of both 2006 and 2011 may be viewed as part of "Ethiopia’s policy over last 10 years of keeping Somalia broken up into 4-5 clan-based micro-states" (21).

For pragmatic Somali politicians there is an opportunity here to examine closely the series of failed attempts to rebuild a central government. They can’t help but notice the relative stability of Somaliland (or even that of Puntland) though they remain, very understandably, wary of steps that might lead to the entrenchment of clan-based politics (22). Perhaps those factions still looking forward to the re-creation of a central government (not necessarily the TFG) will now be more open to an interim stage of semi-autonomous polities. After all, these might become stepping stones toward a more cohesive government down the road. In the meantime, such polities could bring about enough order to permit a gradual rebuilding of civil society and some economic development. A less desirable outcome would be a return to warlordism.

Al Shabaab and Terrorism

Is Al Shabaab just (or mostly) a radical Islamist insurgency in Somalia or is it a terrorist organization with the capacity and will to act beyond its borders?

First, we need to recognize that Al Shabaab has never been a unified movement–despite its having a nominal leader, Sheikh Muktar Adburrahman Abu Zubeyr. Instead, it is a collection of militias and cells, whose leaders have considerable latitude. These fall into three or four geographical groupings, each with its own spokesman (23). One of these occasionally commits acts of terrorism in Puntland and, with much less frequency in Somaliland. Some local warlords have made alliances with Al Shabaab (for example, in the Juba Valley) but mostly out of expediency and might defect to the TFG if given an opportunity. In other words, the large swathes of central and southern Somalia controlled by Al Shabaab are the result of power-brokering and thus susceptible to disruption (24). This does not promote ideological "purity."

Second, we need to treat Al Shabaab’s claims–as well as those of US counterterrorism experts–with a degree of skepticism. Granted, since 2007 Al Shabaab’s core leaders have claimed an affiliation with Al Qaeda. Still, we must ask: How credible is this claim? How much contact does Al Shabaab have with other Al Qaeda "affiliates"?

Western anti-terrorism experts claim that Al Qaeda has provided Al Shabaab with training in bomb-making, but in the global underworld there are plenty of free-lancers with that kind of expertise, so we cannot assume that Al Qaeda sent its own trainers to Somalia. On the other hand, proximity alone would suggest that Al Shabaab has had contact with the Yemen-based group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP) and thus, possibly, indirect communications via AQAP with Al Qaeda itself. (25)

Eventually, in addition to conventional attacks on TFG targets, Al Shabaab began to perpetrate acts of terrorism (for example, a series of suicide car bombings in October 2008). This was probably NOT because the rank-and-file were eager to join any global jihad–because there was plenty for them to do in Somalia, where their main objectives were getting rid of the Ethiopians and ousting the TFG. What seems more plausible is a drifting towards terrorism (at first in Somalia, later beyond its borders) that evolved from more mundane concerns. True, there were hard-core ideologues in Shabaab’s senior leadership, who exercised more influence in some of its factions than in others. But as Al Shabaab needed more income to arm, supply, and pay its militias–it made practical sense for its leaders to reach out to Al Qaeda, perhaps using contacts with AQAP to do so. Gradually, as Al Shabaab grew closer to AQAP, Shabaab spokesmen began to brag about their ties to Al Qaeda. The consequence of that bragging (supported, allegedly, by US intelligence sources) was the US government’s decision (February 2008) to list Al Shabaab as a "foreign Terrorist Organization" and, subsequently, to treat it as a bona fide affiliate of Al Qaeda. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government also refers in its press releases to "Al Shabaab/Al Qaeda." (26).

The potential for an infusion of radical jihadist ideology had been present from the very beginning since a number of Al Shabaab’s founding members were Somalis who had trained and fought in Afghanistan. These include Mukhtar Abu Zubair, who is now Al Shabaab’s overall leader and others who returned to lead the jihad at home (notably the commanders Ibrahim Haji Hama al-Afghani and Abdifatah Aweys Abu Hamza and the spiritual leader Sheikh Muktar Robow Ali). Later they were followed by experienced foreign Al Qaeda operatives and fighters from the Afghan-Pakistan conflict, including several who rose to command Shabaab militias or sectors. By mid-2010 it was being reported that foreigners "now control the movement’s policy making organs" (27). These include a Kenyan military leader commander (recently captured), a Saudi manager, a Pakistani adviser, a Sudanese recruiter, and a charismatic American commander, propagandist and recruiter (whose nickname is Al-Amriki). This foreign "takeover" was the prelude to the 2010 bombings in Kampala. (28)

By this time Al Shabaab was incensed by the ability of AU (African Union) troops from from Uganda and Burundi to protect the TFG in Mogadishu. To punish Uganda its leaders ordered the two suicide bombings in Kampala in July of that year, which killed more than 70 people. For Ugandans these bombings were especially horrific because the targets were civilians, who had gathered in public places to watch final of the World Cup soccer match. This was Al Shabaab’s first act of terrorism outside Somalia–and they were eager to take credit for it. Since then there have been a series of cross-border attacks that, from the Kenyan point of view, should be looked upon as acts of terrorism. (29)

Terrorist attacks inside Somalia have increased (it seems) over the last three months–both before and after the Kenyans crossed the border. On October 4 a suicide bombers targeted Somali students in Mogadishu, who were waiting to learn if they had been selected for scholarships being offered by the Turkish government. More than 100 people were killed and many others wounded. Since the Kenyan incursion a series of bombings in Mogadishu, including a October 18 suicide car bombing that resulted in 15 fatalities. To send a message to the Kenyan government, Al Shabaab has threatened–and perpetrated–acts of terrorism in Nairobi and in a town near Kenya’s border with Somalia. It is also thought that Al Shabaab, carried out the October kidnapping of Danish workers in Puntland and the recent the assassination of a prominent scholar in Puntland. (30)

Al Shabaab is certainly a terrorist organization and its draconian rules and harsh punishments have stamped it with a reputation for brutality. Its jihadist ideology, often specifically "anti-Christian" (which covers both its anti-Ethiopian and anti-Western positions), goes far in explaining its decisions to restrict the access of humanitarian aid agencies, which has prevented many Somalis from receiving very critical assistance during a major famine. Nevertheless, it would be naive to put all the blame on Al Shabaab for the suffering of famine victims or to ignore human rights abuses committed by other contributors (TFG forces, other Somali militias, even the AMISON peacekeepers) to the chaos and violence in Somalia. Another caveat to keep in mind is the variability within Al Shabaab–the contrast between its hard-core and its more pragmatic members. (31)

That said, in many respects the values of Shabaab militants are at odds with those of Somali culture and its more tolerant brand of Islam.

Al Shabaab, Somali Culture, and the Sufis

Al Shabaab is a "youth-oriented" organization focused on fighting. It proscribes nearly every form of leisure activity that young people elsewhere enjoy: no singing, dancing, listening to music, or watching TV–no board games or video games–no "modern" entertainment of any kind. But this austere code is not just a response to what is perceived as Western decadence. Its prohibitions are so far-reaching that from a more traditional Somali point of view it constitutes an assault on their traditional culture and values. Indeed, Somalis look upon Islam and poetry as the "twin pillars" of their culture. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that the edicts of Al Shabaab are an "anathema to Somali culture" (32).

Somali culture is deeply rooted in the dry lands traversed by generations of nomadic pastoralists, whose greatest artistic achievement may be their oral poetry (see RESOURCES). Virtually all Somalis revere their cultural legacy of poetry, song, and dance. That Somalis enjoy singing and and dancing is obvious from videos posted on YouTube (see RESOURCES), but radical Islamists, most prominently the Shabaab, have inflicted public lashings on men and women, whose "only crime was singing and dancing in a traditional folklore event" (33). After banning music on music on radio stations in areas under their control because it was "un-Islamic," they sought to extend the ban through intimidation. Now that Al-Shabaab has been expelled from Mogadishu, people there can once again dance in the streets–as they did during the visit earlier this month of UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon. He was greeted in the streets by "traditional dancers with spears and white gowns" (34).

Moreover, the authoritarianism of the Shabaab is at odds with the Somali segmentary clan system. Though clan politics is infamously contentious–in the manner in which it operates in "modern" contexts--it once had mechanisms for reaching consensus among a set elders, who represented whatever segments were relevant to settling a particular conflict. Clan elders simply do not like being told what they may or may not do, nor do they welcome interference with locally accepted religious practices. From their point of view, as guardians of custom and customary law, they ought to be the ones deciding what is acceptable or unacceptable behavior. It is also widely recognized among Somali critics of Al Shabaab that Shabaab edicts were designed to keep their critics at bay–since dissent, in what is still an emphatically oral society, is often expressed in poems and songs. In traditional venues poetry is integrated into clan dynamics. The only songs acceptable to Al Shabaab are "Islamic songs" (nasheed) that uphold their religious ideology. (35)

Those who had to cope with Al Shabaab’s rules soon discovered that the Shabaab version of Islam was different from their own, which was moderate and much-influenced by Sufism. By late 2008 Al Shabaab had set up Islamic administrations (such those in Juba and Lower Shabelle), called governorates, which were semi-autonomous and modeled after those of the early Islamic period. The governorates were responsible for "missionizing and education, security and morality policing, courts, and the treasury" (36). Above all they were charged with imposing a strict, "Wahabist" version of sharia, meting out harsh punishments (beating, amputating, stoning) to those who failed to comply. Al Shabaab would not even allow people to celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammed. A majority of Somalis look upon this Wahabist Islam as intrusive–because it feels "foreign" (even if they might not know that Wahabism originated in Saudi Arabia). But the Sufis are "part of us" because "they grew up here" (as one elder told report Jeffrey Gettleman). In some localities, however, pragmatic Shabaab administrators stopped short of enforcing sharia in its most extreme form, since doing so would only further alienate those it was trying to win over. (37).

Wherever Al Shabaab was active, its members sought to attract adherents to its religious message ("missionizing")–only to discover that Sufi leaders and their young followers were mostly repulsed by it. Early on, when nationalist sentiment had been an overriding concern, young men had flocked to Shabaab militias. Other supporters looked upon the Shabaab as an alternative to local warlords. But as Shabaab spiritual leaders began to act more aggressively towards their Sufi rivals, the Sufi responded more directly. To counter the Shabaab’s nationalist appeal the Sufis could make a strong counter-argument: the Islam of Al Shabaab was so infused with "foreign" notions that Somalis could legitimately resist its imposition–and thus young men were under no religious obligation to join Shabaab militias. If young men did not willing join Al Shabaab, the group turned to coercive tactics. Of course, this only served to increase the antagonism between Al Shabaab and the general population. 

After the Shabaab began desecrating and destroying Sufi shrines (typically, the tombs of local "saints"), beheading Sufi clerics, and stoning "sinners," many Sufi leaders decided it was time to defend themselves and their communities. In the past, the Sufis had tried to stay out of the political fray, maintaining their "reputation for being peaceful" but they were propelled into action. Sufi militias, usually composed of fighters from three of the four major clans, would be able to operate in many localities (unlike the clan-based militias of the warlords or those which tend to align with either Al Shabaab or Hizb ul-Islam). (38)

In January 2009, when Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed became president of the TFG, he was supported by Sufi clerics, who expected this moderate Islamist would work make a good faith effort to establish a unity government. By this time, however, many Sufis had joined a Sufi-led organization called Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’a (ASWJ), which was already fighting Al Shabaab. President Sheikh Sharif had tried to bring Al Shabaab on board but his appeals were rejected because its leaders the TFG was backed by Western stakeholders (notably, the US). Al Shabaab was also reacting to the fact that Ahlu Sunna’s agreement with the TFG had been brokered in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). All of this set the stage for "the possibility of a wider sectarian war between adherents of the Sufi order and the powerful al-Shabab" (39). When Al Shabaab went on the offensive against the TFG and militias aligned with it, Ahlu Sunna’s militias held onto the spaces they created for themselves in parts of central Somalia–while government troops were losing ground on every front. In September of 2010, however, Ahlu Sunna had a falling out with the TFG–over power-sharing agreement issues and a dispute between the TFG president and prime minister. But Ahlu Sunna vowed "to continue fighting against the al-Shabab and Hizb ul-Islam to keep our controlled areas peaceful" (40).

A Shabaab offensive, beginning in May 2010, damaged Ahlu Sunna positions as well as those of the TFG. But in strongholds along the western border the Sufis held their ground (see MAP) and they would be prepared to advance when given the opportunity. By this time Al Shabaab had to contend with "the steady erosion of its popularity and credibility," which can be attributed to its "attempt to forcefully homogenise Islam and zealously enforce a harsh interpretation of Sharia" (41). In August 2011, as Shabaab fighters retreated into the countryside, they clashed with Sufi militias in some areas. More recently, partly as a result of the Kenyan and Ethiopian incursions, Ahlu Sunna forces have been gaining territory at the expense of the Shabaab and there are signs that Ahlu Sunna would like to create an autonomous administration in parts of central/southern Somalia. If this happens, such an administration would serve as a buffer between the TFG and Ethiopia-and it would probably be backed, equipped, and trained by Ethiopia. (42)

How the Shabaab Became Weak   

For the past year or so there had been signs that Al Shabaab was losing ground ideologically (if not, yet, territorially) as Somalis became disillusioned with how it was organizing affairs in its governorates. If "Al-Shabaab was reeling even before Kenya’s invasion, having steadily lost the support of the population in areas it controlled," then we might wonder just how this came about (43). How did the Shabaab become so disliked that two of Somalia’s neighbors–Kenya and Ethiopia–would risk sending troops to "liberate" them?

After the Ethiopians withdrew (January 2009) Al Shabaab had kept up its insurgency against the weak TFG. Shabaab militants continued using methods such as suicide bombings, which many people thought were no longer justified, and this elicited a strong backlash (*). Al Shabaab’s authoritarianism and brutality went against the grain of clan-based and Sufi-infused Somali traditional values. Here and there clan elders began to challenge Shabaab ideology and as a result clan militias emerged to challenge its grip in rural areas. When Shabaab fighters tried to expand in central Somalia, they were stopped in some places by local militias. So by early 2010 Al Shabaab was fending off adversaries on several fronts–Ahlu Sunna and clan militias, TFG forces and AMISOM in Mogadishu–forcing it to spread its resources and fighters too thinly over a large territory (see Harnisch MAP). For a while it had the upperhand (permitting the May 2010 offensive mentioned above) but with less support in central Somalia it focused on Mogadishu and its suburbs and on strongholds in the Juba and Shabelle valleys of the south. (44).

In 2010 the US decided to fund the TFG--so it could pay its staff and its troops–and the TFG position in Mogadishu finally began to improve. The US also assumed most of the cost of training and supplying the AMISOM peackeeping troops in Mogadishu. President Barack Obama also took steps to disrupt Al Shabaab sources of external funding. As a result, during the early part of 2011 Shabaab fighters began going over to the government at a rate surpassing the flow in the opposite direction. These defections included some Shabaab commanders. After more AU (African Union) troops arrived in May to shore up the AMISOM mission, the TFG was able to increase its operating capacity in the capital. And in June, Al Shabaab took a hit when an infamous international terrorist (Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, alleged to have planned the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam) was shot and killed at a government checkpoint. After hiding out in Somalia for years, he had put himself under Al Shabaab’s protection, but he became a casualty of the conflict. (45)

In August, at last, Al Shabaab was shooed from Mogadishu and security there improved dramatically (though it remained a dangerous city): displaced people left for their homes in the countryside–while those who had fled the city returned; families could visit the beaches on Friday; and Somalis living in the diaspora came back to visit the families they had left behind. In general, an atmosphere of optimism prevailed in Mogadishu--but it was an interlude, disrupted by acts of terrorism. (46)

It can be argued that Al Shabaab was undermined by its own extremism. Its leaders managed to alienate the Somalis that they needed to provide cover and to fight on their behalf. Once they had been chased from Mogadishu, forming smaller cells or militias in the countryside, they gained some flexibility but at a cost. When a radical movement feels boxed in, it will often fracture along ideological lines (as its various factions seek to escape the box). As an organization Al Shabaab had never been monolithic or tightly hierarchical. When its leaders scattered, its fractures grew. The major fault line now runs between those who put nationalistic goals front-and-center and those more inclined towards a global jihadist agenda. Over the years those with the jihadist outlook had moved closer to AQAP and they had been involved in schemes to recruit Somalis living abroad, especially young men from the US. This strategy had unintended consequences: it pushed the US into taking a much harder look at Al Shabaab’s activities in Somalia and eastern Africa, which prompted the US into redoubling its efforts to shore up the TFG (47). Thus, some of the more Somali-centric Shabaab leaders are probably blaming their jihadist brothers for their current predicament and there may be factions willing to negotiate with the TFG, as Jerry Rawlings seems to think (48).

SUMMARY OF FACTORS ERODING SUPPORT FOR AL SHABAAB

• a wide gulf between Al Shabaab religious ideology and the deep cultural tradition of the Somali people
• Al Shabaab’s aversion to indigenous Islamic traditions, particularly those of the Sufis (manifest as attacks on Sufi leaders, shrines, and tombs) 
• cruelty of Shabaab punishments for religious infractions but also for political dissent
• suicide bombings in Mogadishu and other towns--that filled people with horror and disgust
  the coercion of young men into Shabaab militias
• recruitment of young Somalis from the diaspora, a tactic that many local Somalis see as unfair; it has also eroded sources of remittance from diaspora and provoked the US to take strong measures to prevent funds from reaching Al Shabaab (49)
• kidnappings of businessmen (for extortion) and attacks on tourists and aid workers–looked upon as acts of terrorism–for which the Shabaab are blamed though sometimes the work of ordinary criminals and thugs (50)
• Al Shabaab’s interference with famine relief efforts, mistreatment of famine refugees, and recent banning of 16 UN and Western humanitarian aid agencies (their centers closed and looted)

The famine has eroded much of the local support that had allowed the Shabaab to set up their administrations.  For example, a boy was killed for carrying a bag of food that had been given to him by "the infidel."  Al Shabaab’s blocking of humanitarian aid has been uneven: while denying access to the to World Food Programme, its leaders did allow the International Committee of Red Cross into areas under its control. In mid-December it banned UNICEF and other UN agencies, accusing them of using appeals for famine relief to raise money for other purposes. Al Shabaab justified its banning of church-affiliated groups by alleging that they were trying to convert hungry Somali children. Though famine conditions have eased somewhat, many people are still at risk and the internally displaced need medical attention and food. (51)

In early August, when the famine was still spreading, Rashid Abdi of the International Crisis Group thought that the "momentum is now with the people [among Al Shabaab] who are saying let the aid agencies come in because of the gravity of the situation. The clan elders are also putting on a lot of pressure, saying we cannot let our people die, if you continue on this crazy path we will rise up against you" (52). Four months later, Al Shabaab was still putting ideology ahead of the needs of the hungry and the sick. The banning of aid agencies may actually reflect a hardening of the resolve of its hard-core ideologues, a further radicalization under intense pressure from those who are determined to oust them from their strongholds.

In the end it may be Al Shabaab’s cold-heartedness in the midst of such great need that will tip the balance against them. No doubt the Kenyans expected that the presence of their troops would be tolerated. In fact, they now claim that local Somalis are providing with intelligence as they continue to hunt down Shabaab militants (53). Even more remarkable, it seems that the brutality of the Shabaab has predisposed some Somalis along the border to tolerate a limited Ethiopian presence (as long as they do not stay too long). On learning of the Shabaab’s banning orders, the Office of President Shekh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed released a statement, quoting the President: "We call on all Somalis and the International Community to take a unified position in irradiating this irrational terror organization bent on destroying the lives of millions of innocent Somalis" (54).

Right now Al Shabaab is coming under attack from the west and the south–by Kenyan and Ethiopian troops--but also by TFG forces and Ahlu Sunna’s militias. Now that the rains have stopped, the turf is drying and the Kenyans say their army is ready to roll. While the Kenyans still have their sights on Kismayo, the Kenyan Defence Minister has emphasized that after they take this strategic port, they will pacify it and hand it over to the TFG. It has also been reported that one of Al Shabaab’s top commanders has defected and is being interrogated by the Kenya Defence Forces. And last week Ahlu Sunna announced that it was launching new offensives--to reach its goal of "rooting out Al Shabaab fighters from the entire central Somali regions" by New Year’s Day, 2012. It seems that efforts to shoo the Shabaab may be reaching a critical point. (55)

In the meantime, the Shabaab are fighting back as best they can. It would be a mistake to underestimate what they can do–since they are not only determined but now fighting for their survival. They are still capable of staging guerilla terrorist attacks. Their latest tactic is using Twitter in a propaganda offensive, tweeting in English for an international audience. This development is of great concern to the US government, as these tweets could enhance Shabaab efforts to attract more young Somali-Americans to their cause. For that reason the US State Department is looking into legal steps it might take to shut down Al Shabaab’s Twitter account. So shoo-shoo Al Shabaab is becoming shush-shush. (56).

What will be the outcome of the current offensives? Will Al Shabaab’s grip on local communities be too damaged for it to continue as a viable political force? Will one or more buffer polities emerge, aligned with the TFG but tied to external patrons (mostly likely Kenya or Ethiopia)? Only time will tell. Most experts keep repeating that no military solution that can transform Somalia because what is needed is a political solution. True enough. But it is also true that the prerequisite for a political solution is "real reconciliation between clan factions" (57). In my opinion the way forward requires a sustained effort to shoo Al Shabaab. When that happens, I’ll say: Good riddance!

ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCE the topic of Al Shabaab and ongoing efforts to shoo it from Somalia’s political landscape by asking students to IMAGINE waking up one day to discover that nearly all forms of entertainment are now banned (poof–just gone from the scene):

• no more music on the radio
• no singing–unless the song’s lyrics are an approved religious text
• no dancing anywhere
• no movies or TV
• no video or board games
• no digital or video recording of any event (wedding, graduation)
• no birthday parties--not even for the Prophet Muhammed!

ASK: How would your lives change? What would you do? How would your parents respond?

EXPLAIN: This really happened in those parts of Somalia where a radical Islamist group, Al Shabaab, took control and formed its own local governments. They imposed a super-strict form of sharia (Islamic law) and punished people severely (beatings, lashings) for doing anything that Al Shabaab considered un-Islamic. ASK: How do you think people in Somalia, especially young people, responded when Al Shabaab banned music and dancing? EXPLAIN that "Al Shabaab" means "the youth" (though many members were young adults and its leaders might be men in their 30s or even 40s). DISCUSS (briefly) some reasons why young people might be looking for religious answers–when life is so difficult these days in Somalia.

EXPLAIN that oral poetry, songs, and dance are very important in "traditional" Somali culture (for background, draw on articles in RESOURCES), not just "youth" culture. Like rap and hip-hop, Somali songs can carry social and political messages (serious stuff). Then SHOW videos of Somali dancing (begin with the more traditional, move on to more contemporary music and dancing).

ASK: How could such a radical group–with such strict rules–manage to control so much territory (large portions of central and southern Somalia)? EXPLAIN that the context is the political chaos in much of Somalia since a coup in 1991–twenty years ago! This coup brought an end to the government of President Siad Barre (who fled from Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia). In the months leading up to this coup, there were many popular songs critical of the government and accusing President Barre–and his political pals–of corruption.

READ/ANALYZE: Distribute copies of "What Is Somalia’s Al Shabab?" and ASK: What misconceptions about Al Shabaab is the author (Scott Baldauf) trying to correct? Is he convincing? Where is he getting his information? Encourage students to click on the links to find out more and to evaluate Baldauf’s sources. COMPARE his information with that posted as "Al-Shabaab" by the US government on the National Counterterrorism Center website. EXPAND the discussion with recent news articles or video clips.

GLOBAL STUDIES or WORLD HISTORY CLASS: Connect events in Somalia with the varieties of Islam that have developed over time as Islam penetrated different social and cultural settings. The Somali case provides an opportunity to discuss Sufism and why followers of stricter versions of Islam so dislike the Sufis. SHOW the Gettleman video or slideshow from 2009 and, if time permits, read the related article. EXPLAIN that Ahlu Sunna militias are now taking part in the effort to shoo the Shabaab, and they’ve been gaining ground (apparently) in central Somalia.

READ/DISCUSS the articles about Al Shabaab’s use of Twitter to spread its message and demoralize the Kenya forces now operating in parts of southern Somalia (see RESOURCES). Do you think this "Battle of the Tweets" will be effective? Are the Shabaab being hypocrites when they use Twitter and the Internet? Would it be OK for the US government to shutdown their Twitter account?

WRITE: As a writing project assign FAQ sheets on topics related to Somalia (its culture, politics, history, pastoralism, resources, famines past and present, Sufi orders). If students create these as "web-ready’ copy (highly desirable) require embedded links to their sources just as Baldauf did for his Q & A about Al Shabaab.


RESOURCES

MAP: "Somalia: A Country Broken into Pieces." New York Times (9 September 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/10/world/africa/20110910-somalia-a-country-broken-into-pieces.html?ref=somalia

• News reports suggest that the area controlled by Ahlu Sunna has increased considerably since the mid-October Kenyan incursion

MAP: "Political Map of Somalia." In Christopher Harnish, page 6 of PDF of report (see below): http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf

• Shows areas under Islamist control in early 2010 (for comparison)

TIMELINE: "Key Events in Somalia’s Violent History." AlertNet (14 July 2011): http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/key-events-in-somalias-violent-history

TIMELINE: "Somalia Profile: A Chronology of Key Events." BBC News (20 December 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632

"History & Geography." Part of the "Somali" page of Becoming Minnesotan on the Minnesota Historical Society website: http://education.mnhs.org/immigration/communities/Somali 

• Very readable, concise account for students–the place to begin their adventure in "Somali studies"

Background and Analysis: Al Shabaab and Terrorism
   
"Al-Shabaab." National Counterterroism Center (U.S. Government): http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html

• Short and to the point in its presentation of the US government’s appraisal of Al Shabaab; use with the Baldauf fact-sheet [next item]

Baldauf, Scott. "What Is Somalia’s Al Shabab?" "Christian Science Monitor (26 October 2011): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/1026/What-is-Somalia-s-Al-Shabab/Is-Al-Shabab-really-affiliated-with-Al-Qaeda

Hanson, Stephanie. "Al-Shabaab." Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011): http://ww.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650

Harnisch, Christopher. "The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab." A report by the Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute. Critical Threats (12 February 2011): www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/terror-threat-somalia-internationalization-al-shabaab-feb-12-2010

• Scroll down to access full report (70 pages) OR go directly to PDF at http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf
• Granted, the AEI represents folks with a POV that warrants a cautious approach; but this is a detailed report, with much solid information (backed up by 431 footnotes, many with links to online international and Somali media resources)

Gettleman, Jeffrey. "For Somalia, Chaos Breeds Religious War." New York Times (24 May 2009): http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/world/africa/24somalia.html?scp=1&sq=somalia%20chaos%20breeds%20religious%20war&st=cse

• Link to VIDEO: "Somalia’s Sufis Fight the Shabab" (4:04 mins.)
• Link to SLIDESHOW: "Islamist Versus Islamist" (11 slides) or go to http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2009/05/23/world/somalia2_index.html

"Somalia’s Divided Islamists." International Crisis Group (18 May 2010): http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B074-somalias-divided-islamists.aspx

Mutiga, Murithi. "Al Qaeda Veterans Now Run Al Shabaab Militia," The East African (20 July 2010): http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Al%20Qaeda%20veterans%20now%20run%20Al%20Shabaab%20militia/-/2558/964388/-/2j92g1/-/index.html

• Draws on unspecified intelligence reports, a UN report, and International Crisis Group research

Bruton, Bronwyn E. Interviewed by Deborah Jerome. "Disengaging from Somalia." Council on Foreign Relations (10 March 2010): http://www.cfr.org/somalia/disengaging-somalia/p21619

Cohn, Julie. "Terrorism Havens: Somalia." Council on Foreign Relations (Updated June 2011): http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366

Axe, David. "Power Struggle Threatens Outsourced Somalia War." Wired (16 June 2011): http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/power-struggle-threatens-u-s-outsourced-somalia-war/

Scahill, Jeremy. "The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia." The Nation (12 July 2011): http://www.thenation.com/print/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia

Bennett, Ben. "Al Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, U.S. Says." Los Angeles Times (18 July 2011): http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-20110718

Abdi, Rashid. Interview with Jayshree Bajoria. "Al-Shabaab and Somalia’s Spreading Famine." Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011): http://www.cfr.org/somalia/a-shabaab-somalias-spreading-famine/p25630

Jellis, Aurora. "Doctors with Guns." Al Masry Al Youm (26 November 2011): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/519706

• Without mentioning Al Shabaab, this article mentions incidents attributed to its members

Other Topics (by author)

Harding, Andrew. "Welcome to Tough, Unpredictable Mogadishu." BBC News (2 August 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14369252

"Somali Profile: President Shekh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed." BBC News (4 October 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094548?print=true

Hassan, Mohamed Olad. "A Profile of Ahlu Sunna Waljamca (ASWJ)." Somalia Report (24 January 2011): http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/67/A_Profile_of_Ahlu_Sunna_Waljamaca_ASWJ_
　

Recent News and Opinion (August-December 2011)

Pflanz, Mike. "Somalia’s Islamists Appear Divided on Blocking Famine Aid." Christian Science Monitor (3 August 2011): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0803/Somalia-s-Islamists-appear-divided-on-blocking-famine-aid
  
Fleishman, Jeffrey and Lutfi Sheriff Mohammed. "Somalia Shabaab Militants Retreat from Mogadishu." Los Angeles Times (6 August 2011): http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/06/world/la-fg-somalia-militants-20110807

Thurston, Alex. "Al Shabaab Not the Only Guilty Part in Somalia’s Famine, Violence." Christian Science Monitor (15 August 2011): ttp://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/403356

Gettleman, Jeffrey. "As an Enemy Retreats, Clans Carve Up Somalia." New York Times (9 September 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/world/africa/10somalia.html?pagewanted=all

Myers, Seth. "Kenya’s Somali Gamble Could Backfire." BusinessDay [South Africa] (15 November 2011): http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=158674

Gettleman, Jeffrey. "African Union Considers Sending Ethiopian troops to Somalia." New York Times (17 November 2011):

Baldauf, Scott and Muchiri Kioi. "Kenya’s Somalia Operation Hits at Humanitarian Aid." Christian Science Monitor (22 November 2011): http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2011/1122/Kenya-s-Somalia-operation-hits-at-humanitarian-aid

Whitlock, Craig. "U.S. Intensifies Its Proxy Fight Against Al-Shabab in Somalia." Washington Post (24 November 2011): http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-intensifies-its-proxy-fight-against-al-shabab-in-somalia/2011/11/21/gIQAVLyNtN_story.html

IGAD. "IGAD Communique on the Situation in Somalia and a Briefing on the Outstanding Issues of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement." Dated November 25, 2011. RCB Radio (posted 25 November 2011): http://www.raxanreeb.com/?p=120628

• Treat this document as a primary source. It lists all the participants in the summit.

Mathenge, Oliver. "Somalia: Locals Take Centre Stage in Kenya Shabaab Battle." Daily Nation (26 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111260197.html

"Somalia: New Ethiopian Troops Reach in Central Somalia." Shabelle Media Network (26 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111260188.html

Ngirachu, John. "‘"Wham–Winning Hearts and Minds in Somalia." East African (27 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111281132.html

"Local Elders’ Consultative Meeting Wraps Up in Mogadishu." Shabelle Media Network (28 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111291053.html

Ibrahim, Mohammed and Jeffrey Gettleman. "Rebels Resume a Crackdown on Somali Aid." New York Times (28 November 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/world/africa/somali-militants-shut-down-more-aid-operations.html?ref=todayspaper

"President Asks for Support War on Al-Shabab." Shabelle Media Network (29 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111291133.html

Leftie, Peter and Abdulkadir Khalif. "Kenya: Al-Shabaab Ban on Aid Outfits Leaves 1.4 Million Somalis Starving." Daily Nation (29 November 2011): ttp://allafrica.com/stories/201111300116.html

Ibrahim, Mohamed and Jeffrey Gettleman. "In Rare Rally, Somalis Aim at Militants." New York Times (9 December 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/world/africa/in-rare-rally-somalis-protest-shabab.html

Ibrahim, Mohamed and Jeffrey Gettleman. "U.N. Chief Pays Surprise Visit to Somalia." New York Times (9 December 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/world/africa/un-chief-pays-surprise-visit-to-somalia.html?scp=1&sq=ibrahim%20un%20chief%20somalia&st=cse

Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Somalia’s Insurgents Embrace Twitter as a Weapon." New York Times (14 December 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/somalias-rebels-embrace-twitter-as-a-weapon.html

"In Port No More Shebab, But No More Business." Radio Netherlands Worldwide (16 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112161477.html

McKenzie, David. "Inside Kenya’s War with Al Shabaab." CNN (16 December 2011): http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/kenya-war/

"Somalis Call for the Arrest of Puntland Leaders as Fighting Flares in Central Town." Somaliland Press (18 December 2011); http://somalilandpress.com/somalia-somalis-call-for-the-arrest-of-puntland-leader-as-fighting-flares-in-central-town-25305

Gettleman, Jeffrey. "U.S. Considers Combating Somali Militants’ Twitter Use." New York Times (19 December 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/africa/us-considers-combating-shabab-militants-twitter-use.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=somalia%20twitter&st=cse


RESOURCES: SOMALI POETRY, MUSIC, AND DANCE

"All About Somali Songs and Music." http://somali-songs.com/

Hultman, Tamela. "Somalia: A Nation of Poets." Africa News Service [Durham] (3 January 1993): http://allafrica.com/stories/200101080500.html

• Includes famous Richard Burton quote (1854); discusses poetry in the context of the colonial resistance (esp. as led by Sayyid Muahmmad Abdille Hasan = Sayid Maxamed Cabdulle Xasan); a resource for World History classrooms

"Somalia: 20 Years of Anarchy." BBC News (25 January 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12246627

• Poet Abdirashid Omar talks about his poems--and why he’s received threats from Al Shabaab

"The Poetry of Somalia." Somali Culture: http://www.somaliculture.net/poems/index.html.
Afrax, Maxahmad Daahir. "Towards a Culture for Peace: Poetry, Drama and Music in Somali Society." Conciliation Resources: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/somalia/poetry-drama-music.php

Ahmed, Ali Jimale. "The Somali Oral Tradition and the Role of Storytelling in Somalia." Minnesota Humanities Center: http://minnesotahumanities.org/Resources/somalioraltradition.pdf

• Excellent scholarly resource; Ahmed teaches at Queens Colleg and Graduate Center of the City University of New York; see also book under "Print Resources"

"Learn How to Do Somalian Dance." eHow (retrieved 12-18-2011):
http://www.ehow.com/print/way_5437592_learn-do-somalian-dance.html

"Islamist Militants Restrict Somali Wedding Celebrations." Turkish Weekly [orig. VOA News] (20 August 2009): http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/87360/-islamist-militants-restrict-somali-wedding-celebrations.html

Wa’ays, Abdulkadir M. "32 Traditional Dancers Lashed in Public." Freemuse (18 November 2008): http://www.freemuse.org/sw30964.asp

• See related reading at endfor more information about militant Islamists’ ban on music and attacks on musicians, singers, and dancers (items dating from 2008 to end of 2011

Dance Videos

"Traditional Somali Dance."Uploaded by araweelosomaliland, 20 March 2010 (1:05 mins): 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsUDkKoStPo&feature=player_embedded#!

• Women dancing to traditional music

"Ciyaar Soomaali - Xero Daraawiish." Somali Media, Minnesota (10:13 mins.): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbgtGHHC828&feature=related

• "Darrawiish" suggests a connection with Sufi or Sufi-influenced music and dance.

"Dhaanto; Ogaden Traditional Dance." Music by Caabdi Ismaacil. Presented by Xafiiska Wafaafinta (4:56 mins):http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y9yrkXSbEpU&feature=related

• "Dhaanto is the most respected traditional dance in the somali speaking lands. its mostly used by Somali Ogaden folks."

"Soomalliyeeye." Biniam Eshete of Wadani Stars. Ethiopia: Information, Culture and Tourism Bureau (4:52 mins.):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RgkDz_gvPSA&feature=related

• Produced by the Ethiopian government "as a part of its initiative to enhance, promote, and advance the National Heritage of Somali People in Ethiopia."

"Somali Cultural Dance - Dhaanto - Somali Festival Columbus OH 2011." (5:35 mins.): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKrcIk3XKGM

• Somali Unified Youth Somali Cultural Dance - Dhaanto at The 2nd Somali Cultural Festival, Columbus OH July 1st 2011.

　

Print Resources

Ahmed, Ali Jimale. Daybreak is Near–The Politics of Emancipation in Somalia; Literature, Clans, and the Nation State. Lawrenceville, 1996.

Samatar, Said S. Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hassan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.


NOTES For URLS (if missing) see RESOURCES.

1) This group’s full name is "Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin" (Mujahideed Youth Movement). Shabab is an alternate spelling that appearing most frequently in Western media. For more information see Stephanie Hanson, "Al-Shabaab," Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011).

2) For August, Mike Pflanz, "Somalia’s Islamists Appear Divided on Blocking Famine Aid," Christian Science Monitor (3 August 2011); and Rashid Abdi (interview), "Al-Shabaab and Somalia’s Spreading Famine," Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011). More recently: "Somalia: UN Reports Three Areas in Country Have Emerged from Famine." UN News Service (18 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111190072.html; Mike Pflanz, "Somali Islamists Ban Aid Groups, Renewing Famine Concerns," Christian Science Monitor (30 November 2011); Paul Leftie and Abdulkadir Khalif. "Al-Shabaab Ban on Aid Outfits Leaves 1.4 Million Somalis Starving," Daily Nation (29 November 2011).

3) AMISOM has about 9,000 troops protecting the TFG, which now controls Mogadishu plus a few footholds outside the city. See Jeffrey Fleishman and Lutfi Sheriff Mohammed, "Somalia Shabaab Militants Retreat from Mogadishu," Los Angeles Times (6 August 2011); this article credits US drone strikes last June on Shabaab commanders. For the city prior to this retreat see Andrew Harding, "Welcome to Tough, Unpredictable Mogadishu," BBC News (2 August 2011); for an update see Mohamed Moalimu, "Hitting the Beach in Mogadishu After Islamist Withdrawal, " BBC News (26 November 2011). Last month AU and TFG forces pushed Al Shabaab out of its last Mogadishu stronghold, but militants have kept on with guerrilla-style attacks, suicide bombings, and roadside bombing, especially on the outskirts. See Josh Kron, "Somali Lawmaker Killed in Mogadishu Shooting." New York Times (9 November 2011); and "5 Dead in Suicide Bombing in Mogadishu." VOA News (30 November 2011).

4) Scott Baldauf and Muchiri Kioi, "Kenya’s Somalia Operation Hits at Humanitarian Aid," Christian Science Monitor (22 November 2011); "Aid Workers Abducted from Kenyan Camp," Al Jazeera (14 October 2011). For more details on these cases search the New York Times archive or other major media web sites.

5) Christian Science Monitor (22 November 2011). For analysis of Kenyan risks/motives and diplomacy see Jeffrey Gettleman, "Kenyan Motives in Somalia Predate Recent Abductions," New York Times (27 October 2011); Robyn Dixon, "Kenya Sees Military Operation in Somalia as Necessity," Los Angeles Times (18 November 2011); and "EU Backs Kenya’s War" Standard. For an update see Oliver Mathenge, "Somalia: Locals Take Centre Stage in Kenya Shabaab Battle," Daily Nation (26 November 2011). For the Ethiopian incursion see "East Africa: Ethiopian Troops Cross into Somalia–Witnesses," Radio Netherlands Worldwide (19 November 2011); Richard Lough, "Analysis–Ethiopia Dragged Reluctantly Back into Somalia," Reuters (25 November 2011); and "New Ethiopian Troops Reach in Central Somalia," Shabelle Media Network (26 November 2011). See also Jeffrey Gettleman, "African Union Considers Sending Ethiopian Troops to Somalia," New York Times (18 November 2011).

6) For the impact on aid efforts see Scott Baldauf and Muchiri Kioi, "Kenya’s Somalia Operation Hits at Humanitarian Aid," Christian Science Monitor (22 November 2011); for Kenyan provision of food and medical assistance see John Ngirachu, "‘Wham–Winning Hearts and Minds in Somalia," East African (27 November 2011).
7) Aijaz Ahmad, "Empire Marches On," Global Policy Forum (18 January 2007): http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/152-challenges/25885.html.  For a  summary of attempts through most of 2008, see "Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State," International Crisis Group (23 December 2008): http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/147-somalia-to-move-beyond-the-failed-state.aspx.   Also consult the timelines in RESOURCES.

8) The US role in prodding Ethiopia is confirmed by a Wikileaks cable, according to Rob Prince, "Wikileaks Reveals U.S. Twisted Ethiopia’s Arm to Invade Somalia," Global Policy Forum (8 December 2010): http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/184-ethiopia/49637-wikileaks-reveals-us-twisted-ethiopias-arm-to-invade-somalia.html. It has also been alleged that the Djibouti government and a faction of Somali warlords were among those backing the invasion (see Ahmad in note 7).

9) Bronwyn E. Bruton (Interviewed by Deborah Jerome), "Disengaging from Somalia." Council on Foreign Relations (10 March 2010); Scott Baldauf, "What Is Somalia’s Al Shabab?" "Christian Science Monitor (26 October 2011). Though Al Shabaab and Hizb ul-Islam joined forces, they retained separate identities in and on-again, off-again "alliance."

10) While most Somalis see Ethiopia as a Christian country ( because over the centuries Christians have dominated its ruling class), nearly 40% of the population is Muslim. There are ethnic Somalis in the Somali Regional State (one of several states in Ethiopia’s federal system) and the Oromo, the country’s largest ethnic group, are predominantly Muslim.

11) David Axe, "Power Struggle Threatens Outsourced Somalia War," Wired (16 June 2011); and Scott Baldauf, "What Is Somalia’s Al Shabab?" Christian Science Monitor (26 October 2011). Baldauf stresses that Al Shabaab does NOT benefit directly from piracy: most of the pirate havens outside its control–and its leaders view piracy as unIslamic.

12) See "AU Envoy Urges Negotiations with Somalia Rebels," RBC Radio/Reuters (24 November 2011). Ethiopia risks further arouse the antipathy of its own ethnic Somalis, especially members of the Ogaden clan.

13) This very apparent from in reading articles, opinion, and comments by Somalis across a broad range of points of view, as accessed on various websites.

14) Jeffrey Gettleman, "African Union Considers Sending Ethiopian troops to Somalia." New York Times (17 November 2011):  ...  Lough, Richard. "Analysis–Ethiopia Dragged Reluctantly Back into Somalia." Reuters (25 November 2011): http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/25/uk-kenya-somalia-idUKTRE7AO0GW20111125

15) Josh Kron, "Djoubti Adds 850 Soldiers to Peacekeeping Force in Somalia." New York Times (November 2/3, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/world/africa/djiboutis-soldiers-to-join-peacekeepers-in-somalia.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=somalia&st=cse

16) Jeffrey Gettleman, "Kenyan Motives in Somalia Predate Recent Abductions." New York Times (27 October 2011). For an Ethiopian perspective see "Somalis View Ethiopian Incursion with Scepticism, US Expresses," Ezega (26 November 2011).

17) South Sudan was welcomed as IGAD’s newest member. Eritrea, a suspended member, did not attend the summit and was castigated for its alleged funding and arming of Al Shabaab.

18) See the IGAD document, "IGAD Communique on the Situation in Somalia and a Briefing on the Outstanding Issues of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement," dated November 25, 2001, posted on RCB Radio (http://www.raxanreeb.com/?p=120628). Roseleen Nzioka, "IGAD Supports Kenya’s Incursion into Somalia, Condemns Eritrea," The Standard Online (25 November 2011): http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000047277&cid=4&ttl=US%20Senator%20asks%20US%20and%20NATO%20to%20support%20Kenya's%20Somalia%20incursion. Richard Lough, "Analysis–Ethiopia Dragged Reluctantly Back into Somalia." Reuters (25 November 2011). From a geopolitical perspective it is clear that regional/international "stakeholders" are eager to see greater stability in Somalia–which would make it easier to exploit Somalia’s resources, especially oil and gas; see Salma Abdikarim, "Repartition of Somalia," Sunatimes (25 November 2011): http://sunatimes.com/view.php?id=1515.

19) "President Asks for Support War on Al-Shabab." Shabelle Media Network (29 November 2011). "UN-Consultative Meeting Ends in Modadishu." Mareeg (29 November 2011):
http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=22008&tirsan=3

20) "Local Elders’ Consultative Meeting Wraps Up in Mogadishu." Shabelle Media Network (28 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111291053.html.

21) Aijaz Ahmad, "Empire Marches On," Global Policy Forum (18 January 2007): http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/152-challenges/25885.html.  Ahmad points to examples of Ethiopian/Somali cooperation to promote constructive regional development.   I intend to write about Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug in another post. The extreme southwest along the Kenyan border was part of British East Africa [Kenya] until 1925 and one Somali faction aspires to creating entity called "Azania" in this sector.

22) Jeffrey Gettleman, "As an Enemy Retreats, Clans Carve Up Somalia." New York Times (9 September 2011).

23) Stephanie Hanson, "Al-Shabaab," Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011). For details see the PDF of Christopher Harnish, "The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab" (A report by the Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute.), Critical Threats (12 February 2011).

24) Bronwyn E. Bruton,(Interviewed by Deborah Jerome), "Disengaging from Somalia." Council on Foreign Relations (10 March 2010).
25) The degree to which Shabaab is infused with terrorist/jihadist ideology is a matter of some controversy–while the US government has viewed terrorism in the Horn/East Africa as an increasingly serious matter. For analysis supportive of US counterterrorism see the PDF of Christopher Harnisch, "The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab," Critical Threats (12 February 2011). For informative but critical analysis see Jeremy Scahill, "The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia." The Nation (12 July 2011) and David Axe, "Power Struggle Threatens Outsourced Somalia War," Wired (16 June 2011): http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/power-struggle-threatens-u-s-outsourced-somalia-war/. Bruton is also less convinced (see note 24) about the credibility of Al Shabaab’s contact with Al Qaeda central (Bin Laden’s HQ); see also Scott Baldauf, "What Is Somalia’s Al Shabab?" "Christian Science Monitor (26 October 2011). Ben Bennett, "Al Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, U.S. Says," Los Angeles Times (18 July 2011). The Bush administration, using its war on terror lense, emphasized Shabaab ties to Al Qaeda, but vigorous counterrorism efforts in the region continue under President Obama. In 2010 John Brennan listed "Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia" as a set (twice) in "Remarks by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan at CSIS." White House press release: Office of the Press Secretary (26 May 2010): http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi. From what I’ve read, I’d advise paying attention to the time-frame of any analysis, taking into account how Shabaab ideology has changed over time (so that what is being asserted may not reflect the current situation)--in addition to the author’s point of view. For these changes see esp. Stephanie Hanson, "Al-Shabaab," Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011).

26) "Al-Shabaab." National Counterterroism Center (U.S. Government): http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html. Julie Cohn, "Terrorism Havens: Somalia," Council on Foreign Relations (Updated June 2011). Seth Myers, "Kenya’s Somali Gamble Could Backfire," BusinessDay [South Africa] (15 November 2011): http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=158674. For details consult PDF of Christopher Harnisch report (see note 25). A TFG press release condemning Al Shabaab’s bannign of 16 relief agencies refers to "Al-Shabab/Al-Qaeda" (see note 54). Kenyan media also describe Al Shabaab as "the Al Qaeda-linked terror group."

27) For names listed see PDF of Christopher Harnisch report (see note 25), page 4. Quote from Murithi Mutiga, "Al Qaeda Veterans Now Run Al Shabaab Militia," The East African (20 July 2010). The affiliation of senior leaders with Al Qaeda is noted in "Al-Shabaab," National Counterterroism Center (U.S. Government).

28) Al Shabaab’s acceptance of foreign fighters makes it less "home-grown" that its rival (sometimes ally) Hizbul-Islam, as explained in "Behind Somalia’s Islamist Rivalry," BBC News (1 October 2010). Another leader with experience in Afghanistan, Aden Hashi Ayro, active when what became Al Shabaab was operating as the ICU youth wing, was allegedly killed in 2009 by a US air strike. For in-depth analysis see PDF of Christopher Harnisch report (see note 25). I plan to include the Al-Amriki saga in an upcoming post, but see the fascinating account by Andrea Elliott, Andrea, "The Jihadist next Door." New York Times Magazine (31 January 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/ 31Jihadist-t.html. He is of Arab descent, married to an American woman.

29) "‘Somali link’ as 74 World Cup Fans Die in Uganda Blasts." BBC News (12 July 2010):
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10593771; includes video and map, links to photos and an eyewitness acount. David Smith, "Kampala Bomb Attack Heightens Fear of Expanding Islamist Violence in East Africa," The Guardian (17 July 2010): http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/18/shabab-qaida-uganda-somalia

30) "Car Bomb Attack in the Somali Capital Kills 15, Injuries 20 Others." Mareeg (18 October 2011): http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=21472&tirsan=3.  International Crisis Group,  Crisis Watch No. 99 (01 November 2011): http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia.aspx (printed from main page, 1 December 2011). Jeffrey Gettleman, "Fatal Attacks Tied to Raid by Kenya." New York Times (24 November):
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/world/africa/fatal-attacks-in-kenya-tied-to-incursion-into-somalia.html?ref=todayspaper. "Bombs Kill Seven in Mogadishu," Business Recorder/Reuters (30 November 2011): http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/single/599/172/1256448/. Josh Kron, "3 Aid Workers Kidnapped in Somalia," New York Times (25 October 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/world/africa/3-danish-refugee-council-workers-kidnapped-in-puntland-somalia.html?scp=16&sq=somalia&st=cse.  "Puntland Leader Blames Terrorist for Scholar’s Assassination." Garowe Online (5 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112060372.html

31) Alex Thurston, "Al Shabaab Not the Only Guilty Part in Somalia’s Famine, Violence," Christian Science Monitor (15 August 2011); Mike Pflanz, "Somalia’s Islamists Appear Divided on Blocking Famine Aid," Christian Science Monitor (3 August 2011). More provocatively see Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Genocidal Politics and the Somali Famine." Al Jazeera English (30 July 2011): http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/2011726135256169831.html.

32) Quoting Seth Myers, "Kenya’s Somali Gamble Could Backfire," BusinessDay [South Africa] (15 November 2011). The "twin pillars" claim is from a Somaliland website (http://visitsomaliland.com/somaliland_art_and_culture.html), but there is sufficient evidence to extend it.

33) Wa’ays, Abdulkadir M. "32 Traditional Dancers Lashed in Public." Freemuse (18 November 2008): http://www.freemuse.org/sw30964.asp

34) Mohammed Ibrahim and Jeffrey Gettleman, "U.N. Chief Pays Surprise Visit to Somalia." New York Times (9 December 2011).

35) For poetry and clan politics see Said Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism (1982). For poetry and nationalism see also Ali Jimale Ahmed, Daybreak is Near (1996).

36) Will McCants, "Shabaab in Somalia Declare Another Governorate, Hint at Caliphate," Jihadica (8 December 2008): http://www.jihadica.com/shabaab-in-somalia-declare-another-governorate-hint-at-caliphate.

37) Mohamed Olad Hassan, "A Profile of Ahlu Sunna Waljamca (ASWJ)," Somalia Report (24 January 2011). After the fall of the central government in 1991, both Salafism (strict and fundamentalist) and Wahabism (puritanical and fundamentalist) made inroads in Somalia–a development attributed to the Saudi-supported schools and mosques that could provide what other institutions could not in such difficult conditions. Jeffrey Gettleman, "For Somalia, Chaos Breeds Religious War," New York Times (24 May 2009).  For pragmatism Stephanie Hanson, Stephanie, "Al-Shabaab," Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011).

38) Jeffrey Gettleman, "For Somalia, Chaos Breeds Religious War," New York Times (24 May 2009). Coerced recruitment of clan militias, noted in "Al-Shabaab," National Counterterroism Center (U.S. Government): http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html.  For clan dynamics among tIslamists see "Behind Somalia’s Islamist Rivalry," (in note above).

39) "Sufi Clerics in Somalia Support Unity Government," VOA News (18 February 2009): http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-02-18-voa45-68811057.html. Jeffrey Gettleman, "For Somalia, Chaos Breeds Religious War," New York Times (24 May 2009). Mohamed Olad Hassan, "A Profile of Ahlu Sunna Waljamca (ASWJ)." Somalia Report (24 January 2011).

40) "Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca Withdraws Support from U.S.-Backed TFG Regime in Somalia." Pan-African News Wire/Reuters (26 September 2010): http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2010/09/ahlu-sunna-walkamaca-withdraws-support.html

41) "Somalia’s Divided Islamists." International Crisis Group (18 May 2010).

42) "Kenya Troops to Drive Deeper into Somali Rebel Territory," Gubta News Network (15 December 2011): http://www.gubta.com/2011/12/15/kenya-troops-to-drive-deeper-into-somali-rebel-territory/

43) Seth Myers, "Kenya’s Somali Gamble Could Backfire," BusinessDay [South Africa] (15 November 2011).

44) The backlash began in earnest after a a suicide bombing in Mogadishu in December 2009, according to "Somalia’s Divided Islamists." International Crisis Group (18 May 2010).

45) RE: hiding out in Somalia (sorry, lost this reference but will add when find it).

46) Mohamed Moalimu, "Hitting the Beach in Mogadishu After Islamist Withdrawal." BBC News (26 November 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-157725. His optimism seems better suited to conditions prior to October. For the atmosphere before the Shabaab withdrawal, see Andrew Harding, "Welcome to Tough, Unpredictable Mogadishu" BBC News (2 August 2011). Recent violence, reported in "Somalia: Mogadishu Is Very Dangerous City, Deadly Blasts Occur Daily," Mareeg (3 December 2011): http:// www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=22066&tirasan=3.
47) Craig Whitlock, "U.S. Intensifies Its Proxy Fight Against Al-Shabab in Somalia," Washington Post (24 November 2011). Seth Myers, "Kenya’s Somali Gamble Could Backfire," BusinessDay [South Africa] (15 November 2011). Supported by David Axe, "Power Struggle Threatens Outsourced Somalia War," Wired (16 June 2011) and "Somalia’s Divided Islamists." International Crisis Group (18 May 2010)–which refers to "the internal coup that has consolidated the influence of extremists allied for foreign jihadis." For US efforts see Jeremy Scahill, "The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia." The Nation (12 July 2011) and David Axe, "U.S. Used Destroyers, Gunships and Spy Planes in Somali Hunt," Wired (28 November 2011): http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/11/warships-gunships-spyplanes-somalia/

48) "AU Envoy Urges Negotiations with Somalia Rebels." RBC Radio/Reuters (24 November 2011): http://www.raxanreeb.com/?p=120346. See also "Jerry Rawlings Urges Politicans to Stop Bickering," Garowe Online/Star [Nairobi] (24 November 2011):
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Jerry_Rawlings_Urges_Politicians_to_Stop_Bickering.shtml
49) "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia." (Presidential Document. Executive Order 13536 of April 12, 2010. Federal Register/Volume 75, No. 72/April 15, 2010), Government Printing Office: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-8878.pdf.

50) Aurora Jellis, "Doctors with Guns." Al Masry Al Youm (26 November 2011):
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/519706

51) Andrew Harding, "Welcome to Tough, Unpredictable Mogadishu," BBC News (2 August 2011). Mohammed Ibrahim and Jeffrey Gettleman, "Rebels Resume a Crackdown on Somali Aid," New York Times (28 November 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/world/africa/somali-militants-shut-down-more-aid-operations.html?ref=todayspaper.  Peter Leftie and Abdulkadir Khalif, "Al-Shabaab Ban on Aid Outfits Leaves 1.4 Million Somalis Starving," Daily Nation (29 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111300116.html. For effects of looting and attacks on medical services see "Al Shabaab Closes Down Medical Offices in Somali Town Afgoye," Mareeg (3 December 2011): http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=22076&tirsan=3.

52) Rashid Abdi (Interview with Jayshree Bajoria), "Al-Shabaab and Somalia’s Spreading Famine." Council on Foreign Relations (10 August 2011).

53) Oliver Mathenge, "Somalia: Locals Take Centre Stage in Kenya Shabaab Battle." Daily Nation (26 November 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201111260197.html.
54) Republic of Somalia (The Presidency: Office of the Chief of Staff), press release (29 November 2011), published as "President of the Republic of Somalia Strongly Condemned the Shameful and Inhuman Act by the Terror Group Al-Shabaab." Mareeg (29 November 2011): http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=22022&tirsan=3

55) "Kenya Troops to Drive Deeper into Somali Rebel Territory." Gubta News Network (15 December 2011): http://www.gubta.com/2011/12/15/kenya-troops-to-drive-deeper-into-somali-rebel-territory/.  David McKenzie, "Inside Kenya’s War with Al Shabaab," CNN (16 December 2011): http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/15/world/africa/kenya-war.  "Ahlu Sunna Threatens Al-Shabab Militants," Shabelle Media Network (15 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112160803.html; and "Ahlu Sunna Fighters Impose Curfew a Key Town in Central Region," Shabelle Media Network (16 December 2011): http://allafrica.com/stories/201112161119.html

56) Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Somalia’s Insurgents Embrace Twitter as a Weapon." New York Times (14/15 December 2011) and "U.S. Considers Combating Somali Militants’ Twitter Use." New York Times (19 December 2011). Reported earlier by Mary Harper, "Somalia’s Al-Shabab Launches ‘Twitter War,’" BBC News (8 December 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16091751

57) Quote from Bronwyn E. Bruton (Interviewed by Deborah Jerome), "Disengaging from Somalia," Council on Foreign Relations (10 March 2010).